Course Meeting Times
Lectures: 2 sessions/week, 1.5 hours/session
Prerequisites
14.122 Microeconomic Theory II or equivalent. Some familiarity with real analysis, probability theory, and ODE’s is assumed.
Textbooks (optional)
Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780262061414 [Buy at MIT Press]
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson. Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships. Oxford University Press, 2006. ISBN: 9780195300796
Grading
There will be approximately 4 problem sets (60% of the grade), and a take-home final exam (40% of the grade; completed over 24 hours during final exam week with some flexibility).
Students are encouraged to work in groups for the problem sets as long as each student submits an individual copy.
Course Outline
Lectures by Prof. Wolitzky
- Fundamental solution concepts and equilibrium refinements (1 week)
- Communication games: signaling and cheap talk (1 week)
- Repeated games (2 weeks)
- Reputation effects in games and markets (1 week)
- Bargaining (1 week)
- Social learning (guest lecture by Krishna Dasaratha)
Lectures by Prof. Yildiz
- Supermodular games (2 weeks)
- Global games and potential games (2 weeks)
- Type spaces and belief hierarchies (1 week)
- Non-equilibrium learning in games (2 weeks)
