Cahuc and Zilberberg’s Labor Economics (MIT Press, 2004) is a useful reference. You may also want to consult the lecture notes on Prof. Acemoglu’s website (Acemoglu, Daron and David Autor, Lectures in Labor Economics**, Web notes**), though these do not cover all our material.
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates a recommended reading.
I. Labor Market Externalities
A. Non-Pecuniary and Pecuniary Externalities in the Labor Market
J. E. Rauch. “Productivity Gains from Geographic Concentration of Human Capital: Evidence from the Cities.” Journal of Urban Economics 34, 380–400 (1993).
D. Acemoglu. “A Microfoundation for Social Increasing Returns in Human Capital Accumulation.” (PDF) Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(3), 779–804 (1996).
*D. Acemoglu and J. Angrist. “How Large Are the External Returns to Education: Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws.” NBER Macro Annual 2000.
E. Moretti. “Human Capital Externalities in Cities.” (PDF) Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, vol. 4. Elsevier, 2004. 2243–2291.
A. Ciccone and G. Peri. “Identifying Human Capital Externalities: Theory with Applications.” Review of Economic Studies 73(2), 381–412 (2006).
B. Signaling
* M. Spence. “Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(3), 355–374 (1973).
J. Stiglitz. “The Theory of Screening, Education, and the Distribution of Income.” American Economic Review 66, 283–300 (1986).
K. Lang and D. Kropp. “Human Capital Versus Sorting: The Effects of Compulsory Attendance Laws.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(2), 609-624 (1986).
K. Bedard. “Human Capital Versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Dropouts.” Journal of Political Economy 109(4), 749–775 (2001).
A. Chevalier, C. Harmon, I. Walker, and Y. Zhu. “Does Education Raise Productivity, or Just Reflect It?” (PDF) The Economic Journal 114(499), F499–F517 (2004).
* J. Tyler, R. J. Murnane, and J. Willett. “Estimating the Labor Market Signaling Value of the GED.” (PDF) Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(2), 431–468 (2000).
II. Social Mobility, Peer Effects and Human Capital
A. Social Mobility
* G. Becker and N. Tomes. “Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families.” Journal of Labor Economics 4, S1–S39 (1986).
* G. Solon. “Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States.” American Economic Review 82(3), 393–408 (June 1992).
D. J. Zimmerman. “Regression Toward Mediocrity in Economic Stature.” American Economic Review 82(3) 409–29 (June 1992).
C. Mulligan. Parental Priorities and Economic Inequality. University of Chicago Press (1997).
R. Chetty, N. Hendren, P. Kline, and E. Saez. “Is the United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in Intergenerational Mobility.” (PDF) American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 104(5), 141–147 (2014).
* R. Chetty, N. Hendren, P. Kline, and E. Saez. “Where Is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States.” (PDF) Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(4), 1553–1623 (2014).
* R. Chetty, N. Hendren, and L. F. Katz. “The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment.” (PDF) American Economic Review 106(4), 855–902 (2016).
J. Roback. “Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life.” Journal of Political Economy 90(6), 1257–1278 (1982).
* O. Galor and J. Zeira. “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics.” (PDF) Review of Economic Studies 60, 35–52 (1993).
* R. Benabou. “Workings of a City: Location, Education and Production.” (PDF) Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3), 619–652 (1993).
* R. Benabou. “Heterogeneity, Stratification and Growth: Macroeconomic Implications of Community Structure in School Finance.” (PDF) American Economic Review 86(3), 584–609 (1996).
R. Fernandez and R. Rogerson. “Income Distribution, Communities and the Quality of Public Education.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(1), 135–164 (1996).
C. Hoxby. “Are Efficiency and Equity in School Finance Substitutes or Complements?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(4), 51–72 (1996).
B. Peer Effects
E. P. Lazear. “Educational Production.” (PDF) Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(3), 777–803 (2001).
S. Black. “Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Evaluation of Elementary Education.” (PDF) Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3), 577–600 (1999).
P. Bayer, F. Ferreira, and R. MacMillan. “A Unified Framework for Measuring Preferences for Schools and Neighborhoods.” Journal of Political Economy 115(4), 588–68 (2007).
