[F] = Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780262061414.
[G] = Gibbons, Robert S. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press, 1992. ISBN: 9780691003955.
[M] = Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780195073409.
[MC] = McCarty, Nolan, and Adam Meirowitz. Political Game Theory: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, 2007. ISBN: 9780521841078.
[P] = Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. MIT Press, 2002. ISBN: 9780262661317.
Lecture 1: Rationality and Rational Choice
Required Readings:
Cameron, Charles M. “Rational Choice and the Presidency.” Chapter 3 in Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. Cambridge University Press, 2000. ISBN: 9780521625500.
Ignore the specific application to presidential vetoes; the method described (and defended) here is what this course prepares you to practice.
[M] Chapter 1: Preference and Choice.
[MC] Chapter 1: Introduction.
Lecture 2: Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
Required Reading:
[G] Chapter 1.1: Basic Theory: Normal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium. [Preview with Google Books]
Optional Readings:
[G] Chapter 1.2: Applications. [Preview with Google Books]
[MC] Chapter 5.1: The Normal Form.
[MC] Chapter 5.2: Solutions to Normal Form Games.
[MC] Chapter 5.6: Application: Interest Group Contributions.
Lecture 3: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Required Reading:
[G] Chapter 1.3.A: Mixed Strategies.
Optional Readings:
[MC] Chapter 3.1: The Finite Case.
[F] Chapter 1: Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium. [Preview with Google Books] (advanced)
Lecture 4A: Extensive Form Games with Complete Information: Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information
Required Readings:
[G] Chapter 2.1.A: Theory: Backwards Induction.
[G] Chapter 2.1.B: Stackelberg Model of Duopoly.
Lecture 4B: Extensive Form Games with Complete Information: Dynamic Games of Complete and Imperfect Information
Required Readings:
[G] Chapter 2.2.A: Theory: Subgame Perfection.
[G] Chapter 2.2.B: Bank Runs.
[G] Chapter 2.4: Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information
Optional Reading:
Grossman, Gene M, and Elhanan Helpman. “Protection for Sale.” American Economic Review 84, no. 4 (1994): 833–50.
Lecture 5A: Repeated Games: Finitely Repeated Games
Required Reading:
[G] Chapter 2.3.A: Two-Stage Repeated Games.
Lecture 5B: Repeated Games: Infinitely Repeated Games
Required Reading:
[G] Chapter 2.3.B: Infinitely Repeated Games.
Optional Readings:
Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. “Trade Wars and Trade Talks.” (PDF) Journal of Political Economy 103, no. 4 (1995): 675–708.
Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. “Bargaining in Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 83, no. 4 (1989): 1181–1206.
Lecture 6: Static Games of Incomplete Information
Required Reading:
[G] Chapter 3: Static Games of Incomplete Information.
Optional Reading:
Fearon, James D. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414.
Lecture 7: Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
Required Readings:
[G] Chapter 4.1: Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
[G] Chapter 4.2: Signaling Games.
[G] Chapter 4.3A: Cheap-Talk Games.
Optional Reading:
Potters, Jan, and Frans van Winden. “Lobbying and Asymmetric Information.” Public Choice 74, no. 3 (1992): 269–92.
Lecture 8: Social Choice
No readings assigned.
Lecture 9: Additional Topics
- Bounded Rationality
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Evolutionary Game Theory
- Agent-Based Modeling
No readings assigned.
