14.771 | Fall 2021 | Graduate

Development Economics

Readings

Readings marked *** are required.  

Session 1: Introduction

  • Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo (2007). “The Economic Lives of the Poor.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(1): 141-168. 
  • Banerjee, Abhijit V., (2008). “Big Answers for Big Questions: The Presumption of Growth Policy.” Brookings Global Economy and Development. 
  • Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2001). “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” American Economic Review, 91(5), 1369-1401.
  • Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2002). “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1231-1294. 
  • Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David N. Weil (1992). “A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 2, 407-437. 
  • Caselli, Francesco (2005), “Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences.” In Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 679-741. 
  • Dollar, David and Aart Kraay (2002). “Growth Is Good for the Poor.” Journal of Economic Growth, 7, 195-225. 
  • Bills, Mark and Pete Klenow (2000). “Does Schooling Cause Growth?” American Economic Review, 90(5), 1160-1183. 
  • Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi (2002), “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,” Journal of Economic Growth, 9(2), 131-165. 
  • Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (2006). “The World Distribution of Income: Falling Poverty and… Convergence, Period.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 121, No. 2: 351-397. 
  • World Bank (2021). “World Development Indicators 2020.”

Sessions 2–3: Poverty Traps

Read the following in detail:

  • *** Dasgupta, Partha and Debraj Ray (1986). “[Inequality as a Determinant of Malnutrition and Unemployment: Theory](Inequality as a Determinant of Malnutrition and Unemployment: Theory).” The Economic Journal, Vol. 96 (384), pp. 1011-1034. 
  •  *** Srinivasan, T. N. (1994). “Destitution: A Discourse.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 32 (4), pp. 1842-55. 

Theory

  • Galor, Oded and Joseph Zeira (1993). “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics.” Review of Economic Studies, 60, 35-52.

Evidence (or Lack Thereof)

  • *** Subramanian, Shankar and Angus Deaton (1996), “The Demand for Food and Calories” (PDF - 3MB). Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 104 (1), pp 133-62. 
  • Deaton, Angus and Jean Dreze (2009). “Nutrition in India: Facts and Interpretation.” Economic and Political Weekly, 14 February 2009. 
  • Strauss, John (1986), “Does Better Nutrition Raise Farm Productivity?”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, 297-320. 
  • *** Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo (2004). “Growth Theory through the Lens of Development Economics” (PDF). Section 2.1.2. 
  • *** Haushofer, Johannes and Jeremy Shapiro (2016). “The Short-term Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers to the Poor: Experimental Evidence from Kenya.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 131, Issue 4, Pages 1973–2042
  • Jensen, Robert and Nolan Miller (2011). “Do Consumer Price Subsidies Really Improve Nutrition?” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 93(4), pp. 1205-1223. 
  • Jensen, Robert and Nolan Miller (2008). “Giffen Behavior and Subsistence Consumption.” American Economic Review, 98(4), p. 1553−1577. 
  • Strauss, John and Duncan Thomas (1998). “Health, Nutrition and Economic Development.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 36 (2), 766-817. 

Breaking the poverty trap: Ultra-poor programs

  • Balboni, Clare, Oriana Bandiera, Robin Burgess, Maitreesh Ghatak, and Anton Heil (2021). “Why do people stay poor?”
  • Bandiera, Oriana, Robin Burgess, Narayan Das, Selim Gulesci, Imran Rasul, and Munshi Sulaiman (2017). “Labor markets and poverty in village economies.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132, no. 2: 811-870.
  • Abhijit Banerjee, Dean Karlan, Robert Osei, Hannah Trachtman, and Christopher Udry (2020). “Unpacking a Multi-Faceted Program to Build Sustainable Income for the Very Poor.” 
  • Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Nathanael Goldberg, Dean Karlan, Robert Osei, William Parienté, Jeremy Shapiro, Bram Thuysbaert, and Christopher Udry (2015). “A multifaceted program causes lasting progress for the very poor: Evidence from six countries.” Science 348, no. 6236. 
  • Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, and Garima Sharma (2021). “Long-Term Effects of the Targeting the Ultra Poor Program.” American Economic Review: Insights (forthcoming). 
  • Kraay, Aart, and David McKenzie (2014). “Do poverty traps exist? Assessing the evidence.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 28, no. 3: 127-48.

Sessions 3–4: Behavioral Economics

***Bessone, P., Rao, G., Schilbach, F., Schofield, H., & Toma, M. (2021). “The economic consequences of increasing sleep among the urban poor.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 136(3), 1887-1941.  

General Introduction / reference

*** Kremer, Michael, Gautam Rao, and Frank Schilbach (2019). “Behavioral Development Economics.” In Handbook of Behavioral Economics, Vol. 2. 2019. ISBN: 9780444633750.

More generally, the recent Handbook of Behavioral Economics provides great overviews of recent work on various topics, e.g. time preferences, limited attention, beliefs, behavioral IO, etc.

The Euler Equation Puzzle and Demand for Commitment

  • ***Behavioral Development Economics Handbook Chapter (see above), Sections 1 to 4.
  • Banerjee and Duflo (2010). “Growth Theory through the Lens of Development Economics”. Handbook of Economic Growth
  • Frederick, S., G. Loewenstein, and T. O’Donoghue (2002). “Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review.” Journal of Economic Literature, 40 (2), 351-401.
  • Ericson, Keith Marzilli, and David Laibson (2019). “Intertemporal choice.” In Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 1, vol. 2, pp. 1-67. North-Holland. 
  • Cohen, J.D, K.M. Ericson, D. Laibson, and J.M. White (2020). “Measuring Time Preferences.” Journal of Economic Literature. 58(2): 299-347. 
  • Ashraf, Nava, Dean Karlan, and Wesley Yin (2006). “Tying Odysseus to the mast: Evidence from a commitment savings product in the Philippines.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, no. 2: 635-672.
  • Kaur, Supreet, Michael Kremer, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2015). “Self-Control at Work.” Journal of Political Economy. 123(6): 1227-1277. 
  • Laibson, David (2015). “Why Don’t Present-Biased Agents Make Commitments?” American Economic Review P&P. 105(5): 267-272. 
  • Schilbach, Frank (2019). “Alcohol and Self-Control: A Field Experiment in India.”, American Economic Review. 109(4): 1290-1322.
  • Casaburi, Lorenzo, and Rocco Macchiavello (2019). “Demand and supply of infrequent payments as a commitment device: evidence from Kenya.” American Economic Review 109, no. 2: 523-55.
  • Bai, Liang, Ben Handel, Edward Miguel, and Gautam Rao (2021). “Self-Control and Demand for Preventative Health: Evidence from Hypertension in India.” Review of Economics and Statistics
  • Brune, Lasse, Eric Chyn, and Jason Kerwin (2021). “Pay me Later: Savings Contsraints and the Demand for Deferred Payments” American Economic Review 111(7). 2179-2212. 

