14.16 | Spring 2016 | Undergraduate

Strategy and Information

Syllabus

Course Meeting Times

Lectures: 2 sessions / week, 1.5 hours / session

Recitations: 1 session / week, 1 hour / session

Prerequisites

The course is proof-based and assumes that students are comfortable with discrete mathematics, optimization, topology, and probability theory. Previous exposure to economic modeling is helpful. The prerequisite for the course is a substantial economics background or a strong math background with some economics coursework.  

Grading

ACTIVITIES PERCENTAGES
Class attendance and participation 10
Five problem sets 40
In-class midterm 20
Final assignment 30

Readings

The following textbooks are useful references for various parts of the course:

Buy at MIT Press Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780262061414. [Preview with Google Books]

Buy at MIT Press Osborne, Martin J., and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994. ISBN: 9780262650403. [Preview with Google Books]

Roth, Alvin E., and Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayer. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Cambridge University Press, 1992. ISBN: 9780521437882. [Preview with Google Books]

Course Info

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As Taught In
Spring 2016
Learning Resource Types
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Lecture Notes