C. Manski. “Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem.” Review of Economic Studies 60, 531–542 (1993).
J. Angrist. “The Perils of Peer Effects.” Labour Economics 30(C), 98–108 (2014).
* B. Crepon, E. Duflo, M. Grugand, R. Rathelot, and P. Zamora. “Do Labor Market Policies Have Displacement Effects? Evidence from a Clustered Randomized Experiment." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(2), 531–580 (2014).
* B. Sacerdote. “Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 681–704 (2001).
D. Zimmerman. “Peer Effects in Academic Outcomes: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” Review of Economics and Statistics 85, 9–23 (2003).
D. Lyle. “Estimating and Interpreting Peer and Role Model Effects from Randomly Assign Social Groups at West Point.” Review of Economics and Statistics 89, 289–299 (2007).
A. Mas and E. Moretti. “Peers at Work.” (PDF) American Economic Review 99(1), 112–145, (March 2009).
D. Card and L. Giuliano. “Peer Effects and Multiple Equilibria in the Risky Behavior of Friends.” (PDF) The Review of Economics and Statistics 95(4), 1130–1149 (October 2013).
* Y. Bramoulle, H. Djebbari, and B. Fortin. “Identification of Peer Effects through Social Networks.” Journal of Econometrics, 150, 41–55 (2009).
D. Acemoglu, C. Jimeno Garcia, and J. A. Robinson. “State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach.” (PDF) American Economic Review 105(8), 2364–2409, (August 2015).
* S. Carrell, B. Sacerdote, and J. West. “From Natural Variation to Optimal Policy? The Lucas Critique Meets Peer Effects.” Econometrica 81(3), 855–882 (2013).
R. A. Zarate. “Social and Cognitive Peer Effects: Experimental Evidence from Selective High Schools in Peru.” (PDF) MIT mimeo (2018).
III. Incentives, Agency, and Efficiency Wages
A. Multitasking
* B. Holmström. “Moral Hazard and Observability.” (PDF) Bell Journal of Economics 10, 74–91 (1979).
E. Lazear. “Performance Pay and Productivity.” American Economic Review 90(5), 1346–1361 (2000).
* B. Holmström and P. Milgrom. “Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design.” (PDF) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 7(0), 24–52 (1991).
G. P. Baker. “Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement.” (PDF) Journal of Political Economy 100(3), 598–614 (1992).
P. Courty and G. Marschke. “An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives.” (PDF) Journal of Labor Economics 22, 23–56 (2004).
* P. Oyer. “Fiscal Year Ends and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect on Business Seasonality.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 149–85 (1998).
L. Alston and R. Higgs. “Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture since the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests.” Journal of Economic History 42, 327–53 (1982).
B. Career Concerns in the Private and the Public Sector
* B. Holmström. “Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective.” Review of Economic Studies 66(1), 169–82 (1999).
M. Dewatripont, I. Jewitt, and J. Tirole. “The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures.” Review of Economic Studies 66(1), 183–198 (January 1999).
A. Dixit. “Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review.” Journal of Human Resources 37(4), 696–727 (Fall 2002).
D. Acemoglu, M. Kremer, and A. Mian. “Incentives in Markets, Firms and Governments.” (PDF) Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations 24(2), 273–306 (December 2007).
J. Chevalier and G. Ellison. “Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers." (PDF) Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 389–432 (1999).
E. Fehr and S. Gächter. “Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation?” (PDF) Zurich IEER Working Paper No. 34 (2002).
C. Efficiency Wages
* C. Shapiro and J. Stiglitz. “Equilibrium Unemployment as Worker Discipline Device.” American Economic Review 74(3), 433–444 (June 1984).
J. Bulow and L. Summers. “A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination and Keynesian Unemployment.” Journal of Labor Economics 4, 376–415 (1986).
D. Acemoglu and A. Newman. “The Labor Market and Corporate Structure.” (PDF) European Economic Review 46, 1733–1756 (December 2002).
E. Lazear. Personnel Economics, chapter 3. MIT Press (1996).
D. Raff and L. Summers. “Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?” (PDF) Journal of Labor Economics 5, S57–S86 (1987).
C. M. Campbell III and K. S. Kamlani. “The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence from a Survey of Firms.” (PDF) Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(3), 759–789 (1997).
D. Neil. “Supervision and Wages Across Industries.” Review of Economics and Statistics 75, 409–417 (August 1993).
A. B. Krueger. “Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(1), 75–101 (1991).
* P. Cappelli and K. Chauvin. “An Interplant Test of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(3), 769–787 (1991).