Scarcity and Limited Attention

  • Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Sendhil Mullainathan (2008). “Limited Attention and Income Distribution.” American Economic Review, 98(2): 489-93. 
  • Mani, A., S. Mullainathan, E. Shafir, and J. Zhao (2013). “Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function.” Science, 341, 976-980.
  • Mullainathan, Sendhil and Eldar Shafir (2013) Scarcity. New York: Time Books. 
  • Dean, Joshua (2021) “Noise, Cognitive Function, and Worker Productivity.” Mimeo. Working Paper.
  • Fehr, Dietmar and Guenther Fink, and Kelsey Jack (2021): “Poor and Rational: Decision-Making under Scarcity.” Mimeo.
  • Kaur, Supreet, Sendhil Mullainathan, Suanna Oh, and Frank Schilbach (2021): “Do Financial Concerns Make Workers Less Productive?”. 

Sleep

  • Lim, Julian and David Dinges (2010). “A Meta-Analysis of the Impact of Short-Term Sleep Deprivation on Cognitive Variables.” Psychological Bulletin 136(3): 375-389. 
  • Walker, Matthew (2017). “Why We Sleep.” 
  • Bessone, P., Rao, G., Schilbach, F., Schofield, H., & Toma, M. (2021). “The economic consequences of increasing sleep among the urban poor.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 136(3), 1887-1941. 
  • Jagnani, Maulik (2021). “Children’s Sleep and Human Capital Production."
  • Rao, Gautam, Susan Redline, Frank Schilbach, Heather Schofield, and Mattie Toma (2021). “Informing Policy Through Field Experiments on Sleep Around the World.” 
  • Fehr, Ernst and Haushofer, Johannes (2014). “On the Psychology of Poverty.” Science 344, 862–867. 
  • Ridley, Matthew, Gautam Rao, Frank Schilbach, and Vikram Patel (2020). “Poverty, Depression, and Anxiety: Causal Evidence and Mechanisms.” Science 370(6522). 
  • Patel, Vikram, Neerja Chowdhary, Atif Rahman, and Helen Verdeli (2011). “Improving Access to Psychological Treatments: Lessons from Developing Countries.” Behavior Research and Therapy, 49, pp. 523-528. 
  • Singla, Daisy, Brandon Kohrt, Laura Murrary, Arpita Anand, Bruce Chorpita, and Vikram Patel (2017). “Psychological Treatments for the World: Lessons from Low- and Middle-Income Countries.” Annual Review of Clinical Psychology 13: 149-181.
  • Blattman, C, JC Jamison, M Sheridan (2017): “Reducing crime and violence: Experimental evidence from cognitive behavioral therapy in Liberia.” American Economic Review, 107(4): 1165-1206. 
  • Baranov, Victoria, Sonia Bhalotra, Pietro Biroli, and Joanna Maselko (2020): “Maternal Depression, Women’s Empowerment, and Parental Investment: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial.” American Economic Review. 110(3): 824-59. 
  • Angelucci, Manuela and Daniel Bennett (2021): “The Economic Impact of Depression Treatment in India.” 
  • Lund, Crick, et al. (2018). “Economic Impacts of Mental Health Interventions in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” 
  • McKelway, Maddie (2021). “Women’s Employment in India: Intra-Household and Intra-Personal Constraints”.

Sessions 6–9: Education

General Readings on Education (Review Articles)

  • Muralidharan, Karthik (2017). “Field Experiments in Education in Developing Countries.” Draft prepared for the Handbook of Field Experiments. 

The Neo-Classical Model: Returns, Costs, and Budget Constraints

  • *** Banerjee, Abhijit (2004). “Educational Policy and the Economics of the Family.Journal of Development Economics, 74 3-32. 
  • Becker, Gary (1981). A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674906990.
  • Barro, Robert (1974). “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?” Journal of Political Economy 82 (6) 1095-117.
  • Loury, Glenn (1981). “Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings.” Econometrica, 49 (4) 843-867.
  • Strauss, John and Duncan Thomas (1995). “Human Resources: Empirical Modeling of Household and Family Decisions.” In Behrman, Jere and T.N. Srinivasan, eds., Handbook of Development Economics, Volume 3. pp. 1885-2023. 

Evidence—What do household respond to?

Read in detail:

  • Duflo, Esther (2001), “Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment.” American Economic Review, Vol. 91 (4), pp 795-813. 

Perceived Returns and Benefits

Costs and opportunity costs: School building and Conditional Cash transfers

  • Benhassine, Najy, Florencia Devoto, Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, and Victor Pouliquen (2015). “Turning a shove into a nudge? A ’labeled cash transfer’ for education.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 7, no. 3: 86-125.
  • Baird, Sarah, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Özler (2011). “Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash Transfer Experiment.” Oxford University Press, vol. 126(4), pages 1709-1753.

Intra-family information gap and behavioral issues

Evidence (Part 2)—Private and Social returns to education

Read the following in detail:

*** Duflo, Esther, Pascaline Dupas, and Michael Kremer (2021). “The impact of free secondary education: Experimental evidence from Ghana.” No. w28937. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Other papers

  • Chou, Shin-Yi, Jin-Tan Liu, Michael Grossman, and Ted Joyce (2010). “Parental Education and Child Health: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Taiwan.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(1): 33-61.
  • Duflo, Esther, Pascaline Dupas, and Michael Kremer (2015). “Education, HIV, and early fertility: Experimental evidence from Kenya.” American Economic Review 105, no. 9: 2757-97. 
  • *** Duflo, Esther (2004). “The Medium Run Effects of Educational Expansion: Evidence from a Large School Construction Program in Indonesia.” Journal of Development Economics, 74(1), 163-197. 

