The reading list is intentionally long, to give those of you interested in the field an opportunity to dig deeper into some of the topics in this area. The lectures will cover the material marked with an * in detail and also discuss the material without an *, but in less detail.
First Half of the Class Taught by Prof. Daron Acemoglu
| LEC # | TOPICS | READINGS |
|---|---|---|
| Voters (Sessions 1–7) | ||
| 1–2 | Collective Choices and Voting |
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1951, 2nd ed., 1963). Social Choice and Individual Values, Yale University Press. Black, Duncan (1948). “On the Rationale of Group Decision-making”, Journal of Political Economy 56 (1), pp. 23-34. Downs, Anthony (1957). “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy”, Journal of Political Economy 65 (2), pp. 135-150. Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks (2000). Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference, University of Michigan Press. ISBN: 9780472087211.
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521671422.
*Lindbeck, Assar, and Jorgen W. Weibull (1987). “Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition”, Public Choice 52 (3), pp. 273-297. |
| 3 | Voting and Information Aggregation |
Myerson, Roger B. and Robert J. Weber (1993). “A Theory of Voting Equilibria”, American Political Science Review 87 (1), pp. 102-114. Austen-Smith, David (1991). “Rational Consumers and Irrational Voters: A Review Essay on Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory, by Stephen Magee, William Brock and Leslie Young, Cambridge University Press 1989”, Economics and Politics 3 (1), pp. 73-92. Palfrey, Thomas R. and Howard Rosenthal (1985). “Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty”, American Political Science Review 79 (1), pp. 62-78. Feddersen, Timothy and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1998). “Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting”, American Political Science Review 92 (1), pp. 23-35. Feddersen, Timothy and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1996). “The Swing Voter’s Curse”, American Economic Review 86 (3), pp. 408-424. Fey, Mark and Jaehoon Kim (2002). “The Swing Voter’s Curse: Comment”, American Economic Review, 92 (4), pp. 1264-1268 Martinelli, Cèsar (2001). “Elections with Privately Informed Parties and Voters”, Public Choice 108 (1-2), pp. 147-167 Battaglini, Marco, Rebecca B. Morton and Thomas R. Palfrey (2008). “Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections”, American Economic Review 98 (2), pp. 194-200. — — —(2010). “The Swing Voter’s Curse in the Laboratory”, Review of Economic Studies 77 (1), pp. 61-89. |
| 4–5 | Votes and Political Decisions in Practice |
* Spenkuch, Jörg L. (2017). “Expressive vs. Pivotal Voters: An Empirical Assessment.” Fujiwara, Thomas (2011). “A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and Duverger’s Law”, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 6, pp. 197-233. Coate, Stephen, Michael Conlin and Andrea Moro (2008). “The Performance of Pivotal-Voter Models in Small-Scale Elections: Evidence from Texas Liquor Referenda”, Journal of Public Economics 92 (3-4), pp. 582-596. Degan, Arianna and Antonio Merlo (2009). “Do Voters Vote Ideologically?”, Journal of Economic Theory 144 (5), pp. 1868-1894. Harsanyi, John C. (1980). “Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior”, Theory and Decision 12 (2), pp. 115-133. Feddersen, Timothy and Alvaro Sandroni (2006). “A Theory of Participation in Elections”, American Economic Review 96 (4), pp. 1271-1282. * DellaVigna, Stefano, John A. List, Ulrike Malmendier and Gautam Rao (2017). “Voting to Tell Others”, Review of Economic Studies 84 (1), pp. 143-181. * Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green and Ron Shachar (2003). “Voting May Be Habit-Forming: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment”, American Journal of Political Science 47(3), pp. 540-550. Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green, and Christopher W. Larimer (2008). “Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment”, American Political Science Review 102(1), pp. 33-48. Nickerson, David W. (2008). “Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments”, American Political Science Review 102(1), pp. 49-57. Do Parties and Policies Converge to the Middle?* Lee, David S., Enrico Moretti and Matthew J. Butler (2004). “Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (3), pp. 807-859. * Pettersson-Lidbom, Per (2008). “Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach”, Journal of the European Economic Association 6 (5), pp. 1037-1056. Levitt, Steven D. (1996). “How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Rate of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology”, American Economic Review 86 (3), pp. 425-441. Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997). “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1), pp. 85-114. Osborne, Martin J. and Al Slivinski (1996). “A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1), pp. 65-96. * Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra and Esther Duflo (2004). “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India”, Econometrica 72 (5), pp. 1409-1443. Mian, Atif, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi (2010). “The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis”, American Economic Review 100 (5), pp. 1967-98. Policies Reflect Voter Preferences?