[MWG] = Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780195073409.
[Varian] = Varian, Hal R. Microeconomic Analysis, Third Edition. W.W Norton & Company, 1992. ISBN: 9780393957358.
[BD] = 
Bolton, Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont. Contract Theory. MIT Press, 2004. ISBN: 978026202576.
[Kreps] = Kreps, David M. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Financial Times Prentice Hall, 1990. ISBN: 9780745007625.
| SES # | TOPICS | READINGS |
|---|---|---|
| 1-2 | Decision Making Under Uncertainty |
[MWG] Chapter 6 C-D, pp. 183–199. (Review) Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. “Increasing Risk I: A Definition.” Journal of Economic Theory 2, no. 3 (1970): 225–243. Wilson, Robert. “The Theory of Syndicates.” Econometrica 36, no. 1 (1968):119–132. Kamenica, Emir, and Matthew Gentzkow. “Bayesian Persuasion.” American Economic Review 101, no. 6 (2011): 2590–2615. Class Notes: Decision Making Under Uncertainity: Experiments and Value of Information (PDF). |
| 3-6 | Moral Hazard |
[MWG] Chapter 14. [BD] 4.1–4.5, 6.2, 8.1, and 12.4.2. [Kreps] Chapter 16. [Varian] Chapter 25.4. Hart, Oliver, and Bengt Holmstrom. “The Theory of Contracts.” In Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress. Edited by Truman Fassett Bewley. Cambridge University Press, 1989. ISBN: 9780521389259. Holmstrom, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. “Multitask Principal-Agent Analysis.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 7 (1991): 24–52. Lazear Edward P., and Sherwin Rosen. “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts.” Journal of Political Economy 89 (1983): 841–64. |
| 7-9 | Adverse Selection (Screening) |
[MWG] Chapter 13 D, pp. 460–467. [BD] 2.1–2.2 and 13.1.2. [Kreps] Chapter 17.2, pp. 629–645. [Varian] Chapter 25.6-25.9, pp. 457–469. Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Michael Rothschild. “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, no. 4 (1976) 629–649. Maskin, Eric, and John Riley. “Monopoly with Incomplete Information.” The RAND Journal of Economics 15, no 2 (1984): 171–196. |
| 10-11 | Mechanism Design |
[MWG] Chapter 23 A–D, pp. 857–891. [BD] Chapter 7. [Kreps] Chapter 18, pp. 661–713. [Varian] Chapter 23, pp. 414–431. Holmstrom, Bengt. “Groves’ Scheme on Restricted Domains."Econometrica 47, no. 5 (1979): 1137–44. Myerson Roger B., and Mark A. Satterthwaite. “Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading.” Journal of Economic Theory 29 (1983): 265–81. Myerson, Roger B. “Optimal Auction Design (PDF).” Northwestern University Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Discussion Papers No. 362, 1978. |
| 12-13 | Incomplete Contracts and Renogtiation |
[BD] Chapters 10.3, 11.1, and 12.1–12.3. Hart, Oliver. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Clarendon Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780198288817. Chapters 1–4. Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart. “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.” Journal of Political Economy 94, no. 4 (1986): 691–719. |
