Below are the assigned readings for the topics covered in this course.
Textbook Readings (not required):
[FT] = Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780262061414 [Buy at MIT Press]
[MS] = George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson. Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships. Oxford University Press, 2006. ISBN: 9780195300796
Fundamental Solution Concepts
FT chapters 2, 6, and 12
Aumann, Robert J. “Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality.” Econometrica 55, no. 1 (1987): 1–18. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911154.
Aumann, Robert J. “Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974), pp. 67–96.
Bergemann, Dirk, and Stephen Morris. “Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games.” Theoretical Economics 11 (2016), pp. 487–522.
Bernheim, B. Douglas. “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior.” Econometrica (1984), pp. 1007–28.
Dekel, Eddie, Drew Fudenberg, and Stephen Morris. “Interim Correlated Rationalizability.” Theoretical Economics (2007), pp. 15–40.
Pearce, David G. “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection.” Econometrica (1984), pp. 1029–50.
Reny, Philip J. “On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games.” Econometrica 67 (1999), pp. 1029–56.
Equilibrium Refinements
FT chapters 3, 8, and 11
Fudenberg, Drew, David M. Kreps, et al. “On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements.” Journal of Economic Theory 44 (1988), pp. 354–80.
Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. “Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium.” Journal of Economic Theory (1991).
Kajii, Atsushi, and Stephen Morris. “The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information.” Econometrica (1997), pp. 1283–1309.
Kohlberg, Elon, and Jean-Francois Mertens. “On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria.” Econometrica (1986), pp. 1003–1037.
Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson. “Sequential Equilibria.” Econometrica (1982), pp. 863–94.
Myerson, Roger B. “Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept.” International Journal of Game Theory 7 (1978), pp. 73–80.
Selten, R.B. “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 4 (1975), pp. 25–55.
Signaling Games
Banks, Jeffrey S., and Joel Sobel. “Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games.” Econometrica (1987), pp. 647–61.
Cho, In-Koo, and David M Kreps. “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (1987), pp. 179–221.
Cho, In-Koo, and Joel Sobel. “Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling Games.” Journal of Economic Theory 50 (1990), pp. 381–413.
Clark, Daniel, and Drew Fudenberg. “Justified Communication Equilibrium.” American Economic Review 111 (2021), pp. 3004–3034.
Denti, Tommaso. “Costly Monitoring in Signaling Games.” Tech. rep. mimeo, 2021.
Denti, Tommaso, and Doron Ravid. “Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention.” arXiv preprint arXiv:2306.09964 (2023).
Fudenberg, Drew, and Kevin He. “Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games.” Econometrica 86 (2018), pp. 1215–55.
Cheap Talk
Ambrus, Attila, and Satoru Takahashi. “Multi-sender Cheap Talk with Restricted State Spaces.” Theoretical Economics (2008).
Aumann, Robert J., and Sergiu Hart. “Long Cheap Talk.” Econometrica 71 (2003), pp. 1619–60.
Battaglini, Marco. “Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk.” Econometrica 70 (2002), pp. 1379–1401.
Blume, Andreas, Oliver J. Board, et al. “Noisy talk.” Theoretical Economics 2 (2007), pp. 395–440.
Chakraborty, Archishman, and Rick Harbaugh. “Persuasion by Cheap Talk.” American Economic Review 100 (2010), pp. 2361–82.
Chen, Ying, Navin Kartik, et al. “Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria.” Econometrica 76 (2008), pp. 117–136.
Crawford, Vincent P., and Joel Sobel. “Strategic Information Transmission.” Econometrica 50 (1982), pp. 1431–1451.
Farrell, Joseph, and Robert Gibbons. “Cheap Talk with Two Audiences.” American Economic Review 79 (1989), pp. 1214–23.
Goltsman, Maria, et al. “Mediation, Arbitration and Negotiation.” Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009), pp. 1397–1420.
Krishna, Vijay, and John Morgan. “The Art of Conversation: Eliciting Information from Experts through Multi-stage Communication.” Journal of Economic Theory 117 (2004), pp. 147–179.
Lipnowski, Elliot, and Doron Ravid. “Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives.” Econometrica 88 (2020), pp. 1631–60.
Sobel, Joel. “Giving and Receiving Advice.” Advances in Economics and Econometrics 1 (2013), pp. 305–341.
Repeated Games
Repeated games with public monitoring: classics
MS chapters 7–11
Abreu, Dilip, Paul Milgrom, et al. “Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships.” Econometrica 59 (1991), pp. 1713–33.
Abreu, Dilip, David Pearce, et al. “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring.” Econometrica 58 (1990), pp. 1041–1063.
Fudenberg, Drew, David Levine, et al. “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information.” Econometrica 62 (1994).
Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. “Efficiency and Observability in Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players.” Journal of Economic Theory 62 (1994), pp. 103–35.
Kandori, Michihiro. “The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring.” The Review of Economic Studies 59 (1992), pp. 581–93.
Kandori, Michihiro, and Hitoshi Matsushima. “Private Observation, Communication and Collusion.” Econometrica 66 (1998), p. 627.