* Miller, Grant (2008). “Women’s Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (3), pp. 1287-1327. Lott, Jr., John R. and Lawrence W. Kenny (1999). “Did Women’s Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of Government?”, Journal of Political Economy 107 (6), pp. 1163-1198. Husted, Thomas A. and Lawrence W. Kenny (1997). “The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government”, Journal of Political Economy 105 (1), pp. 54-82. * Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo and James A. Robinson (2015). “Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality”, Chapter 21 in Handbook of Income Distribution, Volume 2, edited by Anthony B. Atkinson and François Bourguignon, Elsevier. ISBN: 9780444594303. * Fujiwara, Thomas (2015). “Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil”, Econometrica 83 (2), pp. 423-464. Card, David and Enrico Moretti (2007). “Does Voting Technology Affect Election Outcomes? Touch-Screen Voting and the 2004 Presidential Election”, Review of Economics and Statistics 89 (4), pp. 660-673. * Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels (2016). Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government, Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691169446. |
| 6–7 | Election Politics Gone Wrong: Lobbying, Vote Buying, Clientelism, Coercion, and Populism. |
* Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (1994). “Protection for Sale”, American Economic Review 84 (4), pp. 833-850. * Baron, David P. (1994). “Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters”, American Political Science Review 88 (1), pp. 33-47. * Groseclose, Tim and James M. Snyder, Jr. (1996). “Buying Supermajorities”, American Political Science Review 90 (2), pp. 303-315. Dekel, Eddie, Matthew O. Jackson, and Asher Wolinsky (2008). “Vote Buying: General Elections”, Journal of Political Economy 116 (2), pp. 351-380. * Blanes i Vidal, Jordi, Mirko Draca and Christian Fons-Rosen (2012). “Revolving Door Lobbyists”, American Economic Review 102 (7), pp. 3731-48. * Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi (2014). “Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process”, American Economic Review 104 (12), pp. 3885-3920. Bombardini, Matilde, and Francesco Trebbi (2011). “Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress.” Journal of Public Economics 95 (7-8), pp. 587-611. Bartels, Larry M. (2008). Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of a New Gilded Age, Princeton University Press. Gilens, Martin (2012). Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America, Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691153971. Gawande, Kishore, and Usree Bandyopadhyay (2000). “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection”, Review of Economics and Statistics 82 (1), pp. 139-152. Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou and Giovanni Maggi (1999). “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation”, American Economic Review 89 (5), pp. 1135-1155. Kerr, William R., William F. Lincoln and Prachi Mishra (2014). “The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6 (4), pp. 343-379. Ansolabehere, Stephen, John M. de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder Jr. (2003). “Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (1), pp. 105-130. Clientelism, Patronage and Coercion* Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico (2005). “A Drawback of Electoral Competition”, Journal of the European Economic Association 3 (4), pp. 1318-1348. * Finan, Frederico and Laura Schechter (2012). “Vote-Buying and Reciprocity”, Econometrica 80 (2), pp. 863-881. Nichter, Simeon (2008). “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot”, American Political Science Review 102 (1), pp. 19-31. * Anderson, Siwan, Patrick Fran¸cois and Ashok Kotwal (2015). “Clientelism in Indian Villages”, American Economic Review 105(6), pp. 1780-1816. * Larreguy, Horacio A. (2013). “Monitoring Political Brokers: Evidence from Clientelistic Networks in Mexico.” ESPA 2013 Annual General Conference Paper 655. * Baland, Jean-Marie and James A. Robinson (2008). “Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile”, American Economic Review 98 (5), pp. 1737-1765. * Folke, Olle, Shigeo Hirano and James M. Snyder Jr. (2011). “Patronage and Elections in U.S. States”, American Political Science Review 105 (3), pp. 567-585. de Kadt, Daniel and Horacio A. Larreguy (2018). “Agents of the Regime? Traditional Leaders and Electoral Behavior in South Africa”, The Journal of Politics 80 (2). Martinez-Bravo, Monica (2014). “The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: Evidence from Indonesia”, American Economic Review 104 (4), pp. 1244-1287. Populist Politics* Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin (2013). “A Political Theory of Populism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (2), pp. 771-805. Judis, John B. (2016). The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics, Columbia Global Reports. ISBN: 9780997126440. Guiso, Luigi, Helios Herrera, Massimo Morelli and Tommaso Sonno (2017). “Demand and Supply of Populism” (PDF - 2.1M). Dornbusch, Rudiger and Sebastian Edwards, ed. (1991). The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, University of Chicago Press. ISBN: 9780226158440. |
| Politicans (Sessions 8–10) | ||
| 8–9 | Political Agency |
Barro, Robert J. (1973). “The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model”, Public Choice 14, pp. 19-42. * Ferejohn, John (1986). “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control”, Public Choice 50 (1), pp. 5-25. Banks, Jefrey S. and Rangarajan K. Sundaram (1998). “Optimal Retention in Agency Problems”, Journal of Economic Theory 82 (2), pp. 293-323. * Acemoglu, Daron, Michael Golosov and Aleh Tsyvinski (2008). “Political Economy of Mechanisms”, Econometrica 76 (3), pp. 619-641. Myerson, Roger B. (2015). “Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy”, Econometrica 83 (6), pp. 2083-2126. * Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan (2008). “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (2), pp. 703-745. * — — — (2009). “Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance”, NBER Working Paper No. 14906. Besley, Timothy and Anne Case (1995). “Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (3), pp. 769-798. Dal Bó, Ernesto and Martìn A. Rossi (2011). “Term Length and the Effort of Politicians”, Review of Economic Studies 78 (4), pp. 1237-1263. |
