Industrial Organization I

Readings

The primary text for the course:

[JT] Tirole, Jean. The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press, 1988. ISBN: 9780262200714

Lectures 1–2: Monopoly Pricing and Durable Goods

• [JT], Chapter 1 (including supplementary section).
• Chevalier, J., Kashyap, A., and Rossi, P. “Why Don’t Prices Rise During Periods of Peak Demand? Evidence from Scanner Data.” American Economic Review 93 (2003): 15–37.
• Spence, A. M. “Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics 6 (1975): 417–429.
• Gul, F., Sonnenschein, H., and Wilson, R. “Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture.” Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986): 155–190.
• Fuchs, W., and Skrzypacz, A. “Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders.” American Economic Review 100 (2010): 802–836.
• Board, Simon, and Marek Pycia. “Outside Options and the Failure of the Coase Conjecture.” American Economic Review 104 (2014): 656–671.
• Tirole, Jean. “Sequential Screening with Positive Selection.” Econometrica 84 (2016): 1291–1343.
• Chevalier, J., and Goolsbee, A. “Are Durable Goods Consumers Forward Looking? Evidence from College Textbooks.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (2009): 1853–1884.
• Gentzkow, M., and Shapiro, J. M. “What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from Daily Newspapers.” Econometrica 78 (2010): 35–71.
• Calzolari, G., and Pavan, A. “Monopoly with Resale.” RAND Journal of Economics 37 (2006): 362–375.
• Segal, I. “Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand.” American Economic Review 93 (2003): 509–529.
• Shapiro, C. “Optimal Pricing of Experience Goods.” Bell Journal of Economics 14 (1983): 497–507.
• Bergemann, D., and Valimaki, J. “Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods.” Journal of Political Economy 114 (2006): 713–743.
• Roesler, A., and Szentes, B. “Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing.” American Economic Review 107 (2017): 2072–2080.
• Bergemann, Dirk, and Stephen Morris. “Information Design.” Journal of Economic Literature 57 (2019): 44–95.

Lectures 3–4: Price Discrimination

• [JT], Sections 3.0–3.5.
• Armstrong, M. “Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination.” In Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, vol. 2, edited by R. Blundell, W. Newey, and T. Persson, 1–32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
• Varian, H. “Price Discrimination.” Chapter 10 in Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1, edited by R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, 593–654. New York: Elsevier, 1989.
• Deneckere, R., and R. P. McAfee. “Damaged Goods.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 5 (1996): 149–174.
• McAfee, R. P., J. McMillan, and M. Whinston. “Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (1989): 371–383.
• Aguirre, I., S. Cowan, and J. Vickers. “Multiproduct Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature.” American Economic Review 100 (2010): 1601–1615.
• Sibley, D., and P. Srinagesh. “Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing with Multiple Taste Characteristics.” RAND Journal of Economics 28 (1997): 684–707.
• Rochet, J.-C., and L. Stole. “Pricing with Random Participation.” Review of Economic Studies 69 (2002): 277–311.
• Fudenberg, D., and J. M. Villas-Boas. “Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition.” In Handbook on Economics and Information Systems, edited by T. J. Henderschott, 305–328. Elsevier, 2006.
• Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole. “Upgrades, Trade-ins, and Buybacks.” RAND Journal of Economics 29 (1998): 235–258.
• Courty, P., and H. Li. “Sequential Screening.” Review of Economic Studies 67 (2000): 697–717.
• Shepard, A. “Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration.” Journal of Political Economy 99 (1991): 30–53.
• Graddy, K. “Testing for Imperfect Competition at the Fulton Fish Market.” RAND Journal of Economics 26 (1995): 75–91.
• Scott Morton, F., F. Zettelmeyer, and J. Silva-Risso. “Consumer Information and Price Discrimination: Does the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and Minorities?” Quantitative Marketing and Economics 1 (2003): 65–92.
• Leslie, P. “Price Discrimination in Broadway Theater.” RAND Journal of Economics 35 (2004): 520–541.
• Shiller, B. “Approximating Purchase Propensities and Reservation Prices from Broad Consumer Tracking.” International Economic Review 61 (2020): 847–870.
• Dube, Jean-Pierre, and Sanjog Misra. “Personalized Pricing and Consumer Welfare.” Journal of Political Economy. Forthcoming, 2022.
• Kehoe, Patrick, Bradley Larsen, and Elena Pastorino. “Dynamic Competition in the Era of Big Data.” Hoover Institution Economics Working Paper 22102 (2022).
• McManus, Brian. “Nonlinear Pricing in an Oligopoly Market: The Case of Specialty Coffee.” RAND Journal of Economics 38 (2007): 512–532.
• Luo, Yao, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong. “Structural Analysis of Nonlinear Pricing.” Journal of Political Economy 126 (2018): 1341–1376.
• Chu, S., P. Leslie, and A. Sorensen. “Bundle Size Pricing as an Approximation to Mixed Bundling.” American Economic Review 101 (2011): 263–303.
• Sweeting, Andrew. “Price Dynamics in Perishable Goods Markets: The Case of Secondary Markets for Major League Baseball Tickets.” Journal of Political Economy 120 (2012): 1133–1172.
• Bergemann, Dirk, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris. “The Limits of Price Discrimination.” American Economic Review 105 (2015): 921–957.
• Hidir, Sinem, and Nikhil Vellodi. “Privacy, Personalization, and Price Discrimination.” Journal of the European Economic Association 19 (2021): 1342–1363.

