1 Estimating the Value of a Statistical Human Life: Ashenfelter & Greenstone (2004 JPE)

- The value of a statistical life (VSL) is a topic that makes non-economists uncomfortable. But for policy analysis, there is no way around it. How much should society spend, at the margin, to save a ‘statistical life?’

- A statistical life is a probabilistic concept. When we save a statistical life, we reduce the number of deaths by one in expectation. The value of a statistical life (VSL) is clearly very different from what we would spend to save a specific individual who was in grave danger of death. [And it is emphatically not the answer to the question, “What would I have to pay you to kill you?” or “What should we spend to save baby James who was fallen down the well?”]

- It is critical to have some benchmark number for the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) because we must frequently make societal decisions about how much risk we should tolerate, how much we should spend in tax revenue to avert risk, and how much we should curtail freedom of choice to abate risk.

- In general, economic reasoning suggests that society should undertake safety improvements that cost less than the VSL per life saved and should not undertake safety projects improvements cost more than the VSL per life saved.

- But what is the correct VSL? There is no correct answer to the value of a statistical life.
How do we get a credible estimate of the VSL? Not easy. Asking people will not be very informative (plus they’ll be horrified). But economic reasoning says that we can observe the VSL from the trade-offs that people (or governments) actually make between cost and safety. The idea of measuring values by the observed trade-offs people make, rather than by surveying them, is called revealed preference.

One reasonable approach is to ask how much money people are willing to pay in order to mitigate risk for themselves. Suppose that there is a 1% chance that the BU bridge will collapse each year, killing all of the people currently driving, biking, or walking across it. Assume that there are 100,000 people who use the bridge each year, and each would be willing to pay $10 to reduce the probability of collapse each year from 1% to zero. It would be at least reasonable to assert that the government should reinforce the bridge if and only if the project costs less than $1 million (10,000 × $10). Otherwise, the government is spending more in tax money on a project than its intended beneficiaries would be willing to pay.

Speed limits are one place where this set of tradeoffs is most apparent. The faster people drive, the less time they spend getting from place to place. Since time has value, going slower is costly in foregone opportunities. However, going faster increases the probability of death.

(Side note: In some scenarios, people could value every extra minute they save at the exact same dollar amount for every speed. Setting risk aside, they might be indifferent among all speeds, so which speed they happened to pick doesn’t tell us much about their preferences. In this particular scenario, however, Newtonian principles suggest that they should still have a preferred rate of travel. Because the kinetic energy of a moving body is $E = \frac{1}{2} \times \text{Mass} \times \text{Velocity}^2$, the expected fatality risk of an accident increases quadratically with velocity whereas the time savings is linear in velocity. Moreover, accident risk per mile travel also increases with velocity. So if the value of time is roughly constant on a per hour basis, then there’s probably a unique solution where the cost of going 1 mph faster barely outweighs the benefit of doing so.)

1.1 Context of Ashenfelter & Greenstone (2004)

Prior to 1973, speed limits in the U.S. were set by states. There was no national speed limit.

With the oil crisis in 1973, the federal government imposed a national speed limit of 55 MPH.
• Although this was probably not the intention, highway fatalities fell 15 percent the following year (a reduction of nearly 10,000 fatalities!).

• (Side note: Fatalities were also trending downward before and after 1973. This in large part reflect advances in auto safety. Fatalities per 100 million miles in the U.S. are now trending upward steeply. A moment’s introspection will probably give you a strong hunch for why this is happening. Hint: you could look it up on your smartphone.)

• In 1987, with oil prices low, the federal government allowed states to raise their speed limits to 65 MPH if they wished to.

• 37 states raised their speed limits in 1987 and 3 more did so in 1988.

1.2 Research design

• Though there is considerable technical material in this paper, the research design is straightforward. The authors’ goal is to estimate the public’s willingness to pay for extra safety based on state legislatures’ decisions on whether or not to adopt a higher speed limit. If state governments act according to their constituents’ preferences, then the willingness of state governments to save drivers time but risk safety will reveal the public’s willingness to pay for reduced risk, which gives us a reasonable $VSL$.

• The plan:

  1. Contrast the change in fatalities in adopting versus non-adopting states.
  2. Contrast the change in actual speeds traveled in adopting versus non-adopting states.
  3. Use these two contrasts to develop an estimate of the hours saved in driving time per statistical life lost.
  4. Now, multiply time saved by some monetary value per hour to obtain an estimate of the $VSL$ that state legislatures must have implicitly had in mind to justify their choices. To create a measure in dollars, Ashenfelter and Greenstone use the state mean wage as the value of an hour saved. We can discuss whether this is appropriate.

