[Chalmers] Chalmers, David, ed. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN: 9780195145816.
| SES # | TOPICS | READINGS AND LINKS |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Introduction | No Readings |
| 2 | Searle against artificial intelligience (AI): the Chinese room argument |
[Chalmers] Searle, John R. “Can Computers Think?” Chapter 63. Also available in: Chapter 2 in Minds, Brains and Science (1984 Reith Lectures). Harvard University Press, 1986. ISBN: 9780674576339. [Preview with Google Books] ———. “Minds, Brains, and Programs.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no. 3 (1980): 417–24. |
| 3 | The Chinese room argument (cont.) |
Searle, John R. “Is the Brain a Digital Computer?” Presidential Address. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 1990. |
| 4 | The Chinese room argument (cont.) and the Turing test |
Turing, A. M. “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” Mind 59 (1950): 433–60. Holt, Jim. “Code-breaker: The Life and Death of Alan Turing.” The New Yorker, February 6, 2006. Shieber, Stuart M. “The Turing Test As Interactive Proof.” In The Turing Test: Verbal Behavior as the Hallmark of Intelligence. A Bradford Book, 2004. ISBN: 9780262692939. [Preview with Google Books] Turing, A. M. “On Computable Numbers, With An Application To The Entscheidungsproblem.” In The Essential Turing. Edited by B. J. Copeland. Oxford University Press, 2004. ISBN: 9780198250791. [Preview with Google Books] |
| 5 | The Turing test (cont.) |
Copeland, B. Jack. “The Turing Test.” Minds and Machines 10, no. 4 (2000): 519–39. |
| 6 | Computational complexity (guest lecture by Scott Aaronson) | Aaronson, Scott. “Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity.” Cornell University Library, August 14, 2011, pp. 10–6, and 22–3. |
| 7 | Dualism |
[Chalmers] Descartes, René. “The Passions of the Soul.” Chapter 2. Also available in: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Vol. 1. Translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge University Press, 1985. ISBN: 9780521288071. [Preview with Google Books] Read parts 17–9 and 30–6 of Part One: The Passions in General. ———. Meditations II and VI in Meditations on First Philosophy. Translated and edited by John Cottingham. Cambridge University Press, 1985. ISBN: 9780521338578. Also available as e-text: Meditations on First Philosophy, translated by John Veitch (1901). Descartes’ life and works (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) [Chalmers] Ryle, Gilbert. “Descartes’ Myth.” Chapter 5. Also available in: ———. The Concept of Mind [1949]. New ed. University of Chicago Press, 2000. ISBN: 9780226732961. |
| 8 | Dualism (cont.) |
[Chalmers] Smullyan, Raymond M. “An Unfortunate Dualist.” Chapter 4. Also available in: ———. This Book Needs No Title: A Budget of Little Paradoxes. Prentice-Hall, 1980, pp. 53–5. ISBN: 9780139190353. Searle, John R. Chapters 1 and 2 in Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2005. ISBN: 9780195157345. [Preview with Google Books] |
| 9 | From dualism to behaviorism |
Putnam, Hilary. “Brains And Behavior.” In Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 1. Edited by Ned Block. Harvard University Press, 1983. ISBN: 9780674748767. [Preview with Google Books] Watson, John B. “Behaviorism-The Modern Note In Psychology.” In Consciousness: A Guide to the Debates. Edited by Anthony Freeman. ABC-CLIO, 2003. ISBN: 9781576077917. [Preview with Google Books] Byrne, Alex. “Behaviorism.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Edited by S. D. Guttenplan. Blackwell, 1996. ISBN: 9780631199960. Chomsky, Noam. “A Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior.” Language 35, no. 1 (1959): 26–58. |
| 10 | From behaviorism to the identity theory | [Chalmers] Smart, J. J. C. “Sensations and Brain Processes.” Chapter 9. |
| 11 | The identity theory (cont.) | [Chalmers] Place, U. T. “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” Chapter 8. |
| 12 | Kripke’s Objection | Kripke, Saul A. Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 144–55. ISBN: 9780674598461. [Preview with Google Books] |
| 13 | Functionalism |
[Chalmers] Putnam, Hilary. “The Nature of Mental States.” Chapter 11. Block, Ned. Functionalism. [Chalmers] ———. “Troubles with Functionalism.” Chapter 14. |
| 14 | Review session | No Readings |
| 15 | From functionalism to externalism | Lewis, David. “Mad Pain and Martian Pain.” In Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 1. Edited by Ned Block. Harvard University Press, 1983, pp. 216–22. ISBN: 9780674748767. [Preview with Google Books] |
| 16 | Externalism (cont.) |
[Chalmers] Burge, Tyler. “Individualism and the Mental.” Chapter 55. Chalmers, David J. “Forward to Andy Clark’s Supersizing The Mind.” Canberra, November 2007. (PDF) [Chalmers] Clark, Andy, and David J. Chalmers. “The Extended Mind.” Chapter 59. [Chalmers] Putnam, Hilary. “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Chapter 54. |
| 17 | From externalism to perception | Searle, John R. Chapter 10 in Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2005. ISBN: 9780195157345. [Preview with Google Books] |
| 18 | Perception: Valberg’s puzzle of experience | Valberg, J. J. The Puzzle Of Experience. Oxford University Press, 1992. ISBN: 9780198242918. |
| 19 | Perception, consciousness, and intentionality |
Byrne, Alex. “Intentionality.” In The Philosophy of Science: An Encylopedia. Edited by Sahorta Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer. Routledge, 2006. ISBN: 9780415977098. [Chalmers] Tye, Michael. “Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited.” Chapter 42. Harman, Gilbert. “The Intrinsic Quality Of Experience.” Philosophical Perspectives 4 (1990): 31–52. |
| 20 | Perception, consciousness, and intentionality (cont.) |
Byrne, Alex. “Inverted Qualia.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. November 10, 2004. [Chalmers] Peacocke, Christopher. “Sensation And The Content Of Experience: A Distinction.” Chapter 41. |
| 21 | Jackson’s knowledge argument |
[Chalmers] Jackson, Frank. “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” Chapter 28. Also available: Lewis, David. “What Experience Teaches.” Mind and Cognition (1990). (PDF - 1.2MB) |
| 22 | Nagel on bats | [Chalmers] Nagel, Thomas. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Chapter 25. |
| 23 | Consciousness and its place in nature | [Chalmers] Chalmers, David J. “Consciousness and Its Place in Nature.” Chapter 27. |
| 24 | Consciousness and its place in nature (cont.) |
[Chalmers] Chalmers, David J. “Consciousness and Its Place in Nature.” Chapter 27. ———. “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” Conceivability and Possibility (2002): 145–200. Nagel, Thomas. “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness.” Synthese 22 (1971): 396–413. (PDF - 1.2MB) ———. “Panpsychism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010). Stoljar, Daniel. “Two Conceptions of the Physical.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62, no. 2 (2001): 253–281. |
| 25 | Free Will |
Greene, Joshua, and Jonathan Cohen. “For The Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 359, no. 1451 (2004): 1775–85. Libet, Benjamin. “Do We Have Free Will?” In The Volitional Brain : Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Edited by Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland. Imprint Academic, 2000. ISBN: 9780907845119. [Preview with Google Books] |
| 26 | Last lecture, including information about the final exam | No Readings |