Lectures 5–6: Static Competition and Models of Differentiation

• [JT], Section 2.1 and Chapter 5.
• Vives, X. Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.
• Perloff, J., and S. Salop. “Equilibrium with Product Differentiation.” Review of Economic Studies 52 (1983): 107–120.
• Shaked, A., and J. Sutton. “Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation.” Review of Economic Studies 49 (1982): 3–14.
• Weyl, E.G., and M. Fabinger. “Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence Under Imperfect Competition.” Journal of Political Economy 121 (2013): 528–583.
• Nocke, V., and N. Schutz. “Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly: An Aggregative Games Approach.” Econometrica 86 (2018): 523–557.
• Klemperer, P., and M. Meyer. “Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly Under Uncertainty.” Econometrica 57 (1989): 1243–1278.
• Bresnahan, T. “Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: The 1955 Price War.” Journal of Industrial Economics 35 (1987): 457–482.
• Miller, Nathan, and Matthew Weinberg. “Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture.” Econometrica 85 (2017): 1763–1791.
• Dube, Jean-Pierre, Gunther Hitsch, and Peter Rossi. “Do Switching Costs Make Markets Less Competitive?” Journal of Marketing Research 46 (2009): 435–445.
• Klemperer, P. “The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs.” RAND Journal of Economics 18 (1987): 138–150.
• Handel, B. “Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts.” American Economic Review 103 (2013): 2643–2682.
• Bergemann, D., and J. Valimaki. “Learning and Strategic Pricing.” Econometrica 64 (1996): 1125–1149.
• Stole, L. “Price Discrimination in Competitive Environments.” In Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 3, edited by M. Armstrong and R. Porter, 1237–1291. Elsevier, 2007.
• Holmes, T. “The Effects of Third-Degree Discrimination in Oligopoly.” American Economic Review 79 (1989): 244–250.
• Ellison, G. “A Model of Add-on Pricing.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (2005): 585–637.
• Corts, K. “Third Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly: All-Out Competition and Strategic Commitment.” RAND Journal of Economics 29 (1998): 306–323.
• Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole. “Customer Poaching and Brand Switching.” RAND Journal of Economics 31 (2000): 634–657.
• Armstrong, M., and J. Vickers. “Competitive Nonlinear Pricing and Bundling.” Review of Economic Studies 77 (2010): 30–60.
• Martimort, D., and L. Stole. “Market Participation in Delegated and Intrinsic Common-Agency Games.” RAND Journal of Economics 40 (2009): 78–102.
• Zhou, Jidong. “Competitive Bundling.” Econometrica 85 (2017): 142–172.
• Adams, B., and K. Williams. “Zone Pricing in Retail Oligopoly.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11 (2019): 124–156.
• Borenstein, S., and N. Rose. “Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry.” Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 653–683.
• Busse, M., and M. Rysman. “Competition and Price Discrimination in Yellow Pages Advertising.” RAND Journal of Economics 36 (2005): 378–390.