| 10 | Political Agency Gone Wrong |
* Albertus, Michael and Victor Menaldo (2014). “Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance During Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution”, British Journal of Political Science 44 (3), pp. 575-603. * Acemoglu, Daron, Thierry Verdier and James A. Robinson (2003). “Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule.” NBER Working Paper No. w10136. * Padro ì Miquel, Gerard (2008). “The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: Politics of Fear”, Review of Economic Studies 74 (4), pp. 1259-1274. Dixit, Avinash, Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997). “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making”, Journal of Political Economy 105 (4), pp. 752-769. Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin (2010). “Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (4), pp. 1511-1576. Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson and Ragnar Torvik (2013). “Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?”, Review of Economic Studies 80 (3), pp. 845-875. * Anderson, Siwan and Patrick François (2017). “Reservations and the Politics of Fear” (PDF). * Acemoglu, Daron, Tristan Reed and James A. Robinson (2014). “Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone”, Journal of Political Economy 122 (2), pp. 319-368. |
| Policies (Sessions 11–14) | ||
| 11 | Economic Policy under Representative Democracy |
Rubinstein, Ariel (1982). “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Econometrica 50 (1), pp. 97-109. * Baron, David P. and John A. Ferejohn (1989). “Bargaining in Legislatures”, American Political Science Review 83 (4), pp. 1181-1206. Bernheim, B. Douglas, S. Nageeb Ali and Xiaochen Fan (2014). “Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining”, NBER Working Paper No. 20011. Banks, Jeffrey S. and John Duggan (2000). “A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice”, American Political Science Review 94 (1), pp. 73-88. Bernheim, B. Douglas, Antonio Rangel and Luis Rayo (2006). “The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making”, Econometrica 74 (5), pp. 1161-1190. Cox, Gary W. (1997). Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems, Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521585279. * Persson, Torsten, Gùrard Roland and Guido Tabellini (1997). “Separation of Powers and Political Accountability”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (4), pp. 1163-1202. * Persson, Torsten, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini (2000). “Comparative Politics and Public Finance”, Journal of Political Economy 108 (6), pp. 1121-1161. Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (1996). “Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics”, Review of Economic Studies 63 (2), pp. 265-286.
* Acemoglu, Daron (2005). “Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s the Economic Effects of Constitutions”, Journal of Economic Literature XLIII, pp. 1025-1048. |
| 12 | Political Compromise |
* Alesina, Alberto (1987). “Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (3), pp. 651-678. Dixit, Avinash, Gene M. Grossman and Faruk Gul (2000). “The Dynamics of Political Compromise”, Journal of Political Economy 108 (3), pp. 531-568. McGuire, Martin C. and Mancur Olson (1996). “The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force”, Journal of Economic Literature 34 (1), pp. 7296. de la Sierra, Raúl Sánchez (2017). “On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo”. * Acemoglu, Daron, Mikhail Golosov and Aleh Tsyvinski (2010). “Power Fluctuations and Political Economy”, Journal of Economic Theory 146 (3), pp. 1009-1041. |
| 13–14 | Economic Policy under Nondemocratic Institutions |
* Acemoglu, Daron (2006). “Modelling Inefficient Institutions”, NBER Working Paper. 11940. * Acemoglu, Daron (2009). Chapter 22 “Institutions, Political Economy, and Growth”, Introduction to Modern Economic Growth, Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691132921. Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2006). “Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective”, American Political Science Review 100 (1), pp. 115-131. Fergusson, Leopoldo (2013). “The Political Economy of Rural Property Rights and the Persistence of the Dual Economy”, Journal of Development Economics 103, pp. 167-181. * Acemoglu, Daron (2008). “Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies”, Journal of the European Economic Association 6 (1), pp. 1-44. Olson, Mancur (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, Yale University Press. ISBN: 9780300023077. Stasavage, David (2014). “Was Weber Right? The Role of Urban Autonomy in Europe’s Rise”, American Political Science Review 108 (2), pp. 337-354. Stasavage, David (2017). “When Inclusive Institutions Failed: Lessons from the Democratic Revolutions of the Middle Ages”. |
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press. ISBN: 9780262161954. Second Half of the Class taught by Prof. Benjamin Olken
| TOPICS | READINGS | |
|---|---|---|
| Conflict (Sessions 15–17) | ||
| Theory: Why Does Conflict Take Place? Bargaining Failures and Other Reasons |