Education: The Supply Side

General

  • ***Banerjee, Abhijit, Rukmini Banerji, James Berry, Esther Duflo, Harini Kannan, Shobhini Mukerji, Marc Shotland, and Michael Walton (2017). “From proof of concept to scalable policies: Challenges and solutions, with an application.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 31, no. 4: 73-102. 
  • Duflo Esther, Pascaline Dupas, and Michael Kremer (2011). “Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya.” American Economic Review, Vol.101(5), pp. 1739-74.
  • *** Glewwe, Paul and Michael Kremer (2006). “Schools, Teachers, and Education Outcomes in Developing Countries.” in Handbook of the Economics of Education, Elsevier. 
  • Duflo, Esther and Michael Kremer (2003). “Use of Randomization in the Evaluation of Development Effectiveness.” MIT-Harvard. Proceedings of the Conference on Evaluating Development Effectiveness, July 15-16, 2003, World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (OED) Washington, D.C. 

Class Size

Incentives

  • Muralidharan, Karthik and Venkatesh Sundararaman (2011). “Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India.” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 119, No. 1, pp. 39-77.
  • Glewwe, Paul, Nauman Ilias, and Michael Kremer (2010). “Teacher incentives.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, no. 3: 205-27. 
  • Kremer, Michael, Edward Miguel, and Rebecca Thornton. “Incentives to learn.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 91, no. 3 (2009): 437-456. 
  • Duflo, E., Hanna, R., & Ryan, S. P. (2012). “Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School.” The American Economic Review, 102(4), 1241-1278. 

Teacher Absence

  • Chaudhury, Nazmul, Jeffrey Hammer, Michael Kremer, Karthik Muralidharan, and F. Halsey Rogers (2005).“Teacher Absence in India: A Snapshot.” Journal of the European Economic Association. 3, No. 2-3, Pages 658-667. 
  • Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo (2006). “Addressing Absence.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(1) 117-132.                

Curriculum, Pedagogy, Tracking, Inputs, etc.

  • ***Duflo Esther, Pascaline Dupas and Michael Kremer (2011). “Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya.” American Economic Review, Vol.101(5), pp. 1739-74. 
  • Glewwe, Paul, Michael Kremer and Sylvie Moulin (2009). “Many Children Left Behind? Textbooks and Test Scores in Kenya.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol.1(1)112-135. 
  • Muralidharan, Karthik and Venkatesh Sundararaman (2013). “Contract Teachers: Experimental Evidence from India.” 
  • Banerjee, Abhijit, Shawn Cole, Esther Duflo and Leigh Linden (2007). “Remedying Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 122 (3) 1235-1264. 
  • Dillon, Moira R., Harini Kannan, Joshua T. Dean, Elizabeth S. Spelke, and Esther Duflo (2017). “Cognitive science in the field: A preschool intervention durably enhances intuitive but not formal mathematics.” Science 357, no. 6346: 47-55.

School Choice

  • Angrist, Joshua, Eric Bettinger, and Michael Kremer, (2006). “Long-Term Educational Consequences of Secondary School Vouchers: Evidence from Administrative Records in Colombia.” American Economic Review. Volume 96(3) 847-862. 
  • Angrist, Joshua, Eric Bettinger, Erik Bloom, Michael Kremer and Elizabeth King (2002). “Vouchers for Private Schooling in Colombia: Evidence from Randomized Natural Experiments.” The American Economic Review, December, Volume 92(5) 1535-1558. 
  • Urquiola, Miguel and Chang-Tai Hsieh, (2006). “The Effects of Generalized School Choice on Achievement and Stratification: Evidence from Chile’s School Voucher Program.” Journal of Public Economics, 90 (8-9) 1477-1503. 
  • Foster, Andrew and Mark Rosenzweig (1996). “Technical Change and Human-Capital Returns and Investments: Evidence from the Green Revolution.” American Economic Review, 86(4) 931-953.

Session 10: Time Preferences and Savings

Hyperbolic Discounting/Time Preferences, Demand for commitment

  • Ericson, Keith Marzilli, and David Laibson (2019). “Intertemporal choice.” In Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 1, vol. 2, pp. 1-67. North-Holland. 
  • Cohen, J.D, K.M. Ericson, D. Laibson, and J.M. White (2020). “Measuring Time Preferences.” Journal of Economic Literature. 58(2): 299-347.
  • Frederick, S., G. Loewenstein, and T. O’Donoghue (2002). “Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review.” Journal of Economic Literature, 40 (2), 351-401. 
  • Mahajan, Aprajit, Christian Michel, and Alessandro Tarozzi. “Identification of time-inconsistent models: The case of insecticide treated nets.” No. w27198. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020. 
  • Kaur, Supreet, Michael Kremer, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2015). “Self-Control at Work.” Journal of Political Economy. 123(6): 1227-1277. 
  • Andreoni, James, Michael Callen, Karrar Jaffar, Yasir Khan, and Charles Sprenger (2020). “Using Preference Estimates to Customize Incentives: An Application to Polio Vaccination Drives in Pakistan.” NBER.
  • Schilbach, Frank (2019). “Alcohol and Self-Control: A Field Experiment in India.” American Economic Review. 109(4): 1290-1322. 

Savings

  • Ashraf, Nava, Dean Karlan, and Wesley Yin (2006). “Tying Odysseus to the mast: Evidence from a commitment savings product in the Philippines.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, no. 2: 635-672. 
  • Blumenstock, Joshua, Michael Callen, and Tarek Ghani (2018). “Why do defaults affect behavior? Experimental evidence from Afghanistan.” American Economic Review 108, no. 10: 2868-2901.
  • Casaburi, Lorenzo, and Rocco Macchiavello (2019). “Demand and supply of infrequent payments as a commitment device: evidence from Kenya.” American Economic Review 109, no. 2: 523-55. 
  • Dupas, Pascaline, and Jonathan Robinson (2013). “Savings constraints and microenterprise development: Evidence from a field experiment in Kenya.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5, no. 1: 163-92. 
  • Dupas, Pascaline, and Jonathan Robinson (2013). “Why don’t the poor save more? Evidence from health savings experiments.” American Economic Review 103, no. 4: 1138-71. 
  • Dupas, Pascaline, Dean Karlan, Jonathan Robinson, and Diego Ubfal (2018). “Banking the unbanked? Evidence from three countries.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 10, no. 2: 257-97.
  • Schaner, Simone (2018). “The persistent power of behavioral change: Long-run impacts of temporary savings subsidies for the poor.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 10, no. 3: 67-100.