Kandori, Michihiro, and Ichiro Obara. “Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies.” Econometrica 74 (2006), pp. 499–519.
Repeated games with public monitoring: frequent actions, continuous time, mediation, revisions
Calvano, Emilio, et al. “Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion.” American Economic Review 110 (2020), pp. 3267–97.
Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. “Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring.” Review of Economic Dynamics 10 (2007), pp. 173–92.
Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. “Repeated Games with Frequent Signals.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (2009), pp. 233–65.
Kamada, Yuichiro, and Michihiro Kandori. “Revision Games.” Econometrica 88 (2020), pp. 1599–1630.
Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole. “Markov Perfect Equilibrium, II: Imperfectly Observable Actions”. mimeo ().
Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole. “Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions.” Journal of Economic Theory 100 (2001), 191–219.
Ortner, Juan, Takuo Sugaya, et al. “Mediated Collusion.” Journal of Political Economy 132 (2024) 1247–89.
Rahman, David. “The Power of Communication.” American Economic Review 104 (2014), pp. 3737–51.
Sannikov, Yuliy. “A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem.” The Review of Economic Studies 75 (2008), pp. 957–84.
Sannikov, Yuliy. “Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time.” Econometrica 75 (2007), pp. 1285–1329.
Sannikov, Yuliy, and Andrzej Skrzypacz. “Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production.” American Economic Review 97 (2007), pp. 1794–1823.
Sugaya, Takuo, GSB Stanford, and Alexander Wolitzky. “Performance Feedback in Long-Run Relationships: A Rate of Convergence Approach.” (2023).
Sugaya, Takuo, and Alexander Wolitzky. “Monitoring versus Discounting in Repeated Games”. Econometrica 91 (2023), pp. 1727–61.
Repeated games with private monitoring
MS chapters 12–14
Bhaskar, Venkataraman, and Ichiro Obara. “Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Private Monitoring.” Journal of Economic Theory 102 (2002), pp. 40–69.
Ely, Jeffrey C., Johannes Horner, et al. “Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games.” Econometrica 73 (2005), pp. 377–415.
Ely, Jeffrey C., and Juuso Valimaki. “A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Journal of Economic Theory 102 (2002), pp. 84–105.
Horner, Johannes, and Wojciech Olszewski. “The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring.” Econometrica 74 (2006), pp. 1499–1544.
Mailath, George J., and Stephen Morris. “Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring”. Theoretical Economics 1 (2006), pp. 311–340.
Mailath, George J., and Stephen Morris. “Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring.” Journal of Economic Theory 102 (2002), pp. 189–228.
Matsushima, Hitoshi. “Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Layers.”Econometrica 72 (2004), pp. 823–52.
Piccione, Michele. “The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring.” Journal of Economic Theory 102 (2002), pp. 70–83.
Sekiguchi, Tadashi. “Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Private Monitoring.” Journal of Economic Theory 76 (1997), pp. 345–61.
Sugaya, Takuo. “Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring.” The Review of Economic Studies 89 (2022), pp. 2201–2256.
Large-population repeated games and community enforcement
Clark, Daniel, Drew Fudenberg, et al. “Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies.” The Review of Economic Studies 88 (2021), pp. 2179–2209.
Deb, Joyee, Takuo Sugaya, et al. “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Anonymous Random Matching.” Econometrica 88 (2020), pp. 917–64.
Ellison, Glenn. “Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching.” The Review of Economic Studies 61 (1994), pp. 567–88.
Fudenberg, Drew, and Alexander Wolitzky. “Noise-Tolerant Community Enforcement and the Strength of Small Stakes” (2023).
Heller, Yuval, and Erik Mohlin. “Observations on Cooperation.” The Review of Economic Studies 85 (2017), pp. 2253–82.
Kandori, Michihiro. “Social Norms and Community Enforcement.” The Review of Economic Studies 59 (1992), pp. 63–80.
Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro, and Andrew Postlewaite. “Social Norms and Random Matching Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 9 (1995), pp. 79–109.
Sugaya, Takuo, and Alexander Wolitzky. “A Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel: An Anti-Folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information.” American Economic Review 110 (2020), pp. 3817–35.
Sugaya, Takuo, and Alexander Wolitzky. “Communication and Community Enforcement.” Journal of Political Economy 129 (2021), pp. 2595–2628.
Sugaya, Takuo, and Alexander Wolitzky. “Moral Hazard and Repeated Games with Many Agents” (2023).
Takahashi, Satoru. “Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners’ Past Play.” Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010), pp. 42–62.
Wolitzky, Alexander. “Cooperation in Large Societies.” Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Twelfth World Congress (2022, Forthcoming).
Reputation
Reputation effects in repeated games
MS chapters 15–17
Cripps, Martin W., George J. Mailath, et al. “Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations.” Econometrica 72 (2004), pp. 407–432.
Ekmekci, Mehmet, Olivier Gossner, et al. “Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations.” Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012), pp. 162–78.
Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. “Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies are Imperfectly Observed.” The Review of Economic Studies 59 (1992), pp. 561–81.
Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. “Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player.” Econometrica 57 (1989), pp. 759–78.