* Fearon, James D. (1995). “Rationalist Explanations for War”, International Organization 49(3): 379-414. * Jackson, Matthew O., and Massimo Morelli (2007). “Political Bias and War”, American Economic Review 97(4): 1353-1373. Baliga, Sandeep and Tomas Sjöström (2011). “Conflict Games with Payoff Uncertainty”. Caselli, Francesco and Wilbur John Coleman II (2013). “On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict”, Journal of the European Economic Association 11(1): 161-192. Chassang, Sylvain and Gerard Padrò I Miquel (2010). “Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(4): 1821-1858. Dal Bó, Ernesto and Pedro Dal Bó (2011). “Workers, Warriors, and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium”, Journal of the European Economic Association 9(4): 646–677. Esteban, Joan and Debraj Ray (2008). “On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict”, American Economic Review 98(5): 2185-2202. Powell, Robert (2004). “The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information”, American Political Science Review 98(2): 231-241. Shelling, Thomas C. (1981). The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press. ISBN: 9780674840317. |
|
| Why Does Conflict Occur? Costs, Benefits, and Other Factors |
* Dube, Oeindrila and Juan F. Vargas (2013). “Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia”, Review of Economics Studies 80(4): 1384-1421. Blattman, Christopher and Jeannie Annan (2016). “Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebellion? A Field Experiment with High-Risk Men in a Fragile State”, American Political Science Review 110(1): 117. Baliga, Sandeep, David O. Lucca and Tomas Sjostrom (2011). “Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace?”, Review of Economic Studies 78(2): 458-486. Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2003). “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, American Political Science Review 97(1): 75-90. Jones, Benjamin F. and Benjamin A. Olken (2009). “Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 1(2): 55-87. Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath and Ernest Sergenti (2004). “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach”, Journal of Political Economy 112(4): 725-753. Nunn, Nathan and Nancy Qian (2014). “U.S. Food Aid and Civil Conflict”, American Economic Review 104(6): 1630-1666. Yanagizawa-Drott, David (2014)."Propaganda and Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide", Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(4): 1947-1994. DellaVigna, Stefano, Ruben Durante, Vera Mironova, Maria Petrova and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2014). “Cross-Border Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 6(3): 103 -132. Durante, Ruben and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2018). “Attack When the World Is Not Watching? U.S. News and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, Journal of Political Economy 126 (3). Hsiang, Solomon M., Marshall Burke and Edward Miguel (2013). “Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict”, Science 341 (6151). Bazzi, Samuel and Matthew Gudgeon (2016). “Local Government Proliferation, Diversity, and Conflict”. Dell, Melissa (2015). “Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War”, American Economic Review 105 (6): 1738-1779. |
|
| Counterinsurgency |
* Dell, Melissa and Pablo Querubin (2017). “Nation Building Through Foreign Intervention: Evidence from Discontinuities in Military Strategies”, forthcoming in Quarterly Journal of Economics. * Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia and Ruben Enikolopov (2016). “Winning Hearts and Minds through Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan”. Berman, Eli, Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter (2011). “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq”, Journal of Political Economy 119(4): 766-819. Crost, Benjamin, Joseph Felter and Patrick Johnston (2014). “Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict”, American Economic Review 104(6): 1833-1856. Crost, Benjamin, Joseph H. Felter and Patrick B. Johnson (2016). “Conditional Cash Transfers, Civil Conflict, and Insurgent Influence: Experimental Evidence from the Philippines”, Journal of Development Economics 118(1): 171-182. Shaver, Andrew and Jacob N. Shapiro (2017). “The Effect of Civilian Casualties on Wartime Informing: Evidence from the Iraq War”, forthcoming in Journal of Conflict Resolution. |
|
| The Costs of Conflict |
Abadie, Alberto and Javier Gardeazabal (2003). “The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country”, American Economic Review 93(1): 113-132. Blattman, Christopher and Jeannie Annan (2010). “The Consequences of Child Soldiering”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(4): 882–898. Guidolin, Massimo and Eliana La Ferrara (2010). “The Economic Effects of Violent Conflict: Evidence from Asset Market Reactions”, Journal of Peace Research 47(6): 671–684. Davis, Donald R., David E. Weinstein (2002). “Bones, Bombs, and Break Points: the Geography of Economic Activity”, American Economic Review 92(5): 1269 1289. Miguel, Edward, and Gérard Roland (2011). “The Long-run Impact of Bombing Vietnam”, Journal of Development Economics 96(1): 1-15. |
|
| Collective Action (Sessions 18 & 19) | ||
| Collective Action and Group Size |
Olson, Mancur Jr. (1971). The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press. ISBN: 9780674537514. Putnam, Robert D. (1994). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press. * Ray, Debraj and Esteban, Joan Maria (2001). “Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox”, American Political Science Review 95(3): 663-672. * Banerjee, Abhijit, Lakshmi Iyer and Rohini Somanathan (2008). “Public Action for Public Goods”, Chapter 49 in Handbook of Development Economics, Volume 4, edited by T. Paul Shultz and John A. Strauss. ISBN: 9780444531001. Banerjee, Abhijit and Rohini Somanathan (2007). “The Political Economy of Public Goods: Some Evidence from India”, Journal of Development Economics 82(2): 287-317. Banerjee, Abhijit, Dilip Mookherjee, Kaivan Munshi and Debraj Ray (2001). “Inequality, Control Rights and Rent-Seeking: Sugar Cooperatives In Maharashtra”, Journal of Political Economy 109(1): 138-190. |