Lectures 7–8: Estimation of Demand, Supply, and Market Power

• Anderson, S. P., André De Palma, and Jacques-François Thisse. Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation. MIT Press, 1992.
• Bajari, Patrick, and C. Lanier Benkard. “Demand Estimation with Heterogeneous Consumers and Unobserved Product Characteristics: A Hedonic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 113 (2005): 1239–1276.
• Bresnahan, Timothy F. “The Oligopoly Solution Concept Is Identified.” Economics Letters 10 (1982): 87–92.
• Lau, Lawrence J. “On Identifying the Degree of Competitiveness from Industry Price and Output Data.” Economics Letters 10 (1982): 93–99.
• Bresnahan, Timothy F. “Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power.” In Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 2, edited by Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig, 101–195. Elsevier, 1989.
• Deaton, Angus, and John Muellbauer. “An Almost Ideal Demand System.” The American Economic Review 70 (1980): 312–326.
• Ellison, Sara Fisher, Iain Cockburn, Zvi Griliches, and Jerry Hausman. “Characteristics of Demand for Pharmaceutical Products: An Examination of Four Cephalosporins.” RAND Journal of Economics 28 (1997): 426–446.]
• Chaudhuri, Shubha, Pradeep K. Goldberg, and Patrick Jia. “Estimating the Effects of Global Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of Quinolones in India.” American Economic Review 96 (2006): 1477–1514.
• Berry, Steven T., James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes. “Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium.” Econometrica 63 (1995): 841–890.
• Berry, Steven T., and Philip A. Haile. “Foundations of Demand Estimation.” In Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 2, no. 1, 1–62. Elsevier, 2021.
• Berry, Steven T., James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes. “Differentiated Products Demand Systems from a Combination of Micro and Macro Data: The New Car Market.” Journal of Political Economy 112 (2004): 68–105.
• Chan, T. Y. “Estimating a Continuous Hedonic-Choice Model with an Application to Demand for Soft Drinks.” RAND Journal of Economics 37 (2006): 466–482.
• Conlon, Christopher, and Jeff Gortmaker. “Best Practices for Differentiated Products Demand Estimation with PyBLP.” RAND Journal of Economics 51, no. 4 (2020): 1108–1161.
• Gentzkow, Matthew A. “Valuing New Goods in a Model with Complementarity: Online Newspapers.” American Economic Review 97 (2007): 713–744.
• Gandhi, Amit, and Aviv Nevo. “Empirical Models of Demand and Supply in Differentiated Products Industries.” In Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 4, no. 1, 63–139. Elsevier, 2021.
• Nevo, Aviv. “Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry.” Econometrica 69 (2001): 307–342.
• Nevo, Aviv. “A Practitioner’s Guide to Estimation of Random-Coefficients Logit Models of Demand.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 9 (2000): 513–548.
• Petrin, Amil. “Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the Minivan.” Journal of Political Economy 110 (2002): 705–729.
• Train, Kenneth E. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Lectures 9–11: Search 

• Varian, H. “A Model of Sales.” American Economic Review 70 (1980): 651–658.
• Stahl, D. “Oligopolistic Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumer Search.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 14 (1996): 243–268.
• Wolinsky, Asher. “Product Differentiation with Imperfect Information.” Review of Economic Studies 51 (1984): 53–61.
• Anderson, Simon, and Regis Renault. “Pricing, Product Diversity and Search Costs: A Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond Model.” RAND Journal of Economics 30, no. 4 (1999): 719–735.
• Bar-Isaac, Heski, Guillermo Caruana, and Vicente Cuñat. “Search Design and Market Structure.” American Economic Review 102 (2012): 1140–1160.
• McAfee, R. P. “Multiproduct Equilibrium Price Dispersion.” Journal of Economic Theory 67, no. 1 (1995): 83–105.
• Zhou, Jidong. “Multiproduct Search and the Joint Search Effect.” American Economic Review 104, no. 9 (2014): 2918–2939.
• Rhodes, Andrew. “Multiproduct Retailing.” Review of Economic Studies 82 (2015): 360–390.
• Armstrong, Mark, and Jidong Zhou. “Search Deterrence.” Review of Economic Studies 83 (2016): 26–57.
• Baye, Michael, and John Morgan. “Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets.” American Economic Review 91, no. 3 (2001): 454–474.
• Sorensen, Alan. “Equilibrium Price Dispersion in Retail Markets for Prescription Drugs.” Journal of Political Economy 108 (2000): 833–850.
• Stango, Victor, and Jonathan Zinman. “Borrowing High versus Borrowing Higher: Price Dispersion and Shopping Behavior in the U.S. Credit Card Market.” Review of Financial Studies 29 (2016): 979–1006.
• Sorensen, Alan. “Price Dispersion and Heterogeneous Consumer Search for Retail Prescription Drugs.” NBER Working Paper 8548 (2001).
• Ellison, Glenn, and Sara Fisher Ellison. “Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet.” Econometrica 77, no. 2 (2009): 427–452.
• Ellison, Glenn, and Alexander Wolitzky. “A Search Cost Model of Obfuscation.” RAND Journal of Economics 43, no. 3 (2012): 417–441.
• Wilson, Chris. “Ordered Search and Equilibrium Obfuscation.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 28 (2010): 496–506.
• Genesove, David. “Search and Wholesale Auto Auctions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1995): 23–49.
• Hong, Han, and Matthew Shum. “Using Price Distributions to Estimate Search Costs.” RAND Journal of Economics 37, no. 2 (2006): 257–275.
• Hortacsu, Ali, and Chad Syverson. “Product Differentiation, Search Costs, and Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: A Case Study of the S&P 500 Index Funds.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (2004): 403–456.
• Kim, Jun, Paulo Albuquerque, and Bart Bronnenberg. “Online Demand Under Limited Consumer Search.” Marketing Science 29 (2010): 1001–1023.
• Hortacsu, Ali, Babur De Los Santos, and Matthijs Wildenbeest. “Testing Models of Consumer Search Using Data on Web Browsing and Purchasing Behavior.” American Economic Review 102 (2012): 2955–2980.
• Allen, Jason, Robert Clark, and Jean-Francois Houde. “The Effect of Mergers in Search Markets: Evidence from the Canadian Mortgage Industry.” American Economic Review 104 (2013): 3365–3396.
• Salz, Tobias. “Intermediation and Competition in Search Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 130, no. 2 (2022): 310–345.
• Honka, Elisabeth. “Quantifying Search and Switching Costs in the US Auto Insurance Industry.” RAND Journal of Economics 45 (2014): 847–884.
• Moraga Gonzalez, Jose Luis, Zsolt Sandor, and Matthijs Wildenbeest. “Consumer Search and Prices in the Automobile Market.” Review of Economic Studies (forthcoming, 2022).
• Galenianos, Manolis, and Alessandro Gavazza. “Regulatory Intervention in Consumer Financial Markets: The Case of Credit Cards.” Journal of the European Economic Association (forthcoming, 2022).
• Dinerstein, Michael, Liran Einav, Jonathan Levin, and Neel Sundaresan. “Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce.” American Economic Review 108 (2018): 1820–1859.
• Coey, Dominic, Bradley Larsen, and Brennan Platt. “Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search.” American Economic Review 110 (2020): 3748–3785.