* A. B. Krueger and L. H. Summers. “Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure." Econometrica 56(2), 259–293 (1988).
IV. Investment in Skills
A. Holdups and Investments
* P. Grout. “Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach.” Econometrica 52, 449–460 1984.
S. Grossman and O. Hart. “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.” (PDF) Journal of Political Economy 94, 691–719 (1986).
O. Hart and J. H. Moore. “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm.” (PDF) Journal of Political Economy 98, 1119–58 (1990).
B. Investment in General Skills
D. Acemoglu. “Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market.” (PDF) Review of Economic Studies 64, 445–464 (1997a).
* D. Acemoglu and S. Pischke. “Why Do Firms Train?” (PDF) Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(1), 79–119 (1998).
* D. Acemoglu and S. Pischke. “The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training.” (PDF) Journal of Political Economy 107, 539–572 (June 1999).
* D. H. Autor. “Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?” (PDF) Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(3), 1409–1448 (2001).
D. Acemoglu and S. Pischke. “Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets.” (PDF) Economic Journal 109, F112–142 (February1999).
D. Acemoglu and S. Pischke. “Minimum Wages and On-the-Job Training." Research in Labor Economics 22, 159–202 (2000).
C. Specific Skills, Investments and Learning
R. Topel. “Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority.” Journal of Political Economy 99(1), 145–176 (1991).
G. Baker, M. Gibbs, and B. Holmström. “The Wage Policy of a Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(4), 921–955 (1994).
* L. Jacobson R. LaLonde, and D. Sullivan. “Earning Losses of Displaced Workers.” American Economic Review 83, 685–709 (1993).
D. Neal. “Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence From Displaced Workers.” Journal of Labor Economics 13, 653–677 (October 1995).
J. Altonji and R. Shakotko. “Do Wages Rise With Job Seniority?” Review of Economic Studies 54, 437–459 (1987).
K. Abraham and H. Farber. “Job Duration, Seniority, and Earnings.” American Economic Review 77(3), 278–297 (1986).
* B. Jovanovic. “Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover.” Journal of Political Economy 87(5), 972–990 (1979).
* B. Jovanovic. “Firm Specific Capital and Turnover.” Journal of Political Economy 87(6), 1246–1260 (1979).
* E. Lazear. “Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Skill Weights Approach.” NBER Working Paper No. 9679. (2003)
R. Topel and M. Ward. “Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(2), 439–479 (1992).
* C. Prendergast, Canice. “The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(2), 523–534 (1993).
L. Charmichael. “Firm-Specific Capital and Promotion Ladders.” Bell Journal of Economics 14(1), 251–258 (1983).
E. Lazear. Personnel Economics, chapter 7. MIT Press (1995).
H. Farber and R. Gibbons. “Learning and Wage Dynamics.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 107–147 (1996).
V. Search and Unemployment
A. Unemployment, Non-Employment and Labor Market Flows
* S. Nickell. “Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, 55–74 (1997).
R. Shimer. “Why Is the U.S. Unemployment Rate So Much Lower?” (PDF) Macroeconomics Annual (1998).
C. Juhn, K. Murphy, and R. H. Topel. “Why Has the Natural Rate of Unemployment Increased over Time?" (PDF) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2), 75–126 (1991).
* M. Elsby, B. Hobjin, and A. Sahin. “The Labor Market in the Great Recession.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 41(1)(Spring), 1–69 (2010).
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD Jobs Study, volumes 1 and 2 (1994).
O. Blanchard and P. Diamond. “The Beveridge Curve.” Brookings Papers on Economics Activity 1, 1–60 (1989).
S. J. Davis, R. J. Faberman, and J. Haltiwanger. “The Flow Approach to Labor Markets: New Data Sources and Micro-Macro Links.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(3), 3–26 (2006).
B. The Partial Equilibrium Search Model
* R. Rogerson, R. Shimer, and R. Wright. “Search Models of the Labor Market: A Survey.” Journal of Economic Literature 43, 959–988 (2004).
C. The Basic Equilibrium Search Framework
* C. Pissarides. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. MIT Press (2000).
A. Hosios. “On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment.” Review of Economics Studies 57(2), 279–98 (1990).
