The following notes were used during the course’s recitation sessions. Courtesy of Arda Gitmez, the Teaching Assistant for the course. Used with permission.
| RECITATION # | TOPICS | FILES |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Review of the first lecture and concepts; the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem | Recitation 1 Notes (PDF) |
| 2 | Review of the second and third lectures; Feddersen and Pesendorfer (ASPR, 1998) | Recitation 2 Notes (PDF) |
| 3 | Discussion of “Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government” by Achen and Bartels. | Recitation 3 Notes (PDF) |
| 4 | Review of this week’s class; another take on Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008 Econometrica); theoretical model of Ferraz and Finan (2011, AER) | Recitation 4 Notes (PDF) |
| 5 | A review of dynamic games with: a formal definition of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; a statement of single-deviation principle; Markov Perfect Equilibrium | Recitation 5 Notes (PDF) |
| 6 | Markov Perfect Equilibrium; discussion of why dynamic games is different from repeated games | Recitation 6 Notes (PDF) |
| 7 | Discussion and review of “The Inefficient Use of Costly Conflict with Complete Information” Powell (2004, APSR) | Recitation 7 Notes (PDF) |
| 8 | Recitation notes are not available for this session. | |
| 9 | IO and media; conflict and media | Recitation 9 Notes (PDF) |
| 10 | Why incentives can backfire | Recitation 10 Notes (PDF) |
