Calendar

[FT] = Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory (MIT Press, 1991)
[G] = Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists (Princeton University Press, 1992)

Part # Title # of Lectures Topics
I Static Games 4

  • Modeling strategic interaction (FT 1.1, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, G 1.1AB)
  • Nash Equilibrium (FT 1.2, G 1.1C, 1.2)
  • Mixed strategies (FT 1.1, 1.2.3, G 1.3)
  • Existence theorems, other properties (FT 1.3, 12.1, G 1.3)
II Dynamic Games 4

  • Extensive form games (FT 3.3, 3.4.2, 3.5, G 2.1, 2.4)
  • Subgame perfection (FT 3.5, G 2.2)
  • Examples, repeated games (FT 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, 13.1, G 2.3)
III Incomplete Information 2

  • Types, Bayesian equilibrium, examples (FT 6.1-6.4, 6.7, G 3.1-3.2)
IV Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information 2

  • PBE concept, signalling, reputation (FT 8.1-8.2, 9.1-9.2, G 4.1-4.2, 4.3C)
  • Refinements (FT 11.2-11.3, G 4.4)

Course Info

Learning Resource Types

grading Exams
assignment Problem Sets