Sessions 11–12: Health

The demand for health

Read the following in detail:

  • *** Banerjee, Abhijit, Arun G. Chandrasekhar, Esther Duflo, and Matthew O. Jackson (2019). “Using gossips to spread information: Theory and evidence from two randomized controlled trials.” The Review of Economic Studies 86, no. 6: 2453-2490. 
  • *** Chernozhukov, Victor, Mert Demirer, Esther Duflo, and Ivan Fernandez-Val (2020). “Generic Machine Learning Inference on Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in Randomized Experiments, with an Application to Immunization in India.” No. w24678. National Bureau of Economic Research. 

Other readings

  • *** Dupas, Pascaline (2014). “Short-Run Subsidies and Long-Run Adoption of New Health Products: Evidence from a Field Experiment.Econometrica 82(1), pp. 197-28. 
  • Cohen, Jessica and Pascaline Dupas (2010). “Free Distribution or Cost-Sharing? Evidence from a Randomized Malaria Prevention Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (1), pp.1-45. 
  • Cohen, Jessica, Pascaline Dupas, and Simone Schaner (2015). “Price Subsidies, Diagnostic Tests, and Targeting of Malaria Treatment. American Economic Review 105, no. 2. (February 2015): 609–645.
  • Duflo, Esther, Pascaline Dupas, and Michael Kremer (2015). “Education, HIV, and early fertility: Experimental evidence from Kenya.” American Economic Review 105, no. 9: 2757-97. 
  • Dupas, Pascaline and Edward Miguel (2017). “Impacts and Determinants of Health Levels in Low-Income Countries.” Draft prepared for the Handbook of Field Experiments
  • Ashraf, Nava, James Berry, and Jesse M. Shapiro (2010). “Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia.” American Economic Review, 100(5): 2383-2413. 
  • Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, Dhruva Kothari (2010). “Improving Immunisation Coverage in Rural India: Clustered Randomised Controlled Evaluation of Immunisation Campaigns With and Without Incentives.” BMJ, 340:c2220. 
  • Thornton, Rebecca L. (2008). “The Demand for, and Impact of, Learning HIV Status.” American Economic Review, 98(5): 1829-63.

Health Care

  • *** Das, Jishnu, Alaka Holla, Aakash Mohpal, and Karthik Muralidharan (2016). “Quality and accountability in health care delivery: audit-study evidence from primary care in India.American Economic Review 106, no. 12: 3765-99. 
  • Das, Jishnu, Alaka Holla, Veena Das, Manoj Mohanan, Diana Tabak, and Brian Chan (2012). “In urban and rural India, a standardized patient study showed low levels of provider training and huge quality gaps.” Health Affairs 31, no. 12: 2774-2784. 
  • Das J, and P. Gertler (2007). “Variations in Practice Quality in Five Low-Income Countries: A Conceptual Overview.” Health Affairs, 26(3):w296-w309.
  • *** Das, Jishnu, Jeffrey Hammer, and Kenneth Leonard (2008). “The Quality of Medical Advice in Low-Income Countries.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(2): 93–114. 
  • Leonard, K.L (2009). “The Cost of Imperfect Agency in Health Care: Evidence from Rural Cameroun.” Journal of Development Economics, 88 (2). 
  • ***Leonard, K.L. (2008), “Is Patient Satisfaction Sensitive to Changes in the Quality of Care? An Exploitation of the Hawthorne Effect.” Journal of Health Economics, Volume 27, Issue 2, Pages 444-459. 
  • Banerjee A, A. Deaton, E. Duflo (2004). “Health Care Delivery in Rural Rajasthan.” Economic and Political Weekly, 15(2):153-57.
  • Das, Jishnu and Jeffrey Hammer (2005). “Which Doctor? Combining Vignettes and Item Response to Measure Clinical Competence.” Journal of Development Economics, Volume 78, Issue 2, December 2005, Pages 348-383. 
  • *** Das, Jishnu and Jeffrey Hammer (2007). “Location, Location, Location: Residence, Wealth and the Quality of Medical Care in Delhi, India.” Health Aff. 2007; 26(3); w338-w351. 
  • Chaudhury, Nazmul, Jeffrey Hammer, Michael Kremer, Karthik Muralidharan, and F. Halsey Rogers (2006). “Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(1): 91–116. 
  • Das, Jishnu and Hammer, Jeffrey (2007). “Money for Nothing: The Dire Straits of Medical Practice in Delhi, India.” Journal of Development Economics, Volume 83, Issue 1, May 2007, Pages 1-36.
  • Olken, Benjamin, Junko Onishi, and Susan Wong (2014). “Should Aid Reward Performance? Evidence From a Field Experiment on Health and Education in Indonesia.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics6 (4).
  • Banerjee, Abhijit V., Esther Duflo, and Rachel Glennerster (2008). “Putting a band-aid on a corpse: incentives for nurses in the Indian public health care system.” Journal of the European Economic Association 6, no. 2-3: 487-500. 

Infrastructure and the Environment [for reference only]

  • Kremer, Michael, Jessica Leino, Edward Miguel, and Alix Peterson Zwane (2011). “Spring Cleaning: Rural Water Impacts, Valuation, and Institutions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 126: 145-205.
  • Kremer, Michael, Alix Peterson Zwane and Amrita Ahuja (2010). “Providing Safe Water: Evidence from Randomized Evaluations.” Annual Review of Resource Economics, Volume 2. 
  • Almond, Douglas, Yuyu Chen, Michael Greenstone, and Hongbin Li (2009). “Winter Heating or Clean Air? Unintended Impacts of China’s Huai River Policy.” American Economic Review, 99(2): 184–90. 
  • Burgess, Robin, Dave Donaldson, Olivier Deschenes and Michael Greenstone (2017). “Weather and Death in India: Mechanisms and Implications for Climate Change.” 
  • Buchmann, Nina, Erica M. Field, Rachel Glennerster, and Reshmaan N. Hussam (2019). “Throwing the baby out with the drinking water: unintended consequences of arsenic mitigation efforts in Bangladesh.” No. w25729. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Session 13: Family

Read the following in detail:

 Udry, Christopher (1996). “Gender, Agricultural Production and the Theory of the Household.Journal of Political Economy. 104(5), 1010-1046. 