Lectures 12–13: Platform Competition 

• Farrell, J., and G. Saloner. “Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation.” Rand Journal of Economics 16 (1985): 70–83.
• Katz, M., and C. Shapiro. “Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities.” Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986): 822–841.
• Choi, Jay Pil, Doh Shin Jeon, and Byung Cheol Kim. “Privacy and Personal Data Collection with Information Externalities.” Journal of Public Economics 173 (2019): 113–124.
• Acemoglu, Daron, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarkhsh Malekian, and Asu Ozdaglar. “Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets.” Working paper (2019).
• Innes, Robert, and Richard Sexton. “Customer Coalitions, Monopoly Price Discrimination and Generic Entry Deterrence.” European Economic Review 37 (1993): 1569–1597.
• Pesendorfer, Wolfgang. “Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles.” American Economic Review 85 (1995): 771–792.
• Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. “Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by the Sole Supplier of a Network Good.” Journal of Industrial Economics 48 (2000): 373–390.
• Ellison, G., and Drew Fudenberg. “The Neo-Luddite’s Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry.” Rand Journal of Economics 31 (Summer 2000): 253–272.
• Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole. “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets.” Journal of the European Economic Association 1 (2003): 990–1029.
• Tirole, Jean. “Competition and Industrial Challenge for the Digital Age.” Working paper (2020).
• Armstrong, Mark. “Competition in Two-Sided Markets.” Rand Journal of Economics 37 (2006): 668–691.
• Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole. “Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report.” Rand Journal of Economics 37 (Autumn 2006): 645–667.
• Lerner, Joshua, and Jean Tirole. “A Model of Forum Shopping.” American Economic Review 96, no. 4 (2006): 1091–1116.
• Rysman, Mark. “Competition between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages.” Review of Economic Studies 71, no. 2 (2004): 483–512.
• Chandra, Ambarish, and Allan Collard-Wexler. “Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: An Application to the Canadian Newspaper Industry.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 18 (2009): 1045–1070.
• Fan, Ying. “Ownership Consolidation and Product Characteristics: A Study of the U.S. Daily Newspaper Market.” American Economic Review 103, no. 5 (2013): 1598–1628.
• Jeziorski, Przemyslaw. “Effects of Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: The U.S. Radio Industry.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6 (2014): 35–73.
• Lee, Robin. “Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets.” American Economic Review 103, no. 7 (2013): 2960–3000.
• Armstrong, Mark, and Julian Wright. “Two-Sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts.” Economic Theory 32 (2007): 353–380.
• Wang, Chengsi, and Julian Wright. “Search Platforms: Showrooming and Price Parity Clauses.” RAND Journal of Economics 51 (2020): 32–58.
• Choi, Jay Pil, and Doh-Shin Jeon. “A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Nonnegative Price Constraints.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13 (2021): 283–337.
• Gomes, Renato, and Jean Tirole. “Missed Sales and the Pricing of Ancillary Goods.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 133 (2018): 2097–2169.
• Carlton, Dennis, and Ralph Winter. “Vertical Most-Favored-Nation Restraints and Credit Card No-Surcharge Rules.” Journal of Law and Economics 61 (2018): 215–251.
• Wang, Chengsi, and Julian Wright. “Search Platforms: Showrooming and Price Parity Clauses.” RAND Journal of Economics 51 (2020): 32–58.
• Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole. “Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations.” RAND Journal of Economics 33 (2002): 549–570.

