|1||Egoism||Butler, Joseph. Sermon XI in Fifteen Sermons. 1726. (PDF)|
|2||Egoism: empirical and quasi-empirical issues||Fehr, Ernst, and Urs Fischbacher. "The Nature of Human Altruism." Nature 425 (October 23, 2003): 785-791.|
|II. Beliefs, desires, and intentions|
|3||Belief/desire psychology and the Humean theory of motivation||Smith, Michael. "The Humean Theory of Motivation." Mind New Series 96, no. 381 (January 1987): 36-61.|
|4||Bratman on intention|| |
Bratman, Michael. "Taking Plans Seriously." Social Theory and Practice 9, nos. 2-3 (Summer-Fall 1983): 271-287.
For a short presentation of the Bratman approach and a summary of the empirical work from Gollwitzer:
Bratman, Michael. "Intention and Means-End Reasoning." The Philosophical Review 90, no. 2 (April 1981): 252-265.
———. "Two Faces of Intention." The Philosophical Review 93, no. 3 (July 1984): 375-405.
Bratman's position is developed more fully in:
For a quick way into this, see:
Velleman, David. "Review of Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, by Michael Bratman." The Philosophical Review 100, no. 2 (April 1991): 277-284.
For an alternative view that tries to accommodate intentions within a belief/desire framework, see:
Ridge, Michael. "Humean Intentions." American Philosophical Quarterly 35, no. 2 (April 1998): 157-178.
|III. Reducing intentions|
|5||Velleman on intention|| |
Langton, Rae. "Intention as Faith." In Agency and Action. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55. Edited by John Hyman and Helen Steward. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 243-258. ISBN: 9780521603560.
|IV. Akrasia and weakness of will|
|6||Akrasia||Davidson, Donald. "How is Weakness of Will Possible?" In Essays on Actions and Events. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 21-42. ISBN: 9780198246374.|
|7||Akrasia and desire|| |
Watson, Gary. "Skepticism about Weakness of Will." The Philosophical Review 86, no. 3 (July 1977): 316-339.
Humberstone, Lloyd. "Wanting, Getting, Having." Philosophical Papers 19 (1990): 99-118.
Holton, Richard. "Intention and Weakness of Will." Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 241-262.
|V. Strength of will|
|8||Strength of will: descriptive issues|| |
Ainslie, George. "A Selectionist Model of the Ego: Implications for Self-Control." Chapter 6 in Disorders of Volition. Edited by Natalie Sebanz and Wolfgang Prinz. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. ISBN: 9780262195409.
Holton, Richard. "How is Strength of Will Possible?" In Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Edited by Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003. ISBN: 9780199257362.
Muraven, Mark, and Roy F. Baumeister. "Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?" Psychological Bulletin 126 (2000): 247-259.
Bratman, Michael E. "Planning and Temptation." Chapter 3 In Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 35-57. ISBN: 9780521637275.
McClure, Samuel, David I. Laibson, George Loewenstein, and Jonathan D. Cohen. "Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary Reward." Science 306, no. 5695 (October 15, 2004): 503-507.
Ainslie, George, and John Monterosso. "A Marketplace in the Brain?" Science 306, no. 5695 (October 15, 2004): 421-423.
|9||Strength of will: normative issues|| |
Kavka, G. "The Toxin Puzzle." Analysis 43 (1983): 33-36.
Bratman, Michael E. "Toxin, Temptation and the Stability of Intention." Chapter 4 in Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 58-90. ISBN: 9780521637275.
Broome, John. "Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values?" In Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Edited by Christopher Morris and Arthur Ripstein. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 98-120. ISBN: 9780521781848.
Holton, Richard. "Rational Resolve." The Philosophical Review 113 (2004): 507-535.
|10||Addiction I||Yaffe, Gideon. "Recent Work on Addiction and Responsible Agency." Philosophy and Public Affairs 30, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 178-221. (PDF)|
|11||Addiction II|| |
Berridge, Kent C., and Terry E. Robinson. "The Mind of an Addicted Brain: Neural Sensitization of Wanting Versus Liking." Current Directions in Psychological Science 4, no. 3 (June 1995): 71-75.
Watson, Gary. "Disordered Appetites: Addiction, Compulsion, and Dependence." Chapter 3 in Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 59-87. ISBN: 9780199272273. [Preview in Google Books]
———. "Excusing Addiction." Law and Philosophy 18, no. 6 (1999): 589-619.
|VII. Free will I|
|12||Free will I|| |
Frankfurt, Harry G. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 (January 14, 1971): 5-20.