Other Readings

  • *** Browning, Martin and Pierre-André Chiappori (1998). “Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests. Econometrica, 66 (6): 1241-1278. 
  • Thomas, Duncan (1994). “Like Father, Like Son: Like Mother, Like Daughter: Parental Resources and Child Height.” Journal of Human Resources, 24(4): 950-88. 
  • *** Duflo, Esther and Christopher Udry (2004). “Intra-household Resource Allocation in Côte d’Ivoire: Social Norms, Separate Accounts and Consumption Choices.” NBER Working Paper No. 10498. 
  • *** Duflo, Esther (2003). “Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old Age Pension and Intra-household Allocation in South Africa.” The World Bank Economic Review, 17(1): 1-25. 
  • Basu, Kaushik (2006). “Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously Determined Balance of Power.” The Economic Journal, 116(511): 558-580. 
  • Chiappori, Pierre-André, Bernard Fortin and Guy Lacroix (2002). “Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply.” Journal of Political Economy, 110(1): 37-72. 
  • Angrist, Josh (2002). “How Do Sex Ratios Affect Marriage and Labor Markets? Evidence from America’s Second Generation.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3)997-1038. 
  • Lundberg, Shelly J., Robert A. Pollak, and Terence J. Wales (1997). “Do Husbands and Wives Pool their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit.” Journal of Human Resources, 32(3): 463–480. 
  • Ashraf, Nava (2009). “Spousal Control and Intra-Household Decision Making: An Experimental Study in the Philippines.” American Economic Review, 99(4): 1245-1277. 
  • Robinson, Jonathan (2012). “Limited Insurance Within the Household: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(4): 140–164.
  • Schaner, Simone (2015). “Do Opposites Detract? Intrahousehold Preference Heterogeneity and Inefficient Strategic Savings.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 7(2): 135-74.
  • Schaner, Simone (2016). “The Cost of Convenience? Transaction Costs, Bargaining Power, and Savings Account Use in Kenya.” Journal of Human Resources, 52(4): 919-45 
  • Field, Erica, Rohini Pande, Natalia Rigol, Simone Schaner, and Charity Troyer Moore (2021). “On Her Own Account: How Strengthening Women’s Financial Control Impacts Labor Supply and Gender Norms.” American Economic Review, 111(7): 2342-75.

Sessions 14–15: Gender, Sexual Behavior, and Female Labor Supply

  • Bursztyn, Leonardo, Alessandra L. González, and David Yanagizawa-Drott (2020). “Misperceived social norms: Women working outside the home in Saudi Arabia.” American Economic Review 110, no. 10: 2997-3029.
  • Diva Dhar, Tarun Jain, and Seema Jayachandran (2021). “Reshaping Adolescents’ Gender Attitudes: Evidence from a School-Based Experiment in India.” 
  • *** Qian, Nancy (2008). “Missing Women and the Price of Tea in China.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(3), 1251-1285.
  • McKelway, Madeline (2021). “Women’s employment in India: Intra-household and intra-personal constraints.”
  • Conlon, John J., Malavika Mani, Gautam Rao, Matthew W. Ridley, and Frank Schilbach (2021). “Learning in the Household.” No. w28844. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
  • Duflo, Esther, Pascaline Dupas, and Michael Kremer (2015). “Education, HIV, and early fertility: Experimental evidence from Kenya.” American Economic Review 105, no. 9: 2757-97. 
  • Ashraf, Nava, Erica Field, and Jean Lee (2014). “Household bargaining and excess fertility: an experimental study in Zambia.” American Economic Review 104, no. 7: 2210-37. 
  • Munshi, Kaivan, and Jacques Myaux (2006). “Social norms and the fertility transition.” Journal of Development Economics 80, no. 1: 1-38. 
  • Miller, Grant (2010). “Contraception as development? New evidence from family planning in Colombia.” The Economic Journal 120, no. 545: 709-736. 
  • Jayachandran, Seema, and Rohini Pande (2017). “Why are Indian children so short? The role of birth order and son preference.” American Economic Review 107, no. 9: 2600-2629. 
  • Duflo, Esther (2012). “Women empowerment and economic development.” Journal of Economic Literature 50, no. 4: 1051-79.
  • Jayachandran, Seema (2015). “The Roots of Gender Inequality in Developing Countries.” Annu. Rev. Econ 7: 63-88.
  • Jayachandran, Seema, and Ilyana Kuziemko (2011). “Why do mothers breastfeed girls less than boys? Evidence and implications for child health in India.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, no. 3: 1485-1538. 
  • Banerjee, Abhijit, Eliana La Ferrara, and Victor H. Orozco-Olvera (2019). “The entertaining way to behavioral change: Fighting HIV with MTV.” No. w26096. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Session 16: Land

Sharecropping and Moral Hazard

  • **Burchardi, Konrad B., Selim Gulesci, Benedetta Lerva, and Munshi Sulaiman (2019), “Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence from Tenancy Contracts.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 134(1): 281-347. 
  • Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1974). “Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping.” The Review of Economic Studies 41(2): 219-55. 
  • Shaban, Radwan Ali (1987). “Testing between Competing Models of Sharecropping.” Journal of Political Economy, 95 (5): 893-920. 
  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Mohamed Salah Matoussi (1995). “Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in El Oulja.” Review of Economic Studies, 62(3): 381-399. 
  • Banerjee, Abhijit (2000). “Prospects and Strategies for Land Reforms.” in B. Pleskovic and J. Stiglitz (eds),  Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1999. Washington, DC: World Bank, 253-284.
  • Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess (2000). “Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from India.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(2): 389-430. 