|
| Collective Action and Ethnic Heterogeneity |
* Hjort, Jonas (2014). “Ethnic Divisions and Production in Firms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(4): 1899-1946. * Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir and Caroline Hoxby (2004). “Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities”, Journal of Political Economy 112(2): 348-396. Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir and William Easterly (1999). “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(4): 1243-1284. Alesina, Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara (2000). “Participation in Heterogeneous Communities”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3): 847-904. Miguel, Edward and Mary Kay Gugerty (2005). “Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods in Kenya”, Journal of Public Economics 89(11-12): 2325-2368. Olken, Benjamin A. (2009). “Do TV and Radio Destroy Social Capital? Evidence from Indonesian Villages”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1(4): 1-33. Miguel, Edward (2004). “Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania”, World Politics 56(3): 327-362. Olken, Benjamin A. and Monica Singhal (2011). “Informal Taxation”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3(4): 1-28. Munshi, Kaivan and Mark Rosenzweig (2015). “Insiders and Outsiders: Local Ethnic Politics and Public Good Provision”, NBER Working Paper No. 21720. Bazzi, Samuel, Arya Gaduh, Alexander Rothenberg, and Maisy Wong (2017). “Unity in Diversity? Ethnicity, Migration, and Nation Building in Indonesia” (PDF - 1.5MB). |
|
| Social Capital and Collective Action |
* Olken, Benjamin A. (2009). “Do TV and Radio Destroy Social Capital? Evidence from Indonesian Villages”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1(4): 1-33. Olken, Benjamin A. and Monica Singhal (2011). “Informal Taxation”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3(4): 1-28. Khwaja, Asim Ijaz (2009). “Can Good Projects Succeed in Bad Communities?”, Journal of Public Economics 93(7-8): 899-916. Putnam, Robert D. (1994). Making Democracy Work: Civing Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691037387. |
|
| Promoting Collective Action |
* Banerjee, Abhijit V., Rukmini Banerji, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster and Stuti Khemani (2010). “Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from Three Randomized Experiments in Education in India”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2(1): 1-30. * Björkman, Martina and Jakob Svensson (2009). “Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(2): 735-769. Björkman Nyqvist, Martina, Damien de Walque, Jakob Svensson (2017). “Experimental Evidence on the Long-Run Impact of Community-Based Monitoring”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9(1): 33-69. Alisjahbana, Armida, Rima Prama Artha, Amanda Beatty, Arya Gaduh, Menno Pradhan, Daniel Suryadarma and Maisy Wong (2014). “Improving Educational Quality through Enhancing Community Participation: Results from a Randomized Field Experiment in Indonesia”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 6(2):105-126. * Olken, Benjamin A. (2007). “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia”, Journal of Political Economy 115(2): 200-249. |
|
| Can Stimulating Collective Actions Change Institutions? |
* Casey, Katherine, Rachel Glennerster and Edward Miguel (2012). “Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Preanalysis Plan”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(4): 1755-1812. * Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia and Ruben Enikolopov (2013). “Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan”. Fearon, James D., Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M. Weinstein (2015). “How Does Development Assistance Affect Collective Action Capacity? Results from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia”, American Political Science Review 109(3): 450-469. Humphreys, Macartan, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, and Peter van der Windt (2015). “Social Engineering In The Tropics: Null Evidence from a Grassroots Democratization Experiment in East Congo". |
|
| Decentralization and Local Capture |
* Alatas, Vivi, Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Benjamin A. Olken, Ririn Purnamasari and Matthew Wai-Poi (2013). “Does Elite Capture Matter? Local Elites and Targeted Welfare Programs in Indonesia”, NBER Working Paper No. 18798. * Acemoglu, Daron, Tristan Reed and James A. Robinson (2014). “Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone”, Journal of Political Economy 122(2): 319-368. * Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padrò i Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao (2014). “Political Reform in China: The Effect of Local Elections". Alatas, Vivi, Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Benjamin Olken and Julia Tobias (2012). “Targeting the Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia”, American Economic Review 102(4): 1206-1240. Bardhan, Pranab K. and Dilip Mookherjee (2000). “Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels”, American Economic Review 90(2): 135-139. Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia and Ruben Enikolopov (2017). “Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan”, Journal of Development Economics, 124: 199-213. |
