[F] = Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. *Game Theory*. MIT Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780262061414.

[G] = Gibbons, Robert S. *Game Theory for Applied Economists*. Princeton University Press, 1992. ISBN: 9780691003955.

[M] = Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. *Microeconomic Theory*. Oxford University Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780195073409.

[MC] = McCarty, Nolan, and Adam Meirowitz. *Political Game Theory: An Introduction*. Cambridge University Press, 2007. ISBN: 9780521841078.

[P] = Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy**.* MIT Press, 2002. ISBN: 9780262661317.

**Lecture 1: Rationality and Rational Choice**

*Required Readings:*

Cameron, Charles M. “Rational Choice and the Presidency.” Chapter 3 in *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power.* Cambridge University Press, 2000. ISBN: 9780521625500.

*Ignore the specific application to presidential vetoes; the method described (and defended) here is what this course prepares you to practice.*

[M] Chapter 1: Preference and Choice.

[MC] Chapter 1: Introduction.

**Lecture 2: Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium**

*Required Reading:*

[G] Chapter 1.1: Basic Theory: Normal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium. [Preview with Google Books]

*Optional Readings:*

[G] Chapter 1.2: Applications. [Preview with Google Books]

[MC] Chapter 5.1: The Normal Form.

[MC] Chapter 5.2: Solutions to Normal Form Games.

[MC] Chapter 5.6: Application: Interest Group Contributions.

**Lecture 3: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium**

*Required Reading:*

[G] Chapter 1.3.A: Mixed Strategies.

*Optional Readings:*

[MC] Chapter 3.1: The Finite Case.

[F] Chapter 1: Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium. [Preview with Google Books] *(advanced)*

**Lecture 4A: Extensive Form Games with Complete Information: Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information**

*Required Readings:*

[G] Chapter 2.1.A: Theory: Backwards Induction.

[G] Chapter 2.1.B: Stackelberg Model of Duopoly.

**Lecture 4B: Extensive Form Games with Complete Information: Dynamic Games of Complete and Imperfect Information**

*Required Readings:*

[G] Chapter 2.2.A: Theory: Subgame Perfection.

[G] Chapter 2.2.B: Bank Runs.

[G] Chapter 2.4: Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information

*Optional Reading:*

Grossman, Gene M, and Elhanan Helpman. “Protection for Sale.” *American Economic Review* 84, no. 4 (1994): 833–50.

**Lecture 5A: Repeated Games: Finitely Repeated Games**

*Required Reading:*

[G] Chapter 2.3.A: Two-Stage Repeated Games.

**Lecture 5B: Repeated Games: Infinitely Repeated Games**

*Required Reading:*

[G] Chapter 2.3.B: Infinitely Repeated Games.

*Optional Readings:*

Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. “Trade Wars and Trade Talks.” (PDF) *Journal of Political Economy* 103, no. 4 (1995): 675–708.

Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. “Bargaining in Legislatures.” *American Political Science Review* 83, no. 4 (1989): 1181–1206.

**Lecture 6: Static Games of Incomplete Information**

*Required Reading:*

[G] Chapter 3: Static Games of Incomplete Information.

*Optional Reading:*

Fearon, James D. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414.

**Lecture 7: Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information**

*Required Readings:*

[G] Chapter 4.1: Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.

[G] Chapter 4.2: Signaling Games.

[G] Chapter 4.3A: Cheap-Talk Games.

*Optional Reading:*

Potters, Jan, and Frans van Winden. “Lobbying and Asymmetric Information.” *Public Choice* 74, no. 3 (1992): 269–92.

**Lecture 8: Social Choice**

No readings assigned.

**Lecture 9: Additional Topics**

*Bounded Rationality**Algorithmic Game Theory**Evolutionary Game Theory**Agent-Based Modeling*

No readings assigned.