Property Rights and Investment Decisions

  • ** Goldstein, Markus and Christopher Udry (2008). “The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana.” Journal of Political Economy, 116 (6): 981-1022. 
  • ** Field, Erica (2007). “Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4): 1561-1602. 
  • Goldstein, Markus, Kenneth Houngbedji, Florence Kondylis, Michael O’Sullivan, and Harris Selod (2018). “Formalization without certification? Experimental evidence on property rights and investment.” Journal of Development Economics, 132: 57-74.
  • De Janvry, Alain, Kyle Emerick, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Elisabeth Sadoulet (2015). “Delinking Land Rights from Land Use: Certification and Migration in Mexico.” American Economic Review, 105(10), 3125-49. 
  • Galán, JS (2020). “Tied to the Land? Intergenerational Mobility and Agrarian Reform in Colombia.” Submitted to Quarterly Journal of Economics.
  • Banerjee, Abhijit, Paul J. Gertler, and Maitreesh Ghatak (2002). “Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal.” Journal of Political Economy, 110(2): 239-280. 
  • Do, Quy‐Toan and Lakshmi Iyer (2008). “Land Titling and Rural Transition in Vietnam.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 56(3): 531-579. 
  • Field, Erica and Maximo Torero (2006). “Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access Among the Urban Poor? Evidence from a Nationwide Titling Program.” 
  • Leight, Jessica (2016). “Reallocating Wealth? Insecure Property Rights and Agricultural Investment in Rural China.” China Economic Review, 40: 207-227. 
  • Montero, Eduardo (2021). “Cooperative Property Rights and Development: Evidence from a Land Reform in El Salvador.” 

Land Market Frictions and Reallocation

  • Ravallion, Martin, and Dominique van de Walle (2006). “Land Reallocation in an Agrarian Transition.” The Economic Journal, 116(514): 924-942. 
  • Bleakley, Hoyt, and Joseph Ferrie (2015). “Land Openings on the Georgia frontier and the Coase Theorem in the Short-and Long-Run.” 
  • Restuccia, Diego and Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis (2017). “Land Misallocation and Productivity.”

Sessions 17–18: Public Finance

The Design of Transfer Programs

Targeting

  • *** Alatas, Vivi, Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Benjamin A. Olken, and Julia Tobias (2012). “Targeting the Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia.American Economic Review, 102(4): 1206-1240. 
  • *** Alatas, Vivi, Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Benjamin A. Olken, Ririn Purnamasari, and Matthew Wai-Poi (2016). “Self-Targeting: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia.” Journal of Political Economy 124(2): 371-427. 
  • Hanna, Rema and Benjamin A. Olken (2018). “Universal Basic Incomes vs. Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries*.” Journal of Economic Perspectives.* 32(4): 201-226. 
  • Nichols, Albert L. and Richard J. Zeckhauser (1982). “Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients.” American Economic Review, 72(2): 372-377. 
  • Olken, Benjamin A. (2006). “Corruption and the Costs of Redistribution: Micro evidence from Indonesia.” Journal of Public Economics, 90(4-5): 853-870. 
  • Elbers, Chris, Jean O. Lanjouw, and Peter Lanjouw (2003). “Micro-Level Estimation of Poverty and Inequality.” Econometrica, 71(1): 355-364. 
  • Niehaus, Paul, Antonia Atanassova, Marianne Bertrand, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2013). “Targeting with Agents.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 5(1): 206-238. 

The Form of Transfers: Conditionality, Cash vs In-Kind, Workfare

  • *** Cunha, Jesse M., Giacomo De Giorgi, and Seema Jayachandran (2019). “The Price Effects of Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers.” Review of Economic Studies. 86, 240-281. 
  • *** Baird, Sarah, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Özler (2011). “Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash Transfer Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(4): 1709-175.
  • *** Banerjee, Abhijit, Rema Hanna, Benjamin A. Olken, Elan Satriawan, and Sudarno Sumarto (2021). “Food vs. Food Stamps: Evidence from an At-Scale Experiment in Indonesia.” 
  • Gadenne, Lucie, Samuel Norris, Monica Singhal, and Sandip Sukhtankar (2021). “In-Kind Transfers as Insurance.”
  • Cunha, Jesse M. (2014). “Testing Paternalism: Cash versus In-kind Transfers.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 6(2): 195-230. 
  • Coate, Stephen, Stephen Johnson, and Richard Zeckhauser (1994). “Pecuniary Redistribution Through In-Kind Programs.” Journal of Public Economics, 55(1): 19-40. 
  • Banerjee, Abhijit V. (2016). “Policies for a Better-Fed World.” Review of World Economics, 152 (1): 3-17. 
  • Besley, Timothy and Ravi Kanbur (1988). “Food Subsidies and Poverty Alleviation.” The Economic Journal, 98(392): 701-719.

Big Push Programs, Business Programs, Cash Transfers

  • *** Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Nathanael Goldberg, Dean Karlan, Robert Osei, William Parienté, Jeremy Shapiro, Bram Thuysbaert, and Christopher Udry (2015). “A Multifaceted Program Causes Lasting Progress for the Very Poor: Evidence from Six Countries.” Science, 348(6236): 772-790. 
  • Blattman, Chris, Nathan Fiala, and Sebastian Martinez (2014). “Generating Skilled Self-Employment in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from Uganda.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129 (2): 697-752. 
  • Blattman, Christopher, Eric P. Green, Julian Jamison, M. Christian Lehmann, and Jeannie Annan (2016). “The Returns to Microenterprise Support Among the Ultrapoor: A Field Experiment in Postwar Uganda.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 8(2): 35-64. 
  • ***Haushofer, Johannes, and Jeremy Shapiro (2016). “The Short-Term Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers to the Poor: Experimental Evidence from Kenya.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4): 1973-2042. 
  • Bandiera, Oriana, Robin Burgess, Narayan Das, Selim Gulesci, Imran Rasul, and Munshi Sulaiman (2017). “Labor Markets and Poverty in Village Economies.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(2): 811-870. 