|
| Media (Sessions 20 & 21) | ||
| Political Influence on Media |
Mcmillan, John and Pablo Zoido (2004). “How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(4): 69-92. Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova and Andrei Shleifer (2003). “Who Owns the Media?”, Journal of Law and Economics 46(2): 341-381. Gehlbach, Scott and Konstantin Sonin (2014). “Government Control of the Media”, Journal of Public Economics 118: 163-171. Gentzkow, Matthew, Nathan Petek, Jesse Shapiro and Michael Sinkinson (2015). “Do Newspapers Serve the State? Incumbent Party Influence on the US Press, 1869-1928”, Journal of the European Economic Association 13(1): 29-61. Egorov, Georgy, Sergei Guriev and Konstantin Sonin (2009). “Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data”, American Political Science Review 103(4): 645-668. Reuter, Jonathan and Eric Zitzewitz (2006). “Do Ads Influence Editors? Advertising and Bias in the Financial Media”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(1): 197-227. DellaVigna, Stefano, Ruben Durante, Brian Knight and Eliana La Ferrara (2013). “Market-Based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8(1): 224-256. Di Tella, Rafael and Ignacio Franceschelli (2011). “Government Advertising and Media Coverage of Corruption Scandals”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3(4): 119-151. |
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| Media Bias and Voting |
* Gentzkow, Matthew and Jesse M. Shapiro (2006). “Media Bias and Reputation”, Journal of Political Economy 114(2): 280-316. Prat, Andrea (2017). “Media Power”, forthcoming in Journal of Political Economy. * Durante, Ruben and Brian Knight (2012). “Partisan Control, Media Bias, and Viewer Responses: Evidence from Berlusconi’s Italy”, Journal of the European Economic Association 10(3): 451-481. Mullainathan, Sendhil and Andrei Shleifer (2005). “The Market for News,”, American Economic Review 95(4): 1031-1053. DellaVigna, Stefano and Ethan Kaplan (2007). “The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(3): 1187-1234. Gerber, Alan S., Dean Karlan and Daniel Bergan (2009). “Does the Media Matter? A Field Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and Political Opinions”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1(2): 35-52. Gentzkow, Matthew, Jesse M. Shapiro and Michael Sinkinson (2011). “The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics,” American Economic Review, 101(7): 2980-3018. Enikolopov, Ruben, Maria Petrova and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2011). “Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia”, American Economic Review, 101(7): 3253-3285. Gentzkow, Matthew and Jesse M. Shapiro (2010). “What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers”, Econometrica 78(1):35-71. Puglisi, Riccardo and James M. Snyder, Jr. (2014). “The Balanced US Press”, Journal of the European Economic Association 13(2): 240-264. Groseclose, Tim and Jeffrey Milyo (2005). “A Measure of Media Bias”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(4): 1191-1237. Larcinese, Valentino, Riccardo Puglisi and James M. Snyder, Jr. (2011). “Partisan Bias in Economic News: Evidence on the Agenda-Setting Behavior of U.S. Newspapers”, Journal of Public Economics 95(9-10): 1178-1189. Allcott, Hunt and Matthew Gentzkow (2017). “Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 31(2): 211-236. Adena, Maja, Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, Veronica Santarosa and Katia Zhuravskay (2015). “Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(4): 1885-1939. Durante, Rube, Paolo Pinotti and Andrea Tesei (2017). “The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV”, mimeo. |
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| Media’s Impact on Policy |
* Snyder, James M. Jr. and David Stromberg (2010). “Press Coverage and Political Accountability”, Journal of Political Economy 118(2): 355-408. * Larreguy, Horacio, John Marshall and Janes M. Snyder Jr. (2016). “Leveling the Playing Field: How Campaign Advertising Can Help Non-Dominant Parties”, NBER Working Paper No. 22949. * Campante, Filipe R. and Quoc-Anh Do (2014). “Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability, and Corruption: Evidence from US States”, American Economic Review 104(8): 2456-2481. Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess (2002). “The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4): 1415-1451. Strömberg , David (2004). “Radio’s Impact on Public Spending”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1): 189-221. Eisensee, Thomas and David Strömberg (2007). “News Droughts, News Floods, and U.S. Disaster Relief”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(2): 693-728. DellaVigna, Stefano, et al. (2014). “Cross-Border Media and Nationalism:Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 6(3): 103-132. Yanagizawa-Drott, David (2014). “Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(4): 1947-1994. Adena, Maja, et al. (2015). “Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(4): 1885-1939. |
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| Media and Protest |
Barberà, Salvador and Matthew O. Jackson (2017). “A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information”. Chong, Alberto, Claudio Ferraz, Frederico Finan, Eliana La Ferrara and Luis Meloni (2017). “Can Entertainment Media Undermine Dictatorships? Evidence from Brazil’s Novelas (PDF)”, mimeo. Enikolopov, Ruben, Alexey Makarin, and Maria Petrova (2016). “Social Media and Protest Participation: Evidence from Russia”. Campante, Filipe Ruben Durante and Francesco Sobbrio (2017). “Politics 2.0: The Multifaceted Effect of Broadband Internet on Political Participation”, forthcoming in Journal of the European Economic Association. Manacorda, Marco and Andrea Tesei (2016). “Liberation Technology: Mobile Phones and Political Mobilization in Africa (PDF - 5.7MB)”, mimeo. Madestam, Andreas, Daniel Shoag, Stan Veuger and David Yanigazawa-Drott (2013). “Do Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(4): 1633-1685. |