Watson, Gary. "Free Action and Free Will." Mind New Series 96, no. 382 (April 1987): 145-172.
|13||Free will II||Frankfurt, Harry G. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (December 4, 1969): 829-839.|
|VIII. Free will II|
|14||Free will IV: libertarianism||Kane, Robert. "Two Kinds of Incompatibilism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, no. 2 (December 1989): 219-254.|
|15||Free will III: Strawson|| |
Strawson, Peter F. "Freedom and Resentment." Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1961): 187-211.
Watson, Gary. "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme." In Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Edited by Ferdinand Schoeman. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 256-286. ISBN: 9780521339513.
Wolf, Susan. "The Importance of Free Will." Mind New Series 90, no. 359 (July 1981): 386-405.
|IX. Free will III|
Free will VI: empirical work
Free will V: choice
Wegner, Daniel M., and T. Wheatley. "Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will." American Psychologist 54, no. 7 (July 1999): 480-492.
Wegner, Daniel M. "Précis of The Illusion of Conscious Will (and Commentaries and Reply)." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, no. 5 (October 2004): 649-692.
Bayne, Timothy. "Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing: Wegner on the Conscious Will." In Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? Edited by Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, and Shaun Gallagher. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009, pp. 169-186. ISBN: 9780262512572. (PDF)
Mele, Alfred R. "Free Will: Action Theory Meets Neuroscience." Working Paper, Florida State University, 2007. (PDF)
|X. Identification and autonomy|
Frankfurt, Harry. "Identification and Wholeheartedness." In The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 159-176. ISBN: 9780521336116.
Scanlon, T. M. "Reasons and Passions." Chapter 6 in The Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002, pp. 165-188. ISBN: 9780262025133.
Moran, Richard. "Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental Life." Chapter 7 in The Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002, pp. 189-226. ISBN: 9780262025133.
|18||Self-determination theory|| |
Deci, E. L., and R. M. Ryan. "The Support of Autonomy and the Control of Behavior." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 53 (1987): 1024-1037.
Ryan, R. M., and E. L. Deci. "Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being." American Psychologist 55 (2000): 68-78.
Deci, E. L., and R. M. Ryan. "The 'What' and 'Why' of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior." Psychological Inquiry 11 (2000): 227-268.
Mele, Alfred R. "Real Self-Deception." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20, no. 1 (1997): 91-136. (Note: This is a pre-print, and does not include the peer commentary that appeared with the printed version.)
Holton, Richard. "What is the Role of the Self in Self-Deception?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series 101 (2001): 53-69.
|XII. Moral psychology I: what could empirical work tell us about morality?|
|20||The metaethical implications of empirical work||Do the Harvard Moral Sense Test|
|21||Moral judgment and motivation|| |
Nichols, Shaun. "Norms with Feeling." Cognition 84 (2002): 221-236.
Haidt, Jonathan. "The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment." Psychological Review 108, no. 4 (2001): 814-834. (PDF)
Greene, Joshua D., Leigh E. Nystrom, Andrew D. Engell, John M. Darley, and Jonathan D. Cohen. "The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment." Neuron 44 (2004): 389-400.
|XIII. Moral psychology II|
|22||Autism and sociopathy|| |
Kennett, Jeanette. "Autism and Empathy." Philosophical Quarterly 52 (July 2002): 340-357.
McGeer, Victoria. "Varieties of Moral Agency: Lessons from Autism." In Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development. Vol. 3. Edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. ISBN: 9780262195645.
Roskies, Adina. "Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons from Acquired Sociopathy." Philosophical Psychology 16, no. 1 (March 2003): 51-66.
|23||Moral luck and the Knobe effect|| |
Knobe, Joshua. "The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology." Philosophical Studies 130, no. 2 (August 2006): 203-231.
Pettit, Dean, and Joshua Knobe. "The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment." Mind and Language forthcoming. (PDF)
Nelkin, Dana K. "Moral Luck." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition). Edited by Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/moral-luck/.
Cushman, Fiery. "Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment." Cognition 108, no. 2 (August 2008): 353-380.
|XIV. Moral psychology III|
|24||Virtue and character|| |
Doris, John M. "Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics." Noûs 32, no. 4 (December 1998): 504-530.
Bem, Daryl. "On the Uncommon Wisdom of our Lay Personality Theory." Psychological Inquiry 3 (1992): 82-84.
Kamtekar, Rachana. "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of our Character." Ethics 114, no. 3 (2004): 458-491.
|25||Determinism and moral motivation|| |
Vohs, Kathleen D., and Jonathan W. Schooler. "The Value of Believing in Free Will: Encouraging a Belief in Determinism Increases Cheating." Psychological Science 19, no. 1 (January 2008): 49-54.
Baumeister, Roy F., E. J. Masicampo, and C. Nathan DeWall. "Prosocial Benefits of Feeling Free: Disbelief in Free Will Increases Aggression and Reduces Helpfulness." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 35, no. 2 (February 2009): 260-268.