Taxation

Taxes and the Informal Sector

  • *** Jensen, Anders (2019). “Employment Structure and the Rise of the Modern Tax System.” NBER Working Paper 25502.
  • *** Basri, M. Chatib, Mayara Felix, Rema Hanna, and Benjamin A. Olken (2019). “Tax Administration vs. Tax Rates: Evidence from Corporate Taxation in Indonesia.” NBER Working Paper 26150.
  •  *** Khan, Adnan Q., Asim Khwaja, and Benjamin A. Olken (2016). “Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(1): 219-271. 
  • ***Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, and Emmanuel Saez (2016). “Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries.” Economica, 83: 219–246.
  • Naritomi, Joana (2019). “Consumers as Tax Auditors.” American Economic Review, 109(9): 3031-72*.*
  • Kumler, Todd, Eric Verhoogen, and Judith Frías (2020). “Enlisting Employees in Improving Payroll-Tax Compliance: Evidence from Mexico.” 
  • Gordon, Roger and Wei Li (2009). “Tax Structure in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation.” Journal of Public Economics, 93(7-8): 855-866. 
  • Fisman, Raymond and Shang-Jin Wei (2004). “Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from ‘Missing Imports’ in China.” Journal of Political Economy, 112(2): 471-496. 
  • Mishra, Prachi, Arvind Subramanian, and Petia Topalova (2008). “Tariffs, Enforcement, and Customs Evasion: Evidence from India.” Journal of Public Economics, 92(10-11): 1907-1925. 
  • Olken, Benjamin A., and Monica Singhal (2011). “Informal Taxation.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(4): 1-28. 
  • De Paula, Áureo and José A. Scheinkman (2010). “Value-Added Taxes, Chain Effects, and Informality.” American Economics Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(4): 195-221. 
  • Carrillo, Paul, Dina Pomeranz, and Monica Singhal (2017). “Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 9(2): 144-164. 
  • Gadenne Lucie, Tushar K. Nandi, Roland Rathelot (2019). “Taxation and Supplier Networks: Evidence from India.” International Growth Centre S-89450-INC-1. 
  • Brockmeyer, Anne, Alejandro Estefan, Karina Ramírez Arras, Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato (2020). “Taxing Property in Developing Countries: Theory and Evidence from Mexico.” 112th Annual Conference on Taxation
  • Bachas, Pierre, Lucie Gadenne, and Anders Jensen (2020). “Informality, Consumption Taxes, and Redistribution.” NBER Working Paper 27429.
  • Londoño-Vélez, Juliana and Javier Ávila-Mahecha (2021). “Enforcing Wealth Taxes in the Developing World: Quasi-experimental Evidence from Colombia.” American Economic Review: Insights, 3(2): 131-48. 
  • Almunia, Miguel, Jonas Hjort, Justine Knebelmann, and Lin Tian (2021). “Strategic or Confused Firms? Evidence from ‘Missing’ Transactions in Uganda.”

Sessions 19–21: Labor

Labor Supply and Labor Demand in Rural Labor Markets

Labor Supply: Testing for Separation

Classical Labor Supply

  • Jayachandran, Seema (2006). “Selling Labor Low: Wage Responses to Productivity Shocks in Developing Countries.” Journal of Political Economy, 114(3): 538-575. 
  • Imbert, Clément and John Papp (2015). “Labor Market Effects of Social Programs: Evidence from India’s Employment Guarantee.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(2): 233-263.
  • Goldberg, Jessica (2016). “Kwacha Gonna Do? Experimental Evidence about Labor Supply in Rural Malawi.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 8(1): 129-149.

Nominal Rigidities, Behavioral Issues, and Labor Supply

  • Breza, Emily, Supreet Kaur, and Yogita Shamdasani (2019). “Labor Rationing: A Revealed Preference Approach from Hiring Shocks.” 
  • Kaur, Supreet (2019). “Nominal Wage Rigidity in Village Labor Markets.” American Economic Review. 109(10): 3588-3616. 
  • Breza, Emily, Supreet Kaur, and Nandita Krishnaswamy (2018). “Scabs: The Social Suppression of Labor Supply.”
  • Schultz, Theodore W. “The Doctrine of Agricultural Labor of Zero Value.” Chapter 4 in Transforming Traditional Agriculture. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1964.
  • Hussam, Reshmaan, Erin M. Kelley, Gregory Lane, and Fatima Zahra (2021). “The Psychosocial Value of Employment.” NBER Working Paper No. 28924.
  • Agness, Daniel, Travis Baseler, Sylvain Chassang, Pascaline Dupas, and Erik Snowberg (2020). “Valuing the Time of the Self-Employed.” 
  • Oh, Suanna (2020). “Does Identity Affect Labor Supply.” CDEP-CGEG Working Paper Series. 
  • Kaur, Supreet, Sendhil Mullainathan, Suanna Oh, and Frank Schilbach (2021). “Do Financial Concerns Make Workers Less Productive?” 

Frictions in Labor Demand

  • Fink, Günther, B. Kelsey Jack, and Felix Masiye (2018). “Seasonal Liquidity, Rural Labor Markets and Agricultural Production.” NBER Working Paper No. 24564.

Urban Labor Markets, Search, and Frictions

  • ***Blattman, Christopher and Stefan Dercon (2018). “The Impacts of Industrial and Entrepreneurial Work on Income and Health: Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 10(3): 1-38*.* 
  • Derenoncourt, Ellora, François Gérard, Lorenzo Lagos, and Claire Montialoux (2021). “Racial Inequality, Minimum Wage Spillovers, and the Informal Sector.” NBER Summer Institute Development Economics.
  • Hjort, Jonas, Xuan Li, and Heather Sarsons, (2020), “Across-Country Wage Compression in Multinationals.” 
  • Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess (2004). “Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1): 91-134. 
  • Alfonsi, Livia, Oriana Bandiera, Vittorio Bassi, Robin Burgess, Imran Rasul, Munshi Sulaiman, and Anna Vitali (2020). “Tackling Youth Unemployment: Evidence from a Labor Market Experiment in Uganda.” Econometrica, 88(6): 2369-2414. 
  • Bertrand, Marianne, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Nick Tsivanidis (2017). “Contract Labor and Firm Growth in India.” 
  • Carranza, Eliana, Robert Garlick, Kate Orkin, and Neil Rankin (2020). “Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills*,”* CID Faculty Working Paper No. 383.
  • Wheeler, Laura, Robert Garlick, Eric Johnson, Patrick Shaw, and Marissa Gargano (2021). “LinkedIn(to) Job Opportunities: Experimental Evidence from Job Readiness Training.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics (forthcoming). Working Paper.
  • *** Boudreau, Laura (2020). “Multinational enforcement of labor law: Experimental evidence from Bangladesh’s apparel sector.” Working Paper.
  • Boudreau, Laura, Rocco Macchiavello, Virginia Minni, and Mari Tanaka (2021). “Union Leaders: Experimental Evidence from Myanmar.” Columbia Business School. Working Paper.