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| Bureaucracy (Sessions 22 & 23) | ||
| Do Bureaucrats Matter? |
* Best, Michael Carlos, Jonas Hjort, and David Szakonyi (2017). “Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectiveness, and Consequences for Policy Design”, NBER Working Paper No. 23350. Bertrand, Marianne, Robin Burgess, Arunish Chawla and Guo Xu (2016). “The Costs of Bureaucratic Rigidity: Evidence from the Indian Administrative Service (PDF - 2.5MB)”, mimeo. Do, Quoc-Anh, Kieu-Trang Nguyen, and Anh Tran (2016). “One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime", American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9 (4): 1–29. |
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| Incentives for and Allocation of Bureaucrats |
* Khan, Adnan Q., Asim I. Khwaja and Benjamin A. Olken (2016). “Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 131 (1): 219-271. *— — — (2016). “Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Posting”. Fisman, Raymond and Youngxiang Wang (2017). “The Distortionary Effects of Incentives in Government: Evidence from China’s Death Ceiling Program", American Economic Journal:Applied Economics 9 (2): 202–212. Serrato, Juan Carlos Suarez, Xiao Yu Wang and Shuang Zhang (2017). “The Limits of Meritocracy: Screening Bureaucrats Under Imperfect Verifiability”, NBER Working Paper No. 21963. Iyer, Lakshmi and Anandi Mani (2012). “Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India”, Review of Economics and Statistics 94(3): 723-739. Mas, Alexandre (2006). “Pay, Reference Points and Police Performance”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(3): 783821. |
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| Selection of Bureaucrats |
* Xu, Guo (2017). “The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire (PDF)”, mimeo. Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, and Scott S. Lee (2016). “Do-Gooders and Go-Getters: Selection and Performance in Public Service Delivery”, mimeo. Dal B´o, Ernesto, Frederico Finan and Martin A. Rossi (2013). “Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(3): 1169-1218. Hanna, Rema and Shing-Yi Wang (2016). “Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service”, forthcoming in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. Weaver, Jeff B. (2017). “Jobs for Sale: Corruption and Misallocation in Hiring (PDF -2.0MB)”, mimeo. Ornaghi, Arianna (2016). “Civil Service Reforms: Evidence from U.S. Police Departments (PDF -1.4MB)”, mimeo. |
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| Rules vs. Discretion |
Duflo, Esther, Rohini Pande, Michael Greenstone and Nicholas Ryan (2016). “The Value of Regulatory Discretion: Estimates from Environmental Inspections in India”, mimeo. Tran, Anh (2011), “Which Regulations Reduce Corruption? Evidence from the Internal Records of a Bribe-Paying Firm”, mimeo. |
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| Corruption (Sessions 24–27) | ||
| Efficiency Costs |
* Banerjee, Abhijit, Rema Hanna and Sendhil Mullainathan (2012). “Corruption”, Chapter 27 in Handbook of Organizational Economics, edited by Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691132792. * Bandiera, Oriana, Andrea Prat and Tommaso Valletti (2009). “Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment”, American Economic Review 99 (4): 1278-1308. ** Bertrand, Marianne, Simeon Djankov, Rema Hanna and Sendhil Mullainathan (2007). “Obtaining a Driver’s License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4): 1639-1676. Fisman, Raymond, Florian Schulz and Vikrant Vig (2014). “The Private Returns to Public Office”, Journal of Political Economy 122(4): 806-862. Chaudhury, Nazmul, Jeffrey Hammer, Michael Kremer, Karthik Muralidharan and Halsey F. Rogers (2006). “Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(1): 91-116. Cheung, Yan Leung, P. Raghavendra Rau and Aris Stouraitis (2012). “How Much Do Firms Pay as Bribes and What Benefits Do They Get? Evidence From Corruption Cases Worldwide”, NBER Working Paper No. 17981. Fisman, Ray (2001). “Estimating the Value of Political Connections”, American Economic Review 91(4): 1095-1102. Fisman, Ray and Shang-Jin Wei (2004). “Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from ‘Missing Imports’ in China”, Journal of Political Economy 112(2): 471-500. Fisman, David, Raymond J. Fisman, Julia Galef, Rakesh Khurana and Yongxiang Wang (2012). “Estimating the Value of Connections to Vice-President Cheney”, The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 13(3): 1-18. Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Enrico Moretti (2006). “Did Iraq Cheat the United Nations? Underpricing, Bribes, and the Oil for Food Program”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(4): 1211-1248. Klitgaard, Robert (1991). Tropical Gangsters: One Man’s Experience with Development and Decadence in Deepest Africa, Basic Books. ISBN: 9780465087600. Mauro, Paulo (1995). “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(30): 681-712. Niehaus, Paul and Sandip Sukhtankar (2013). “The Marginal Rate of Corruption in Public Programs: Evidence from India”, Journal of Public Economics 104: 52-64. Reinikka, Ritva and Jakob Svensson (2004). “Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(2): 679-705. Plunkitt, George Washington. (2014). Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A Series of Very Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics. The Project Gutenberg, 2001. ISBN: 9781494885007. Sequeira, Sandra and Simeon Djankov (2014). “Corruption and Firm Behavior: Evidence from African Ports”, Journal of International Economics 94(2): 277-329. Wade, Robert (1982). “The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India”, Journal of Development Studies 18(3): 287-328. |