Lectures 14–15: Dynamic Competition

• [JT], Chapter 6.
• Rotemberg, Julio J., and Garth Saloner. “A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms.” American Economic Review 76 (1986): 390–407.
• Green, E. J., and R. Porter. “Non-cooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information.” Econometrica 52 (1984): 87–100.
• Abreu, Dilip, David Pearce, and E. Stachetti. “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring.” Econometrica 58 (1990): 1041–63.
• Athey, Susan, Kyle Bagwell, and Chris Sanchirico. “Collusion and Price Rigidity.” Review of Economic Studies 71 (2004): 317–49.
• Athey, Susan, and Kyle Bagwell. “Optimal Collusion with Private Information.” RAND Journal of Economics 32 (2001): 651–674.
• Harrington, Joseph E. “Cartel Price Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority.” RAND Journal of Economics 35 (2004): 651–674.
• Harrington, Joseph E., and Andrzej Skrzypacz. “Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices.” American Economic Review 101 (2011): 1–25.
• Sugaya, Tetsuya, and Ariel Wolitzky. “Maintaining Privacy in Cartels.” Journal of Political Economy 126 (2018): 2569–2607.
• Awaya, Yuichiro, and V. Krishna. “On Communication and Collusion.” American Economic Review 106 (2016): 285–315.
• McCutcheon, Barbara. “Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?” Journal of Political Economy 105 (1997): 330–350.
• Borenstein, Severin, and A. Shepard. “Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets.” RAND Journal of Economics 27 (1996): 429–51.
• Porter, Robert H. “A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Economic Committee, 1880–1886.” Bell Journal of Economics 14 (1983): 301–314.
• Ellison, Glenn. “Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee.” RAND Journal of Economics 25 (1994): 37–57.
• Asker, John, A. Collard Wexler, and Jan De Loecker. “Market Power, Production (Mis)allocation, and OPEC.” American Economic Review 109, no. 4 (2019): 1568–1615.
• Genesove, David, and W. Mullin. “Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case.” American Economic Review 91 (2001): 379–398.
• Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole. “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles.” Econometrica 56 (1988): 571–599.
• Noel, Michael. “Edgeworth Price Cycles: Evidence from the Toronto Retail Gasoline Markets.” Journal of Industrial Economics 55 (2007): 69–92.
• Wang, Zhongmin. “Mixed Strategy in Oligopoly Pricing: Evidence from Gasoline Price Cycles Before and Under a Timing Regulation.” Journal of Political Economy 117 (2009): 987–1030.
• Calvano, Emilio, Giacomo Calzolari, Vincenzo Denicolo, and Sergio Pastorello. “Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion.” American Economic Review 110 (2020): 3267–3297.
• Klein, Timo. “Autonomous Algorithmic Collusion: Q-learning Under Sequential Pricing.” RAND Journal of Economics 52 (2021): 538–558.
• Brown, Zach, and Alexander MacKay. “Competition in Pricing Algorithms.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming, 2022.
• Ellison, Sara Fisher, Christopher Snyder, and Hongkai Zhang. “Costs of Managerial Attention and Activity as a Source of Sticky Prices: Structural Estimates from an Online Market.” NBER Working Paper 24680 (2018).
• Asker, John, Chaim Fershtman, and Ariel Pakes. “Artificial Intelligence and Pricing: The Impact of Algorithm Design.” NBER Working Paper 28535 (2021).
• Johnson, Justin, Andrew Rhodes, and Matthijs Wildenbeest. “Platform Design When Sellers Use Pricing Algorithms.” Working Paper (2021).

