Reading Schedule
NB: The numbers in [square brackets] indicate the rank-ordering in a citation count conducted using all articles from the AJPS, APSR, and LSQ since 2000 that addressed a topic in congressional politics. (For instance, the first assigned reading, by Miller and Stokes, was the 31st most-cited article among all articles about congressional politics in these journal since 2000.) There are many ties.
Readings by Session
| SES # | TOPICS | READINGS |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Congressional Elections and Representation |
Miller, Warren, and Donald Stokes. “Constituency influence in Congress.” American Political Science Review 57 (1963): 45-56. [31] Tufte, Edward R. “The relationship between seats and votes in two-party systems.” American Political Science Review 67 (1973): 540-54. Fiorina, Morris P. Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies. Toronto, ON: Lexington Books, 1974, ISBN: 9780669902174. [15] Fenno, Richard F. “U.S. House members and their constituencies: An exploration.” American Political Science Review 71 (1977): 883-917. The booklength treatment is Fiorina, Morris P., and David W. Rohde, eds. Home Style and Washington Work: Studies of Congressional Politics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780472101207. Which you should be familiar with eventually. [8] Engstrom, Eric J., and Samuel Kernell. “Manufactured responsiveness: The impact of state electoral laws on unified party control of the presidency and House of Representatives, 1840-1940.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (2005): 531-549. Additional Readings Fiorina, Morris P. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981. ISBN: 9780300025576. [38.5] Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1983. ISBN: 9780316455633. [15] ———. The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946-1988. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. ISBN: 9780813309071. [24] Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. Congress as Public Enemy: Public Attitudes Toward American Political Institutions Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780521483360. [38.5] |
| 2 | Congressional Candidates |
Downs, Anthony. Chapter 8 in An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, NY: Harper, 1957. [15] Jacobson, Gary C., and Samuel Kernell. Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981. ISBN: 9780300026900. [38.5] Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III. “Old voters, new voters, and the personal vote: Using redistricting to measure the incumbency advantage.” American Journal of Political Science 44 (2000): 17-34. ———. “Candidate positioning in U.S. House elections.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (2001): 136-59. Carson, Jamie L., and Jason M. Roberts. “Strategic politicians and U.S. House Elections, 1874-1914.” Journal of Politics 67 (2005): 474-496. |
| 3 | Committees |
Fenno, Richard F. Chapters 1-4 in Congressmen in Committees. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1973. [15] Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. “Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional voting models.” American Journal of Political Science 23 (1979): 27-59. [38.5] ———. “The institutional foundations of committee power.” American Political Science Review 81 (1987): 85-127. [24] Weingast, Barry R., and William J. Marshall. “The industrial organization of Congress: Or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets.” Journal of Political Economy 96 (1988): 132-163. [48.5] Krehbiel, Keith. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780472094608. [8] Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde.“The Republican revolution and the House Appropriations Committee.” Journal of Politics 62 (2000): 1-33. Additional Readings Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. “Collective decisionmaking and standing committees: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3 (1987): 287-335. [31] Hall, Richard L., and Frank W. Wayman. “Buying time: Moneyed interests and the mobilization of bias in congressional committees.” American Political Science Review 84 (1990): 797-820. [24] |
| 4 | Parties and Leadership I |
Froman, Lewis A. Jr., and Randall B. Ripley.“Conditions for party leadership: The case of the House Democrats.” American Political Science Review 59 (1965): 52-63. [38.5] Nelson, Garrison. “Partisan patterns of House leadership change, 1789-1977.” American Political Science Review 71 (1977): 918-939. Brady, David W., Joseph Cooper, and Patricia A. Hurley. “The decline of party in the United State House of Representatives, 1887-1968.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 4 (1979): 381-407. Cooper, Joseph, and David W. Brady. “Institutional context and leadership style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn.” American Political Science Review 75 (1981): 411-425. [15] Brady, David W. “A reevaluation of realignment in American politics: Evidence from the House of Representatives.” American Political Science Review 79 (1985): 28-49. Rohde, David W. Parties and Leaders in the Post-reform House of Representatives. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780226724072. [2] Aldrich, John. Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780226012728. [5.5] Additional Readings Sinclair, Barbara. Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780801849558. [8] |
| 5 | Parties and Leadership II |
Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. Legislative Leviathan. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993. ISBN: 9780520072206. [1] Krehbiel, Keith. “Where’s the party?” British Journal of Political Science 23 (1993): 235-266. [11] Schickler, Eric, and Andrew Rich. “Controlling the floor: Parties as procedural coalitions in the House.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 1340-1375. [15] Binder, Sarah A., Eric D. Lawrence, and Forrest Maltzman.“Uncovering the hidden effect of party.” Journal of Politics 61 (1999): 815-831. [48.5] Snyder, James M., Jr., and Timothy Groseclose. “Estimating party influence in congressional roll call voting.” American Journal of Political Science 44 (2000): 193-211. [38.5] Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart III. “The effects of party and preferences on congressional roll-call voting.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 26 (2001): 533-72. |
| 6 | Decisionmaking and Rules |
Clausen, Aage. Chapters 1-3 in How Congressmen Decide. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 1973. ISBN: 9780312394455. [24] Kingdon, John. Chapters 1-8 in Congressmen’s Voting Decisions. New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1973. ISBN: 9780060436551. [48.5] Asher, Herbert B., and Herbert F. Weisberg. “Voting change in Congress: Some dynamic perspectives on an evolutionary process.” American Journal of Political Science 22 (1978): 395-425. Wright, John R. “PACS, contributions, and roll calls: An organizational perspective.” American Political Science Review 79 (1985): 400-414. Jackson, John E. “Ideology, interest group scores, and legislative votes.” American Journal of Political Science 36 (1992): 805-823. Krehbiel, Keith. Pivotal Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. ISBN: 9780226452722. [5.5] ———. “Restrictive rules reconsidered.” American Journal of Political Science 62 (1997): 144-168. [15] Additional Readings Duncan Black. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1958, 1963. [38.5] Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. “Ideology, party, and voting in the United States Congress 1959-1980.” American Political Science Review 79 (1985): 373-399. [24] Smith, Steven S. Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989. ISBN: 9780815780137. [24] Bond, Jon R., and Richard Fleisher. The President in the Legislative Arena. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992, 1992. ISBN: 9780226064109. [48.5] Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. “Patterns of congressional voting.” American Journal of Political Science 35 (1991): 228-278. [24] Snyder, James M., Jr. “Artificial extremism in interest group ratings.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 17 (1992): 319-342. [38.5] Jackson, John E., and John W. Kingdon. “Ideology, interest group scores, and legislative votes.” American Journal of Political Science 36 (1993): 805-823. [48.5] Binder, Sarah A., and Steven S. Smith. Politics or Principle? Filibustering in the United States Senate. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996. ISBN: 9780815709510. [31] Heckman, James J., and James M. Snyder, Jr. “Linear probability models of the demand for attributes with an empirical application to estimating the preferences of legislators.” Rand Journal of Economics 28, special issue (1997): S142-S189. [31] Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. “Toward a theory of legislative rules changes: Assessing Schickler and Rich’s evidence.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 1376-1386. [48.5] Dion, Douglas, and John D. Huber. “Sense and Sensibility: The role of rules.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 945-957. [48.5] Groseclose, Timothy, Steven Levitt, and James M. Snyder, Jr. “Comparing interest group scores across time and chambers: Adjusted ADA scores for the U.S. Congress.” American Political Science Review 93 (1999): 33-50. [10] |
| 7 | History |
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. Congress: A political-economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997. ISBN: 9780195055771. [3] Polsby, Nelson W. “The institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives.” American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 144-168. [48.5] Stewart, Charles III, and Barry R. Weingast. “Stacking the Senate, changing the nation: Republican rotten boroughs, statehood politics, and American Political Development.” Studies in American Political Development (1992): 223-71. Schickler, Eric. Disjointed pluralism: Institutional Innovation and Development of the U.S. Congress. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. ISBN: 9780691049250. Schickler, Eric, and Gregory Wawro. “Where’s the Pivot?: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre-cloture Senate.” American Journal of Political Science 48 (2004): 758-774. Additional Readings Brady, David W. Critical Elections and Congressional Policymaking. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988. ISBN: 9780804714426. [48.5] Binder, Sarah A. Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress. Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997. ISBN: 9780521587921. [24] Dion, G. Douglas. Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997. ISBN: 9780472108206. [24] |
| 8 | Paper Workshop | |
| 9 | Some Classic General Works |
Mayhew, David. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004. ISBN: 9780300105872. [4] Wilson, Woodrow. Congressional Government. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002. ISBN: 9780765809285. Arnold, R. Douglas. The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990. ISBN: 9780300048346.[19] Additional Readings Mayhew, David R. Divided We Govern. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780300048353. [38.5] |
The 20 Most Important Books About Congress to have Read to Understand Contemporary Scholarship
Aldrich, John. Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780226012728.