• A&G refer to their approach as an ‘instrumental variables’ estimation, and this is one valid way to interpret it. After all, the adoption of the higher speed limit raises speed (the endogenous variable) and raises fatalities (the outcome variable) by raising speed
but probably does not affect fatalities through any channel other than speed. However, it’s not a typical IV paper since the ultimate goal is not to find the effect of speed on fatalities. Moreover, it is unlike our usual IV setup because the decision to ‘take-up’ the higher speed-limit is *chosen* by states—it is not randomly assigned as it is in conventional IV. So this research design does smell like an IV, but it offers a slight twist on our regular IV approach.

- The fact that states choose whether to adopt the higher speed limit is crucial for interpreting the results through the lens of Revealed Preference. Revealed Preference allows us to say that any state that *chose* to take up the higher speed limit must have valued the time savings at greater than or equal to the lives lost (otherwise, by Revealed Preference, it would not have made this choice). If this time savings was $1 million per life lost, then the VSL could be no higher than $1 million.

  - For this design, it’s actually important that not every state raised the limit... If they had, we would be able to say that states are certainly willing to trade more risk for more time, but we would not know whether states were *barely* willing to give up safety for extra time, or very anxious to give up safety for extra time (and would raise the limit more if they could). Graphically, we could say that indifference curves between safety and time were pretty steep, but we could not actually pinpoint how steep they are (see Theoretical Framework below).

- The notion of Revealed Preference was introduced and formalized by MIT faculty member (now deceased) and Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson. Revealed preference says, in essence, that an agent $A$ faces a choice between actions (or bundles) $X$ and $Y$ and she chooses $Y$, then $Y$ is *revealed preferred* to $X$ for agent $A$. Though this argument appears both innocuous and trivial, it turns out to be neither.

- There is also an important discussion in the paper of whether political decision making about speed limits is efficient—that is, representative of constituents’ preferences. If the politics of raising the speed limit does not represent the preferences of constituents—perhaps it is determined by lobbying, or legislators are ignorant of the costs and benefits of raising speed limits—then the decision tells us very little about constituents’ revealed VSL. It’s crucial to the interpretation to know whether:

  - Legislators roughly understood the trade-offs between time-savings and safety when deciding on the speed limit.
Legislators’ choices roughly represent the preferences of ‘typical’ citizens (“the median voter”) rather than of some interest group that has very different preferences about the VSL.

- Why isn’t it enough to assume that individuals optimally choose their speed as a function of time savings and safety?

1.3 Theoretical framework

- States face a Production Possibility Frontier in Time Saved-Lives Saved space. They want to choose their preferred point on this frontier. See the figures from class.

- If the speed limit is capped at 55 MPH, states may not be able to select their optimal point on the PPF. The 1987 law expands the feasible choice set.

- For states that choose to move to the new location on the PPF, we can say that this point is Revealed Preferred to the old location.

- We can observe the gains they make in time savings and the loss of life as they make this movement. That forms the basis for our calculations.

1.4 Results

See the attached slide deck for results.

2 Should Infant Seats be Required on Airplanes?\(^1\)

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has for many years been considering a regulation whereby all children younger than two old would be required to travel in child safety restraint systems (CSR) on airplanes. This rule would require adults to purchase seats specifically for children younger than two years instead rather than allowing these children to travel in an adult’s lap for free (which is the current regulation).

Consider first: Assume that parents have full information about the risks of traveling with their babies on their laps. Is it socially efficient to allow parents to make a decision to buy a seat for their babies or should the government make it mandatory? That is, will parents made

\(^1\)This section draws on Newman, Thomas B., Brian D. Johnson and David C. Grossman. 2003. “Effects and Costs of Requiring Child-Restraint Systems for Young Children Traveling on Commercial Airplanes.” Archive of Pediatric & Adolescent Medicine, 137, October, 969–974. This article is posted on the 14.03/14.003 web site.
'good' decisions, or is there a public policy argument for overruling their decisions through mandatory safety regulations? (Yet another way of saying this: is there a 'market' failure that causes parents or airlines to provide a suboptimal amount of safety in the absence of a CSR mandate?)

Let’s for the moment assume that parents do not consider this risk for their children (e.g., perhaps they have no information about these risks). Our first goal is to assess whether mandating CSRs is worth the cost.

- The NTSB calculates that there are 6.5 million ‘enplanements’ (plane trips) per year by children younger than age two.

- It also calculates that the expected number of child fatalities averted per year by use of CSR is 0.4. Assume the price of an airline ticket for a child of $200 (and ignoring the direct cost of the CSR).

- What is the total cost per child airline fatality averted? Answer:

\[
(6,500,000 \times $200) / 0.4 = $3.25 \text{ billion per life saved}
\]

So, from a pure cost-benefit perspective, this does not appear attractive. If you believe that saving one life is worth $3.25 billion, consider that you could save many more lives by spending $3.25 billion elsewhere, for example, by improving drinking water quality in the developing world or by building fences around backyard swimming pools (many more children die each year from accidental backyard drownings than from plane crashes).