Lectures 16–17: Entry

• [JT], Sections 7.1–7.2.
• Mankiw, N.G., and M. Whinston. “Free Entry and Social Inefficiency.” RAND Journal of Economics 17 (1986): 48–58.
• Sutton, J. Sunk Costs and Market Structure. MIT Press, 1991. Chapters 1–2.
• Jovanovic, B. “Selection and the Evolution of Industry.” Econometrica 50 (1982): 649–670.
• Vellodi, Nikhil. “Ratings Design and Barriers to Entry.” Working paper (2021).
• Bresnahan, T., and P. Reiss. “Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 99 (1991): 977–1009.
• Berry, S., and J. Waldfogel. “Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting.” RAND Journal of Economics 30 (Autumn 1999): 397–420.
• Dunne, T., M. Roberts, and L. Samuelson. “Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing.” RAND Journal of Economics 19 (Winter 1988): 495–515.
• Golder, P., and G. Tellis. “Pioneer Advantage: Marketing Logic or Marketing Legend.” Journal of Marketing Research 30 (993): 158–170.
• Bronnenberg, B., S. Dhar, and J.-P. Dube. “Brand History, Geography, and the Persistence of Brand Shares.” Journal of Political Economy 117 (2009): 2472–2508.
• Bronnenberg, Bart, Jean-Pierre Dube, and Matthew Gentzkow. “The Evolution of Brand Preferences: Evidence from Consumer Migration.” American Economic Review 102 (2012): 2472–2508.
• Foster, Lucia, John Haltiwanger, and Chad Syversion. “The Slow Growth of New Plants: Learning About Demand.” Econometrica 83 (2016): 91–129.
• Berry, S., A. Eizenberg, and J. Waldfogel. “Optimal Product Variety in Radio Markets.” RAND Journal of Economics 47 (Fall 2016): 463–497.

Lectures 18–19: Strategic Investment

• [JT], pp. 207–8, Chapter 8.
• Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Chapter 12, Appendix B.
• Bulow, J., John Geanakoplos, and Paul Klemperer. “Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements.” Journal of Political Economy 93 (1985): 488–511.
• Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. “The Fat Cat Effect, the Puppy Dog Ploy, and the Lean-and-Hungry Look.” American Economic Review 74 (1984): 361–366.
• Dixit, Avinash K. “The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence.” Economic Journal 90 (1980): 721–729.
• Schmalensee, Richard. “Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry.” Bell Journal of Economics 9 (1978): 305–327.
• Judd, Kenneth L. “Credible Spatial Preemption.” Rand Journal of Economics 16 (1985): 153–166.
• Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton. “Entry Prevention Through Contracts with Customers.” American Economic Review 77 (1987): 388–401.
• Whinston, Michael D. “Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion.” American Economic Review 80 (1990): 837–859.
• Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. “Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis.” Econometrica 50 (1982): 443–459.
• Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. “A Signal Jamming Theory of Predation.” Rand Journal of Economics 17 (1986): 366–376.
• Chevalier, Judith. “Capital Structure and Product Market Competition: Empirical Evidence from the Supermarket Industry.” American Economic Review 85 (1995): 415–435.
• Goolsbee, Austan, and Chad Syverson. “How Do Incumbents React to the Threat of Entry? The Case of Major Airlines.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (2008): 1611–1633.
• Ellison, G., and S. F. Ellison. “Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3 (2011): 1–36.
• Sweeting, Andrew, James Roberts, and Chris Gedge. “A Model of Dynamic Limit Pricing with an Application to the Airline Industry.” Journal of Political Economy 123 (2020): 1148–1193.
• Smiley, R. “Empirical Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 6 (1988): 167–180.
• Zheng, Fanyin. “Spatial Competition and Preemptive Entry in the Discount Retail Industry.” Columbia Working Paper (2016).
• Cunningham, Colleen, Florian Ederer, and Song Ma. “Killer Acquisitions.” Journal of Political Economy (2022).
• Ryan, Stephen. “The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry.” Econometrica 80 (2012): 1019–1061.
• Pakes, Ariel, and Paul McGuire. “Computing Markov Perfect Equilibrium: Numerical Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product Model.” Rand Journal of Economics 25 (1994): 555–589.
• Pakes, Ariel, and Robert Ericson. “Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work.” Review of Economic Studies 62 (1995): 53–82.
• Besanko, David, Ulrich Doraszelski, Yannis Kryukov, and Mark Satterthwaite. “Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics.” Econometrica 78 (2010): 453–508.