Arnold, R. Douglas. The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990. ISBN: 9780300048346.
Binder, Sarah A. Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress. Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997. ISBN: 9780521587921.
Clausen, Aage. How Congressmen Decide. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 1973. ISBN: 9780312394455.
Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. Legislative Leviathan. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993. ISBN: 9780520072206.
Dion, G. Douglas. Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997. ISBN: 9780472108206.
Dodd, Lawrence, and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Congress Reconsidered. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004. ISBN: 9781568028590.
Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, NY: Harper, 1957.
Fenno, Richard F. Congressmen in Committees. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1973.
———. Home style: House Members in Their Districts. New York, NY: Longman Press, 1978, 2002. ISBN: 9780321121837.
Fiorina, Morris P. Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies. Toronto, ON: Lexington Books,1974. ISBN: 9780669902174.
Jacobson, Gary C. Politics of Congressional Elections. New York, NY: Longman, 2000. ISBN: 9780321070692.
———. The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House elections 1946-1988. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. ISBN: 9780813309071.
Krehbiel, Keith. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780472094608.
———. Pivotal Politics Chicago. IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. ISBN: 9780226452722.
Mayhew, David. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004. ISBN: 9780300105872.
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. Congress: A political-economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997. ISBN: 9780195055771.
Rohde, David W. Parties and Leaders in the Post-reform House of Representatives. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780226724072.
Sinclair, Barbara. Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the postreform era. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780801849558.
Wilson, Woodrow. Congressional Government. Boston, MA; New York, NY: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1887.
The 10 Most Important Articles That are Not Associated With These Books
Cooper, Joseph, and David W. Brady.“Institutional context and leadership style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn.” American Political Science Review 75 (1981): 411-425.
Froman, Lewis A., Jr., and Randall B. Ripley. “Conditions for party leadership: The case of the House Democrats.” American Political Science Review 59 (1965): 52-63.
Groseclose, Timothy, Stephen D. Levitt, and James M. Snyder, Jr. “Comparing interest group scores across time and chambers: Adjusted ADA scores for the U.S. Congress.” American Political Science Review 93 (1999): 33-50.
Hall, Richard L., and Frank W. Wayman. Buying time: Moneyed interested and the mobilization of bias in congressional committees 84 (1990): 797-820.
Heckman, James J., and James M. Snyder, Jr. Linear probability modesl of the demand for attributes with an empirical application to estimating the preferences of legislators 28, special issue (1997): S142-S189.
Krehbiel, Keith. “Where’s the party?” British Journal of Political Science 23 (1993): 235-266.
———. “Restrictive rules reconsidered.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 919-944.
Miller, Warren E., and Donald E. Stokes. “Constituency influence in Congress.” American Political Science Review 57 (1963): 45-56.
Schickler, Eric, and A. Rich. “Controlling the floor: Parties as procedural coalitions in the House.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 1340-1375.
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. “The institutional foundations of committee power.” American Political Science Review 81 (1987): 85-104.
Winners of the Richard F. Fenno, Jr. Prize From the Legislative Studies Section of the APSA (And Some of the Competition That Didn’t Win)
2004
Binder, Sarah A. Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. ISBN: 0815709099.
2003
Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002. ISBN: 9780521520706.
2002
Schickler, Eric. Disjointed pluralism: Institutional innovation and development of the U.S. Congress. Princeton, NJ: University Press, 2001. ISBN: 9780691049267.
2001
Cameron, Charles M. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. New York, NY:Cambridge University Press, 2000. ISBN: 9780521625500.
2000
Canon, David. Race Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999. ISBN: 9780226092713.
1999
Krehbiel, Keith. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998. ISBN: 9780226452722.
1998
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. Congress: A Political-economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997. ISBN: 9780195055771.
1997
Hall, Richard. Participation in Congress. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996. ISBN: 9780300068115.
