[FT] = Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory (MIT Press, 1991)
[G] = Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists (Princeton University Press, 1992)
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Part #
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Title
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# of Lectures
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Topics
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I
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Static Games
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4
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- Modeling strategic interaction (FT 1.1, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, G 1.1AB)
- Nash Equilibrium (FT 1.2, G 1.1C, 1.2)
- Mixed strategies (FT 1.1, 1.2.3, G 1.3)
- Existence theorems, other properties (FT 1.3, 12.1, G 1.3)
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II
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Dynamic Games
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4
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- Extensive form games (FT 3.3, 3.4.2, 3.5, G 2.1, 2.4)
- Subgame perfection (FT 3.5, G 2.2)
- Examples, repeated games (FT 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, 13.1, G 2.3)
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III
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Incomplete Information
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2
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- Types, Bayesian equilibrium, examples (FT 6.1-6.4, 6.7, G 3.1-3.2)
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IV
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Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
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2
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- PBE concept, signalling, reputation (FT 8.1-8.2, 9.1-9.2, G 4.1-4.2, 4.3C)
- Refinements (FT 11.2-11.3, G 4.4)
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