Gossner, Olivier. “Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation.” Econometrica 79 (2011), pp. 1627–41.
Liu, Qingmin. “Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics.” The Review of Economic Studies 78 (2011), pp. 1400–1425.
Liu, Qingmin, and Andrzej Skrzypacz. “Limited Records and Reputation Bubbles.” Journal of Economic Theory 151 (2014), pp. 2–29.
Pei, Harry. “Reputation Effects under Interdependent Values.” Econometrica 88 (2020), pp. 2175–2202.
Sorin, Sylvain. “Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information.” Games and Economic Behavior 29 (1999), pp. 274–308.
Reputation effects in markets
MS chapter 18
Board, Simon and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn. “Reputation for Quality.” Econometrica 81 (2013), pp. 2381–2462.
Deb, Joyee and Jack Fanning. “Reputation and Competitive Selection.” Tech. rep. Working Paper, 2023.
Ely, Jeffrey, Drew Fudenberg, et al. “When is Reputation Bad?” Games and Economic Behavior 63 (2008), pp. 498–526.
Ely, Jeffrey C., and Juuso Valimaki. “Bad Reputation.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (2003), pp. 785–814.
Holmstrom, Bengt. “Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective.” The Review of Economic Studies 66 (1999), pp. 169–182.
Horner, Johannes, and Nicolas S. Lambert. “Motivational Ratings” The Review of Economic Studies 88 (2021), pp. 1892–1935.
Levine, David K. “The Reputation Trap.” Econometrica 89 (2021), pp. 2659–78.
Mailath, George J., and Larry Samuelson. “Who Wants a Good Reputation?” The Review of Economic Studies 68 (2001), pp. 415–41.
Morris, Stephen. “Political Correctness.” Journal of Political Economy 109 (2001), pp. 231–65.
Pei, Harry. “Reputation Building under Observational Learning.” The Review of Economic Studies 90 (2023), pp. 1441–69.
Pei, Harry. “Reputation Effects under Short Memories” (2023).
Vong, Allen. “Certification for Consistent Quality Provision.” Tech. rep. Working Paper, 2022.
Bargaining
Bargaining with incomplete information
FT chapter 10
Admati, Anat R., and Motty Perry. “Strategic Delay in Bargaining.” The Review of Economic Studies 54 (1987), pp. 345–64.
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Peter Cramton, et al. “Bargaining with Incomplete Information.” Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications 3 (2002), pp. 1897–1945.
Ausubel, Lawrence M., and Raymond J. Deneckere. “Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly.” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1989), pp. 511–31.
Brzustowski, Thomas, Alkis Georgiadis-Harris, et al. “Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture.” American Economic Review 113 (2023), pp. 1334–59.
Daley, Brendan, and Brett Green. “Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons.” Econometrica 80 (2012), pp. 1433–1504.
Deneckere, Raymond, and Meng-Yu Liang. “Bargaining with Interdependent Values.” Econometrica 74 (2006), pp. 1309–1364.
Doval, Laura, and Vasiliki Skreta. “Optimal Mechanism for the Sale of a Durable Good.” Theoretical Economics 19 (2024), pp.865–915.
Fuchs, William, and Andrzej Skrzypacz. “Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders.” American Economic Review 100 (2010).
Fudenberg, Drew, David K. Levine, and Jean Tirole. “Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information.” Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Ed. by A. Roth. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 73–98.
Gul, Faruk, Hugo Sonnenschein, and Robert Wilson. “Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture.” Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986), pp. 155–90.
Horner, Johannes, and Nicolas Vieille. “Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons.” Econometrica 77 (2009), pp. 29–69.
Ravid, Doron. “Ultimatum Bargaining with Rational Inattention.” American Economic Review 110 (2020), pp. 2948–63.
Wolitzky, Alexander. “Unobserved-Offers Bargaining.” American Economic Review 113 (2023), pp. 136–73.
Bargaining and reputation
Abreu, Dilip, and Faruk Gul. “Bargaining and Reputation.” Econometrica 68 (2000), pp. 85–117.
Abreu, Dilip, and David Pearce. “Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts." Econometrica 75 (2007), pp. 653–710.
Fanning, Jack. “Mediation in Reputational Bargaining.” American Economic Review 111 (2021), pp. 2444–72.
Fanning, Jack. “Optimal Dynamic Mediation.” Journal of Political Economy 131 (2023), pp. 2969–3002.
Fanning, Jack. “Outside Options, Reputations, and the Partial Success of the Coase Conjecture” (2023).
Fanning, Jack. “Reputational Bargaining and Deadlines.” Econometrica 84 (2016), pp. 1131–79.
Fanning, J., Wolitzky, A. (2022). “Reputational Bargaining.” In: Karagözoğlu, E., Hyndman, K.B. (eds) Bargaining. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_3
Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson. “Reputation and Imperfect Information.” Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982), pp. 253–79.
Pei, Harry, and Maren Vairo. “Reputational Bargaining and Inefficient Technology Adoption” (2023). arXiv:2201.01827
Wolitzky. Alexander. “Reputational Bargaining with Minimal Knowledge of Rationality.” Econometrica 80 (2012), pp. 2047–87.