1996
Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. Congress as Public Enemy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780521483360.
Sinclair, Barbara. Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmakers. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780801849558.
1995
Davidson, Chandler, and Bernard Grofman. Quiet Revolution in the South Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. ISBN: 9780691021089.
1994
Cox, Gary W., and Matthew D. McCubbins. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993. ISBN: 9780520072206.
Swain, Carol. Black Faces, Black Interests. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992, 1993. ISBN: 9780674076150.
1993
Sorauf, Frank. Inside Campaign Finance. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994. ISBN: 9780300059328.
1992
Krehbiel, Keith. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780472094608.
Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. The Logic of Delegation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780226435312.
Mayhew, David R. Divided We Govern New Haven. CT: Yale University press, 1991. ISBN: 9780300048353.
Rohde, David W. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780226724072.
1991
Arnold, R. Douglas. The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990. ISBN: 9780300048346.
Bond, Jon R. The President in the Legislative Arena. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1990. ISBN: 9780226064093.
Canon, David T. Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990. ISBN: 9780226092683.
Jacobson, Gary C. The Electoral Origins of Divided Government. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. ISBN: 9780813309071.
1990
Sinclair, Barbara. The Transformation of the U.S. Senate. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. ISBN: 9780801837661.
Smith, Steven S. Call to Order. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1989. ISBN: 9780815780137.
1989
Brady, David W. Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988. ISBN: 9780804714426.
1988
Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990. ISBN: 9780674663183.
Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1987. ISBN: 9780316455640.
The 25 Most-cited Articles (On A Per-year Basis) in Legislative Studies Quarterly Since 1985
Squire, Peverel. “Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures.” (1992): 69-79.
Moe, Terry M. “An Assessment of the Positive Theory of Congressional Dominance.” (1987): 475-520.
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. “Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions.” (1994): 149-179.
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. “D-NOMINATE after 10 Years: A Comparative Update to Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting.” pp. 5-29.
Huber, John D. and Charles R. Shipan. “The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs.” (2000): 25-52.
Reingold, Beth. “Concepts of Representation among Female and Male State Legislators.” (1992): 509-537.
Snyder, James M. “Artificial Extremism in Interest Group Ratings.” (1992): 319-345.
Crombez, Christophe. “The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union. (1997): 97-119.
Squire, Peverel. “Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures.” (1988): 65-82.
———. “Challengers in United States Senate Elections.” (1989): 531-547.
Jewell, Malcolm E., and David Breaux. “The Effect of Incumbency on State Legislative Elections.” (1988): 495-514.
Vega, Arturo, and Juanita M. Firestone. “The Effects of Gender on Congressional Behavior and the Substantive Representation of Women.” (1995): 213-222.
Swers, Michele. “Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women’s Issue Bills than Their Male Colleagues?” (1998): 435-448.
Hager, Gregory L., and Jeffery C. Talbert. “Look for the Party Label: Party Influences on Voting in the U.S. House.” (2000): 75-99.
Squire, Peverel. “Uncontested Seats in State Legislative Elections.” (2000): 131-146.
Remington, Thomas F., and Steven S. Smith. “The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia.” (1995): 457-489.
Londregan, John, and James M. Snyder. “Comparing Committee and Floor Preferences.” (1994): 233-266.
Krehbiel, Keith. “Spatial Models of Legislative Choice.” (1988): 259-319.
Burden, Barry C., Gregory A. Caldeira, and Timothy Groseclose. “Measuring the Ideologies of U.S. Senators: The Song Remains the Same.” 2000: 237-258.
Matland, Richard E. “Women’s Representation in National Legislatures: Developed and Developing Countries.” (1998): 109-125.
Nokken, Timothy P. “Dynamics of Congressional Loyalty: Party Defection and Roll Call Behavior, 1947-97.” (2000): 417-444.
Rohde, David W. “Parties and Committees in the House: Member Motivations, Issues, and Institutional Arrangements.” (1994): 341-359.
Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. “Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House.” (1994): 215-231.
Krehbiel, Keith. “Paradoxes of Parties in Congress.” (1999): 31-64.
The 25 Most-cited Articles (On A Per-year Basis) in the American Journal of Political Science on the Topic of Legislatures, Since 1985
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. “Patterns of Congressional Voting.” (1991): 228-278.