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| The Official’s Decisions to Be Corrupt: Wages, Incentives, and Selection |
*Olken, Benjamin A. (2007). “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia”, Journal of Political Economy 115(2): 200-249. * Becker, Gary S. and George J. Stigler (1974). “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers”, Journal of Legal Studies 3(1): 1-18. * Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan (2011). “Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance”, mimeo. Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo and Racheo Glennerster (2008). “Putting a Band-Aid on a Corpse: Incentives for Nurses in the Indian Public Health Care System”, Journal of European Economic Association 6(2-3): 487-500. Duflo, Esther, Rema Hanna and Stephen P. Ryan (2012). “Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School”, American Economic Review 102(4): 1241-1278. Niehaus, Paul and Sandip Sukhtankar (2013). “Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5(4): 230-269. Di Tella, Rafael and Ernesto Schargrodsky (2003). “The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires (PDF)”, Journal of Law and Economics 46(1): 269-292. Mookerjee, Dilip and I. P. L. Png (1995). “Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?”, Economic Journal 105: 145-159. Zamboni, Yves and Stephan Litschig (2017). “Audit Risk and Rent Extraction: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Brazil”. Banerjee, Abhijit, Rema Hanna, Jordan Kyle, Benjamin A. Olken and Sudarno Sumarto (2017). “Tangible Information and Citizen Empowerment: Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia”, forthcoming in Journal of Political Economy. Muralidharan, Karthik, Paul Niehaus, and Sandip Sukhtankar (2016). “Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India”, American Economic Review 106 (10): 2895-2929. |
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| The IO of Corruption |
* Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny (1993). “Corruption”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3): 599-617. ** Olken, Benjamin A. and Patrick Barron (2009). “The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh”, Journal of Political Economy 117(3): 417-452. * Burgess, Robin, Matthew Hansen, Benjamin A. Olken, Peter Potapov and Stefanie Sieber (2012). “The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(4): 1707-1754. Bai, Jie, et al. (2017). “Firm Growth and Corruption: Empirical Evidence from Vietnam”, The Economic Journal. Banerjee, Abhijit V. (1997). “A Theory of Misgovernance”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (4): 1289-1332. Menes, Rebecca (2006). “Limiting the Reach of the Grabbing Hand: Graft and Growth in American Cities, 1880 to 1930”, Chapter 2 in Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America’s Economic History, edited by Edward L. Glaeser and Claudia Goldin, University of Chicago Press. Svensson, Jakob (2003). “Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Firms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1): 207-230. |
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| Corruption and Politics |
Politicians and FirmsCingano, Federico and Paolo Pinotti (2013). “Politicians at Work: The Private Returns and Social Costs of Political Connections”, Journal of the European Economic Association 11(2): 433-465. * Khwaja, Asim Ijaz and Atif Mian (2005). “Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(4): 1371-1411. Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny (1994). “Politicians and Firms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(4): 995-1025. Fisman, Raymond and Yongxiang Wang (2015). “The Mortality Cost of Political Connections”, Review of Economic Studies 82(4): 1346-1382. Elections as a Disciplinary Device* Banerjee, Abhijit, Selvan Kumar, Rohini Pande and Felix Su (2011). “Do Informed Voters Make Better Choices? Experimental Evidence from Urban India” (PDF - 4.6MB). * Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan (2008). “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits and Electoral Outcomes”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(2): 703-745. Chong, Alberto, Ana L. De La O, Dean Karlan and Leonard Wantchekon (2013). “Looking Beyond the Incumbent: Exposing Corruption and the Effect on Electoral Outcomes”, NBER Working Paper No. 17679. Elections and the Demand for CorruptionBurgess, Robin, Matthew Hansen, Benjamin A. Olken, Peter Potapov, and Stefanie Sieber (2012). “The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(4): 1707-1754. Mironov, Maxim and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2016). “Corruption in Procurement and the Political Cycle in Tunneling: Evidence from Financial Transactions Data”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8(2): 287-321. Politicians and the Rents from Office* Fisman, Raymond, Florian Schulz and Vikrant Vig (2014). “The Private Returns to Public Office”, Journal of Political Economy 122(4): 806-862. Querubin, Pablo and James M. Snyder, Jr. (2013). “The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by U.S. Congressmen, 1850-1880”, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 8(4): 409-450. |
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