Lectures 20–21: Bounded Rationality

• Ellison, G. “Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization.” In Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, vol. 2, edited by R. Blundell, W. Newey, and T. Persson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
• Rubinstein, Ariel. “On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model.” Journal of Political Economy 101 (1993): 473–484.
• Van Zandt, Timothy. “Real Time Information Processing as a Model of Organizations with Boundedly Rational Agents.” Review of Economic Studies 66 (1999): 633–658.
• Della Vigna, Stefano, and Ulrike Malmendier. “Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (2004): 353–402.
• Della Vigna, Stefano, and Ulrike Malmendier. “Paying Not to Go to the Gym.” American Economic Review 96 (2006): 694–719.
• Heidhues, Paul, and Botond Koszegi. “Exploiting Naivete about Self Control in the Credit Market.” American Economic Review 100 (2010): 2279–2303.
• Heidhues, Paul, Botond Koszegi, and Takeshi Murooka. “Procrastination Markets.” Working paper (2021).
• Heidhues, Paul, and Botond Koszegi. “Competition and Price Variation when Consumers are Loss Averse.” American Economic Review 98 (2008): 1245–1268.
• Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer. “Salience and Consumer Choice.” Journal of Political Economy 121 (2013): 803–843.
• Grubb, Michael. “Selling to Overconfident Consumers.” American Economic Review 99 (2009): 1770–1807.
• Grubb, Michael. “Cellular Service Demand: Biased Beliefs, Learning, and Bill Shock.” American Economic Review 105 (2015): 234–271.
• Seim, Katja, Varia Ana Vitorino, and David Muir. “Drip Pricing When Consumers Have Limited Foresight: Evidence from Driving School Fees.” Working paper (2017).
• Grunewald, Andreas, Jonathan Lanning, David Low, and Tobias Salz. “Auto Dealer Loan Intermediation: Consumer Behavior and Competitive Effects.” Working paper (2020).
• Kamenica, Emir. “Contextual Inference in Markets: On the Informational Content of Product Lines.” American Economic Review 98 (2008): 2127–2149.
• Spiegler, Ran. “The Market for Quacks.” Review of Economic Studies 73 (2006): 1113–1131.
• Antler, Yair. “Multilevel Marketing: Pyramid-Shaped Schemes or Exploitative Scams.” Mimeo, 2018.
• Ellison, G., and D. Fudenberg. “Rules of Thumb for Social Learning.” Journal of Political Economy 101 (1993): 612–643.
• Sobel, Joel. “A Model of Declining Standards.” International Economic Review 41 (2000): 295–303.
• Ellison, Glenn. “Evolving Standards for Academic Publishing: A q-r Theory.” Journal of Political Economy 110 (2002): 994–1034.
• Baye, Michael R., and John Morgan. “Price Dispersion in the Lab and on the Internet: Theory and Evidence.” RAND Journal of Economics 35 (2004): 449–466.
• Eliaz, Kfir, and Ran Spiegler. “Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing.” Review of Economic Studies 78 (2011): 235–262.
• Piccione, Michele, and Ran Spiegler. “Price Competition under Limited Comparability.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (2012): 97–135.

Lecture 22: Advertising 

• [JT], Sections 2.2–2.4, 7.3.
• Butters, George R. “Equilibrium Distribution of Prices and Advertising.” Review of Economic Studies 44 (1977): 465–492.
• Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. “Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality.” Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986): 796–821.
• Anderson, Simon, and Regis Renault. “Comparative Advertising: Disclosing Horizontal Match Information.” RAND Journal of Economics 40 (2009): 558–581.
• Becker, Gary S., and Kevin M. Murphy. “A Simple Theory of Advertising as a Good or Bad.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (1993): 941–964.
• Shapiro, J. “A Memory Jamming Theory of Advertising.” Mimeo, 2006.
• Lauga, Dominique. “Persuasive Advertising with Sophisticated but Impressionable Consumers.” Mimeo, 2008.
• Lewis, Randall A., and David H. Reiley. “Online Ads and Offline Sales: Measuring the Effects of Retail Advertising via a Controlled Experiment on Yahoo!” Quantitative Marketing and Economics 12 (2014): 235–266.
• Lewis, Randall A., Justin M. Rao, and David H. Reiley. “Here, There, and Everywhere: Correlated Online Behaviors Can Lead to Overestimates of the Effects of Advertising.” WWW 2011.
• Milyo, Jeffrey, and Joel Waldfogel. “The Effect of Price Advertising on Prices: Evidence in the Wake of 44 Liquormart.” American Economic Review 89 (1999): 1081–1096.
• Ackerberg, Daniel A. “Empirically Distinguishing Informative and Prestige Effects of Advertising.” RAND Journal of Economics 32 (Summer 2001): 316–333.
• Shapiro, Bradley. “Positive Spillovers and Free Riding in Advertising of Prescription Pharmaceuticals: The Case of Antidepressants.” Journal of Political Economy 126 (2018): 381–437.
• Tucker, Catherine, and Avi Goldfarb. “Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising.” Management Science 57 (2011): 57–71.
• Aridor, Guy, Yeon-Koo Che, and Tobias Salz. “The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence from GDPR.” Working paper (2022).

