14.770 | Fall 2017 | Graduate

Introduction to Political Economy


The following notes were used during the course’s recitation sessions. Courtesy of Arda Gitmez, the Teaching Assistant for the course. Used with permission.

1 Review of the first lecture and concepts; the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem Recitation 1 Notes (PDF)
2 Review of the second and third lectures; Feddersen and Pesendorfer (ASPR, 1998) Recitation 2 Notes (PDF)
3 Discussion of “Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government” by Achen and Bartels. Recitation 3 Notes (PDF)
4 Review of this week’s class; another take on Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008 Econometrica); theoretical model of Ferraz and Finan (2011, AER) Recitation 4 Notes (PDF)
5 A review of dynamic games with: a formal definition of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; a statement of single-deviation principle; Markov Perfect Equilibrium Recitation 5 Notes (PDF)
6 Markov Perfect Equilibrium; discussion of why dynamic games is different from repeated games Recitation 6 Notes (PDF)
7 Discussion and review of “The Inefficient Use of Costly Conflict with Complete Information” Powell (2004, APSR) Recitation 7 Notes (PDF)
8 Recitation notes are not available for this session. 
9 IO and media; conflict and media Recitation 9 Notes (PDF)
10 Why incentives can backfire Recitation 10 Notes (PDF)

Course Info

As Taught In
Fall 2017
Learning Resource Types
Lecture Notes
Problem Sets