Assignments

Referee Reports

Students are required to write three referee reports due in Ses #3, Ses #5, and Ses #7. A referee report evaluates the paper on its readiness for publication by commenting on the results, the structure, and the exposition of the paper. For details, please refer to William Thomson’s article:

Guidelines on writing referee reports (PDF)

The suggested articles for the three referee reports are listed below.

REPORT # ARTICLES
1

Introduction and motivations

Fowlie, Meredith, and Jeffrey Perloff. “Distributing Pollution Rights in Cap-and-Trade Programs: Are Outcomes Independent of Allocation?” Mimeograph, University of Michigan, 2009.

Mansur, Erin T., and Matt White. “Market Organization and Efficiency in Electricity Markets.” Mimeograph, University of Pennsylvania, 2007. (PDF)

Leslie, Phillip, and Alan Sorenson. “The Welfare Effects of Ticket Resale.” Mimeograph, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, October 2009. Also available as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 15476, November 2009.

Fowlie, Meredith, Stephen Holland, and Erin T. Mansur. “What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and To Whom? Evidence from Southern California’s NOx Trading Program.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 15082, June 2009.

Basic mechanism design and auction theory

McLennan, Andrew. “Manipulation in Elections with Uncertain Preferences.” School of Economics Discussion Paper No. 360, University of Queensland, Australia, 2008.

2

More mechanism design and auction theory

Bergemann, Dirk, and Juuso Välimäki. “The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism.” Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1672, Yale University, August 2008.

Chen, Chia-Hui. “One-to-Many Negotiation Between a Seller and Asymmetric Buyers.” PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, April 2009.

Pai, Mallesh M., and Rakesh Vohra. “Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders.” Mimeograph, Northwestern University, July 2009.

Fox, Jeremy T., and Patrick Bajari. “Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction.” Mimeograph, University of Chicago, October 2009. (PDF - 1.1MB) Also available as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 11671, October 2005.

Segal, Ilya, and Michael D. Whinston. “An Expected-Efficient Status Quo Allows Efficient Bargaining.” Mimeograph, Stanford University, January 2009.

Hafalir, Isa, and Vijay Krishna. “Asymmetric Auctions with Resale.” Mimeograph, Pennsylvania State University, January 2006.

Cheng, Harrison, and Guofu Tan. “Auctions with Resale and Bargaining Power.” Mimeograph, University of Southern California, January 2009. (PDF)

Assorted auction topics (multi-unit auctions, empirical auctions, new directions)

DeMarzo, Peter, Ilan Kremer, and Andrzej Skrzypacz. “Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design.” American Economic Review 95, no. 4 (September 2005): 936-959. 

Krishna, Vijay. “Asymmetric English Auctions.” Journal of Economic Theory 112, no. 2 (October 2003): 261-288.

Asker, John. “A Study of the Internal Organisation of a Bidding Cartel.” Working paper, Stern School of Business, New York University, April 2009. (PDF)

Marshall, Robert, and Leslie Marx. “The Vulnerability of Auctions to Bidder Collusion.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, no. 2 (May 2009): 883-910.

Kastl, Jakub. “Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions.” Mimeograph, Stanford University, 2009. (PDF)

Hortaçsu, Ali, and Jakub Kastl. “Do Bidders in Canadian Treasury Bill Auctions Have Private Values?” Mimeograph, Stanford University, 2008. (PDF)

3

Stochastic matching mechanisms

Manea, Mihai. “Asymptotic Ordinal Inefficiency of Random Serial Dictatorship.” Theoretical Economics 4, no. 2 (June 2009): 165-197.

Sönmez, Tayfun, and M. Utku Ünver. “House Allocation with Existing Tenants: An Equivalence.” Games and Economic Behavior 52, no. 1 (July 2005): 153-185.

Bogomolnaia, Anna, and Hervé Moulin. “Random Matching under Dichotomous Preferences.” Econometrica 72, no. 1 (January 2004): 257-279.

Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez, and M. Utku Ünver. “Pairwise Kidney Exchange.” Journal of Economic Theory 125, no. 2 (December 2005): 151-188.

Axiomatic resource allocation

Sönmez, Tayfun, and M. Utku Ünver. “House Allocation with Existing Tenants: A Characterization.” Mimeograph, Department of Economics, Boston College, 2009.

Pycia, Marek, and M. Utku Ünver. “A Theory of House Allocation and Exchange Mechanisms.” Boston College Working Papers in Economics No. 715, January 2009.

Student assignment and school choice

Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda. “Expanding ‘Choice’ in School Choice.” Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Research Paper No. 20, November 2008.

Other topics

Budish, Eric. “The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes.” Mimeograph, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, October 2009. (PDF)

Pycia, Marek. “Many-to-One Matching without Substitutability.” Industrial Performance Center (IPC) Working Paper No. 05-008, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November 2005. (PDF - 1.6MB)

Yenmez, M. Bumin. “Incentive Compatible Market Design with an Application to Matching with Wages.” Mimeograph, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, November 2009. (PDF)

Lee, Soohyung. “Marriage and Online Mate-Search Services: Evidence from South Korea.” Mimeograph, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, October 2009. (PDF - 1.4MB)

Research Paper

A short 2-3 page progress report on the research paper is due one week after Ses #7, and the final paper is due 6 weeks later at the end of the January Independent Activities Period (IAP). The goal of the research paper is to lay the foundation for dissertation work. The paper may be empirical or theoretical in nature. I will meet with students in the middle of January to check the progress of the paper.

Course Info

Learning Resource Types

assignment Written Assignments