Lectures 23–24: Auctions

• Krishna, Vijay. Auction Theory. Academic Press, 2002.
• Klemperer, Paul. “Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature.” Journal of Economic Surveys 13 (1999): 227–286.
• McAfee, R. Preston, and John McMillan. “Auctions and Bidding.” Journal of Economic Literature 25 (1987): 699–738.
• Milgrom, Paul. “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (Summer 1989): 3–22.
• Ausubel, Lawrence, and Paul Milgrom. “The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction.” In Combinatorial Auctions, edited by Cramton et al., MIT Press, 2005.
• Bulow, Jeremy, and Paul Klemperer. “Auctions Versus Negotiations.” American Economic Review 86 (1996): 180–194.
• Pesendorfer, Martin, and J. Swinkels. “Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions.” American Economic Review 90 (2000): 499–525.
• Daskalakis, Christos, Christos Papadimitriou, and Chrysanthos Tazmos. “Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?” In Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ‘16, 2016.
• Gomes, Renato. “Optimal Auction Design in Two-Sided Markets.” RAND Journal of Economics 45 (2014): 248–271.
• Doraszelski, Ulrich, Katja Seim, Michael Sinkinson, and Peter Wang. “Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction.” NBER Working Paper 23034 (2019).
• Hendricks, Kenneth, and Robert Porter. “An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information.” American Economic Review 78 (1988): 865–883.
• Kagel, John H., Dan Levin, and R. Harstad. “Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study.” Econometrica 55 (1987): 1275–1304.
• Lucking-Reiley, David. “Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet.” American Economic Review 89 (1999): 1063–1080.
• Roberts, James, and Andrew Sweeting. “When Should Sellers Use Auctions?” American Economic Review 103 (2013): 1830–1861.
• Said, Maher. “Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization.” Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012): 2419–2438.
• Kong, Yunmi. “Not Knowing the Competition: Evidence and Implications for Auction Design.” RAND Journal of Economics 51 (2020): 840–867.
• Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Hervé Ossard, and Quang Vuong. “Econometrics of First-Price Auctions.” Econometrica 63 (1995): 953–980.
• Guerre, Emmanuel, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong. “Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First Price Auctions.” Econometrica 68 (2000): 525–574.
• Athey, Susan, and Jonathan Levin. “Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions.” Journal of Political Economy 109 (2001): 375–417.
• Athey, Susan, Jonathan Levin, and Enrique Seira. “Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (2011): 207–257.
• Haile, Philip A., and Elie Tamer. “Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions.” Journal of Political Economy 111 (2003): 1–51.
• Asker, John. “A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel.” American Economic Review 100 (2010): 724–762.

Lectures 25–26: Online Markets

• Edelman, Benjamin, Michael Ostrovsky, and Michael Schwarz. “Generalized Second Price Auction.” American Economic Review 97 (2007): 242–259.
• Athey, Susan, and Glenn Ellison. “Position Auctions with Consumer Search.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (2011): 1213–1270.
• Rayo, Luis, and Ilya Segal. “Optimal Information Disclosure.” Journal of Political Economy 118 (2010): 949–987.
• Anderson, Simon, and Regis Renault. “Search Direction: Position Externalities and Position Auction Bias.” Working paper (2021).
• Armstrong, Mark, and Jidong Zhou. “Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition.” American Economic Review 112 (2022): 534–577.
• Bergemann, Dirk, and Alessandro Bonatti. “Selling Cookies.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7 (2015): 259–294.
• Einav, Liran, Theresa Kuchler, Jonathan Levin, and Neel Sundaresan. “Assessing Sales Strategies in Online Markets Using Matched Listings.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7 (2015): 215–247.
• Einav, Liran, Chiara Farronato, Jonathan Levin, and Neel Sundaresan. “Auctions Versus Posted Prices in Online Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 126 (2018): 178–215.
• Mayzlin, Dina, and Judith Chevalier. “The Effect of Word of Mouth on Sales: Online Book Reviews.” Journal of Marketing Research 43 (2006): 345–354.
• Che, Yeon-Koo, and Johannes Hörner. “Recommender Systems and Mechanisms for Social Learning.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 133 (2018): 871–925.
• Mayzlin, Dina, Yaniv Dover, and Judith Chevalier. “Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation.” American Economic Review 104 (2014): 2421–2455.
• Brynjolfsson, Erik, Yu Hu, and Michael Smith. “Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the Value of Increased Product Variety at Online Booksellers.” Management Science 49 (2003): 1580–1596.
• Ellison, Glenn, and Sara Fisher Ellison. “Match Quality, Search, and the Internet Market for Used Books.” Working paper (2020).
• Quan, Thomas, and Kevin Williams. “Product Variety, Across-Market Demand Heterogeneity, and the Value of Online Retail.” RAND Journal of Economics 49 (2018): 877–913.