Sessions 22–23: Credit 

Sources of Credit Constraints: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Monitoring

  • *** Banerjee, Abhijit (2004)."Contracting Constraints, Credit Markets, and Economic Development” (PDF). In M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S. Turnovsky, eds. Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eight World Congress of the Econometric Society, Volume III. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-46. 
  • ****Karlan, Dean and Jonathan Zinman (2009). “Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment.” Econometrica, 77(6): 1993-2008.
  • Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo (2010). “Giving Credit Where it is Due.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(3): 61-80. 
  • Aleem, Irfan (1990). “Imperfect Information, Screening and the Costs of Informal Lending: A Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan.” World Bank Economic Review, 4(3): 329-349. 
  • Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo (2014). “Do Firms Want to Borrow More? Testing Credit Constraints Using a Directed Lending Program.” Review of Economic Studies, 81 (2): 572-607. 

Estimating Credit Constraints, and What Happens When You Relax Them

  • *** McKenzie David, Suresh de Mel, and Christopher Woodruff (2008). “Returns to Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(4): 1329-72. 
  • McKenzie, David, Suresh de Mel, and Christopher Woodruff (2012). “One-Time Transfers of Cash or Capital Have Long-Lasting Effects on Microenterprises in Sri Lanka.” Science, 335(6071): 962-66. 
  • *** Townsend, Robert M. and Joseph P. Kaboski (2011), “A Structural Evaluation of a Large-Scale Quasi-Experimental Microfinance Initiative.” Econometrica, 79(5): 1357-1406. 
  • Karlan, Dean, Robert Osei, Isaac Osei-Akoto and Christopher Udry (2014). “Agricultural Decisions After Relaxing Credit and Risk Constraints.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129 (2): 597-652. 
  • Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo (2014). “Do Firms Want to Borrow More? Testing Credit Constraints Using a Directed Lending Program.” Review of Economic Studies, 81(2): 572-607.
  • Keniston, Daniel E. (2011). “Experimental vs. Structural Estimates of the Return to Capital in Microenterprises.” Mimeo, Yale.
  • Blouin, Arthur, and Rocco Macchiavello (2013). “Tropical Lending: International Prices, Strategic Default and Credit Constraints among Coffee Washing Stations.” 
  • Bernhardt, Arielle, Erica Field, Rohini Pande, and Natalia Rigol (2019). “Household Matters: Revisiting the Returns to Capital among Female Microentrepreneurs,” American Economic Review: Insights, 1(2): 141-60. 

Microfinance: Impacts and Mechanisms

  • ***Meager, Rachael (2019). “Understanding the Average Impact of Microcredit Expansions: A Bayesian Hierarchical Analysis of Seven Randomized Experiments.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 11(1): 57-91. 
  • *** Hussam, Reshmaan, Natalia Rigol, and Benjamin N. Roth (2020). “Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in The Field.” PEDL Research Paper. 
  • *** Field, Erica, John Papp, Rohini Pande and Natalia Rigol (2013). “Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage Entrepreneurship Among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India.” American Economic Review, 103(6): 2196-2226.
  • *** Karlan, Dean (2007). “Social Connections and Group Banking.” The Economic Journal, 117(517): F52-F84. 
  • *** Feigenberg, Benjamin, Erica Field and Rohini Pande (2013). “The Economic Returns to Social Interaction: Experimental Evidence from Microfinance.” Review of Economic Studies, 80(4): 1459-1483. 
  • Bryan, Gharad, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Zinman (2015). “Referrals: Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3): 174-204.
  • Giné, Xavier and Dean Karlan (2014). “Group versus Individual Liability: Short and Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups.” Journal of Development Economics, 107: 65–83. 
  • Field, Erica and Rohini Pande (2008). “Repayment Frequency and Default in Micro-finance: Evidence from India.” Journal of the European Economics Association Papers and Proceedings 6(2-3): 501-509.
  • Banerjee, Abhijit, Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman (2015). “Six Randomized Evaluations of Microcredit: Introduction and Further Steps.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(1): 1-21. 
  • Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Cynthia Kinnan (2015). “The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(1): 22-53. 
  • Tarozzi, Alessandro, Jaikishan Desai, and Kristin Johnson (2015). “The Impacts of Microcredit: Evidence from Ethiopia.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(1): 54-89.
  • Attanasio, Orazio, Britta Augsburg, Ralph De Haas, Emla Fitzsimons, and Heike Harmgart (2015). “The Impacts of Microfinance: Evidence from Joint-Liability Lending in Mongolia.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(1): 90-122. 
  • Crépon, Bruno, Florencia Devoto, Esther Duflo, and William Parienté (2015). “Estimating the Impact of Microcredit on Those Who Take It Up: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Morocco.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(1): 123-50.
  • Angelucci, Manuela, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Zinman (2015). “Microcredit Impacts: Evidence from a Randomized Microcredit Program Placement Experiment by Compartamos Banco.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(1): 151-82.
  • Augsburg, Britta, Ralph De Haas, Heike Harmgart, and Costas Meghir (2015). “The Impacts of Microcredit: Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(1): 183-203. 
  • Karlan, Dean and Jonathan Zinman (2010). “Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts.” The Review of Financial Studies, 23(1): 433-464. 
  • Banerjee, Abhijit (2013). “Microcredit under the Microscope: What Have We Learned in the Past Two Decades, and What Do We Need to Know?” Annual Review of Economics 5: 487-519.
  • Karlan, Dean and Jonathan Zinman (2008). “Credit Elasticities in Less Developed Countries: Implications for Microfinance.” American Economic Review, 98(3): 1040-1068.

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