However, this is not the end of the story. While CSRs may not be the most efficient way to save lives, at least they do save some lives, right? Actually, maybe not. CSRs may both cost a lot and kill people indirectly. Notice that the proposed CSR rule would also change incentives by making it more costly for parents with children to travel by air. How would you expect families to respond?

- Consider that some families will switch from air to car travel or vice versa depending on the relative costs of the two. Newman et al. (2003) estimate that:

  - Approximately 6% of families with infants will choose to drive rather than pay $200 for a child seat on the plane. (This seems a conservative estimate.)
  - The average net increase in car travel per enplanement for families switching from planes to cars is 300 miles.
The average vehicle occupancy for extra trips is 2.4.

Recent estimates of motor vehicle safety put the risk of auto deaths at 0.5 fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled.

- From these numbers, the estimated annual effect of the seat mandate on motor vehicle deaths is:

\[
6,500,000 \times 0.06 \times 2.4 \left( \frac{300 \times 0.5}{100,000,000} \right) = +1.40 \text{ deaths}
\]

In words, the estimated number of additional motor vehicle deaths induced by the air safety policy is roughly three and a half times as large as the number of airplane deaths averted. If we assume that more than 6% of families switch from plane to cars, the policy looks even worse.

- Now, if we want to consider total lives saved/lost from the CSR mandate, we need to also account for the deaths averted due to families not traveling by air. Recent estimates of the fatality risk from air travel (not car-seat avertable) are 117 deaths per billion passenger journeys. So, the lives saved due to averted air travel (crash-related + car-seat related) deaths are:

\[
-0.4 + 6,500,000 \times 0.06 \times 2.4 \times \left( \frac{-117}{1,000,000,000} \right) = -0.51 \text{ deaths}
\]

- In sum, this policy would be expected to increase total travel related fatalities by approximately 0.9 per year at a cost of about 3 billion dollars. For this reason, the Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] has so far resisted the NTSB’s regulatory recommendation.

- Not all supporters of the NTSB policy find this type of argument compelling. For example, Ralph Nader and Wesley Clark in their 1994 book, *Collision Course: The Truth about Airline Safety*, write

“The argument in support of the FAA’s resistance to the NTSB [National Transportation Safety Board] recommended rule mandating child safety seats is unreasonable on its face, and ridiculous in its justification. It protects theoretical children driving in cars at the expense of real flesh-and-blood infants whose safety is unquestionably compromised when flown as a lap-baby [italics by Autor, not by authors].”
• A high ranking regulatory official in the Food and Drug Administration said of the child seat policy and the statistics above that,

“It identifies a classic regulator’s dilemma of which risks to protect against. While the NTSB may well recognize that there could be more auto fatalities if they require car seats, those fatalities will not be blamed on them. Assuming the study above is accurate, if the NTSB does the right thing from the point of view of mitigating “total risk,” they face the prospect of getting all of the blame for allowing child fatalities on aircraft and none of the credit for preventing child fatalities on the road. Of course, if the airlines wanted to provide seats for kids under age two at a nominal cost, they might at least break even financially because parents would fly more and kids could fly safely.”

• The attorney above recommends that airlines should subsidize infant tickets rather than charge for them. For example, imagine that the FAA paid the $200 per seat so that parents incurred no additional cost to travel with infants in CSR’s. Would this make the policy any more attractive from a cost-benefit perspective? It would still cost $3.25 billion per life saved. However, it would reduce the likelihood that parents of infants would substitute towards auto travel, so it would at least eliminate the perverse effects of the policy.

• Finally, just to flex our mental muscles a bit more, consider a policy where the FAA instead paid parents $200 to travel with their children on their laps instead of driving in their cars? This policy appears perverse: it would surely increase the number of infants killed in aircraft accidents! What would Ralph Nader say?

• But, if this policy were feasible, it would be more efficient from a lives-saved-per-dollar perspective.

  – As we know, the chance of a carseat-avertable airplane fatality for an infant is $0.4/6,500,000$ per enplanement
  – The chance of an auto-fatality is $0.5/100,000,000$ per mile.
  – The chance of an air-related fatality is $117$ per billion enplanements.
  – We assume that there are $2.4$ members of a family traveling together.
  – The crossover point where an airplane trips is safer than a car-trip (inclusive of
non-buckled infant deaths) is:

\[
\frac{M \times 2.4 \times 0.5}{100,000,000} > \frac{0.4}{6,500,500} + \frac{2.4 \times 117}{1,000,000,000} \Rightarrow M > 28.5
\]

- This means (very roughly) that any trip over roughly 30 miles, it is safer for a family with a lap child (without a CSR) to travel by air than by car. So, if we want to minimize travel fatalities, we should pay people to fly rather than drive.

- Finally, note that requiring *CSRs* on airplanes would *still* be a waste of money under such a policy. We’d get more safety for the dollar by using that money to subsidize more people to fly rather than drive.