Green, Donald P., and Jonathan S. Krasno. “Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent:Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections.” (1988): 884-907.
Huddy, Leonine, and Nayda Terkildsen. “Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates.” (1993): 119-147.
Jacobson, Gary C. “The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments.” (1990): 334-362.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart III. “Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections.” (2001): 136-159.
Jackson, John E., and John W. Kingdon. “Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes.” (1992): 805-823.
McKelvey, Richard D. “Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice.” (1986): 283-314.
Calvert, Randal L., Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast. “A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion.” (1989): 588-611.
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. “Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee.” (1989): 459-490.
Jacobson, Gary C. “The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the United States House of Representatives, 1952-82.” (1987): 126-141.
Poole, Keith T. “Recovering a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales.” (1998): 954-993.
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. “Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature.” (1990): 531-564.
Mooney, Christopher Z., and Mei-Shien Lee. “Legislating Morality in the American States: The Case of Pre-Roe Abortion Regulation Reform.” (1995): 599-627.
Ames, Barry. “Electoral Strategy Under Open-List Proportional Representation.” (1995): 406-433.
Gerber,Elizabeth R. “Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives.” (1996): 99-128.
Groseclose, Timothy. “A Model of Candidate Location when One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage.” (2001): 862-886.
Grenzke, Janet M. “PACs and the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency Is Complex.” (1989): 1-29.
Smith, David Austen, and John R. Wright. “Counteractive Lobbying.” (1994): 25-44.
Erikson, Robert S. “Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: A Review of the Macrolevel Evidence.” (1990): 373-399.
Durr, Robert H., John B. Gilmour, and Christina Wolbrecht. “Explaining Congressional Approval.” (1997): 175-207.
McCubbins, Mathew D. “The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure.” (1985): 721-748.
King, Gary, James E. Alt, Nancy E. Burns, and Michael Laver. “A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies.” (1990): 846-871.
Segal, Jeffrey A., Charles M. Cameron, and Albert D. Cover. “A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations.” (1992): 96-121.
Huber, John D., Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. “Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy.” (2001): 330-345.
The 25 Most-cited Articles (On a Per-year Basis) in the American Political Science Review on the Topic of Legislatures, Since 1985
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. “The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power.” (1987): 85-104.
Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. “Bargaining in Legislatures.” (1989): 1181-1206.
Groseclose, Timothy, Stephen D. Levitt, and James M. Snyder, Jr. “Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress.” (1999): 33-50.
Stimson, James A., Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson. “Dynamic Representation.” (1995): 543-565.
Tsebelis, George. “The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter.” (1994): 128-142.
Denzau, Arthur T., and Michael C. Munger. “Legislators and Interest-Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented.” (1986): 89-106.
Bawn, Kathleen. “Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures.” (1995): 62-73.
Moe, Terry M. “Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB.” (1985): 1094-1116.
Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Halloran. “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?” (1996): 794-812.
Hall, Richard L., and Frank W. Wayman. “Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees.” (1990): 797-820.
Smith, David Austen, and Jeffrey Banks. “Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes.” (1988): 405-422.
Segal, Jeffrey A. “Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts.” (1997): 28-44.
Wood, B. Dan, and Richard W. Waterman. “The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy.” (1991): 801-828.
Alt, James E., and Robert C. Lowry. “Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States.” (1994): 811-828.
Krehbiel, Keith. “Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers.” (1990): 149-163.
Kathlene, Lyn. “Power and Influence in State Legislative Policy-Making: The Interaction of Gender and Position in Committee Hearing Debates.” (1994): 560-576.
Diermeier, Daniel, and Timothy J. Feddersen.” Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure." (1998): 611-621.
Abramowitz, Alan I. “Explaining Senate Election Outcomes.” (1988): 385-403.
Alesina, and Howard Rosenthal. “Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy.” (1989): 373-398.
Burden, Barry C., and David C. Kimball. “A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting.” (1998): 533-544.
Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. “Coalitions and Cabinet Government.” (1990): 873-890.
Wright, John R. “Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the United States House of Representatives.” (1990): 417-438.
McCarthy, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. “The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress.” (2001): 673-687.
Huber, John D. “The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies.” (1996): 269-282.
Hall, Richard L., and Bernard Grofman. “The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias.” (1990): 1149-1166.