* D. Mortensen and C. Pissarides. “Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment.” Review of Economic Studies 61, 397–416 (1994).
D. Monopsony
* O. C. Ashenfelter, H. Farber, and M. R. Ransom. “Labor Market Monopsony.” (PDF) Journal of Labor Economics 28(2), 203–210 (2010) .
* V. Bhaskar, A. Manning, and T. To. “Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets.” (PDF) Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(2), 155–174 (2002).
W. M. Boal and M. R. Ransom. “Monopsony in the Labor Market.” Journal of Economic Literature 35(1), 86–112 (1997).
A. Manning. Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets. Princeton University Press (2003).
* K. Burdett and D. T. Mortensen. “Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment.” International Economic Review 39(2), 257–273 (1998).
F. Postel–Vinay and J.–M. Robin. “Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker and Employer Heterogeneity.” (PDF) Econometrica 70(6), 2295–2350 (2002).
S. Caldwell and N. Harmon. “Outside Options, Bargaining, and Wages: Evidence from Coworker Networks.” (PDF) Unpublished manuscript, University of Copenhagen (2019).
E. Assignment Models
S. Rosen. “The Economics of Superstars.” American Economic Review 71, 845–858 (1981).
* M. Sattinger. “Comparative Advantage and the Distribution of Earnings and Abilities.” (PDF) Econometrica 43, 455–468 (1975).
* C. N. Teulings. “The Wage Distribution in a Model of the Assignment of Skills to Jobs.” Journal of Political Economy 103, 280–315 (1995).
* X. Gabaix and A. Landier. “Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 49–100 (2006).
M. Tervio. “The Difference that CEOs Make: An Assignment Model Approach.” American Economic Review 98, 642–668 (2008).
D. Acemoglu, D. Laibson, and J. List. “Equalizing Superstars: The Internet and the Democratization of Education.” (PDF) American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 523–527 (2014).
F. The Composition of Jobs
* D. Acemoglu. “Good Jobs versus Bad Jobs.” (PDF) Journal of Labor Economics 19, 1–22 (January 2001).
* D. Acemoglu. “Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality: An Alternative Theory and Some Evidence.” (PDF) American Economic Review 89(6), 1259–1278 (1999).
D. Autor and D. Dorn. “The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market.” (PDF) American Economic Review 103(5), 1553–1597 (2013).
N. Jaimovich and H. Siu. “The Trend Is the Cycle: Job Polarization and Jobless Recoveries.” (PDF) NBER Working Papers 18334 (2013).
C. L. Foote and R. W. Ryan. “Labor Market Polarization over the Business Cycle.” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 29(1), 371–413 (2015).
G. Real and Nominal Wage Rigidity (for future reference; we will probably not have time for this topic)
R. Shimer. “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies.” American Economic Review 95, 25–49 (2005).
R. E. Hall and P. R. Milgrom. “The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain.” American Economic Review 98, 1653–1674 (2008).
* R. Shimer. “The Consequences of Rigid Wages in Search Models.” Journal of European Economic Association 2, 469–479 (2008).
* C. Pissarides. “The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?” (PDF) Econometrica 77, 1339–1369 (2009).
R. Shimer. “Wage Rigidities and Jobless Recoveries.” (PDF) Journal of Monetary Economics, 59, S65–S77 (2012).
* T. Bewley. Why Wages Don’t Fall During a Recession. Harvard University Press (1999).
* D. Card and D. Hyslop. “Does Inflation ‘Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market’?” (PDF) In C. D. Romer and D. H. Romer (eds.), Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy. NBER Studies in Business Cycles 30. University of Chicago Press (1997).
W. T. Dickens, L. Goette, E. L. Groshen, S. Holden, J. Messina, M. E. Schweitzer, J. Turunen, and M. E. Ward. “How Wages Change: Micro Evidence from the International Flexibility Project.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(2), 195–214 (2007).
* E. Fehr and L. Goette. “Robustness and Real Consequences of Nominal Wage Rigidity.” Journal of Monetary Economics 52(4), 779–804 (2005).
S. Nickell and G. Quintini. “Nominal Wage Rigidity and the Rate of Inflation.” (PDF) The Economic Journal 113, 762–781 (2003).
S. Kaur. “Nominal Wage Rigidity in Village Labor Markets.” American Economic Review 109(10), 3585–3616 (2019).
