Course Description
This course provides a rigorous treatment of non-cooperative solution concepts in game theory, including rationalizability and Nash, sequential, and stable equilibria. It covers topics such as epistemic foundations, higher order beliefs, bargaining, repeated games, reputation, supermodular games, and global games. It …
This course provides a rigorous treatment of non-cooperative solution concepts in game theory, including rationalizability and Nash, sequential, and stable equilibria. It covers topics such as epistemic foundations, higher order beliefs, bargaining, repeated games, reputation, supermodular games, and global games. It also introduces cooperative solution concepts—Nash bargaining solution, core, Shapley value—and develops corresponding non-cooperative foundations.
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A cartoon of two people sitting across from each other playing chess. Chess is an example of a perfect information game, which is a topic discussed in this course. (Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.)
