14.16 | Spring 2016 | Undergraduate

Strategy and Information

Topics

Static Games of Complete Information

  1. Strictly dominated strategies, iterated strict dominance
  2. Rationalizability, equivalence to iterated dominance
  3. Nash equilibrium: Existence and continuity properties

Static Games with Incomplete Information

  1. Bayesian Nash equilibrium
  2. Auctions, revenue equivalence

Dynamic Games with Perfect Information

  1. Extensive-form games, multi-stage games
  2. Backwards induction
  3. Subgame perfection
  4. The one-shot deviation principle
  5. Bargaining with complete information
  6. Repeated games: Folk theorems

Dynamic Games with Imperfect Information

  1. Sequential equilibrium
  2. Perfect and proper equilibria: Existence and properties
  3. The intuitive criterion
  4. Iterated weak dominance

Nash Bargaining

  1. Axiomatization
  2. Non-cooperative bargaining implementation

Cooperative Games

  1. Core: Existence and properties
  2. The core and competitive equilibrium
  3. Core tâtonnement
  4. Shapley value: Axiomatizations
  5. Bargaining implementations
  6. Networks

Matching Problems

  1. Stable matchings
  2. Lattice structure
  3. The deferred acceptance algorithm
  4. Axioms for deferred acceptance

Bargaining in Markets

  1. Symmetric buyers and sellers
  2. Networks

Course Info

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As Taught In
Spring 2016
Learning Resource Types
Exams
Lecture Notes