14.126 | Spring 2016 | Graduate

Game Theory

Syllabus

Course Meeting Times

Lectures: 2 sessions / week, 1.5 hours / session

Recitations: 1 session / week, 1 hour / session

Prerequisite

14.122 Microeconomic Theory II is the prerequisite for this course.

Grading

ACTIVITIES PERCENTAGES
4 problem sets 40%
Take-home final exam 60%

Buy at MIT Press Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780262061414.

Topics

1. Solution Concepts for Static Games

     a. Complete information: rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, epistemic foundations

     b. Incomplete information: Bayesian Nash equilibrium, interim correlated
         rationalizability

2. Solution Concepts for Extensive-form Games

     a. Backwards induction, subgame perfection, iterated conditional dominance

     b. Bargaining with complete information 

3. Equilibrium Concepts for Games with Imperfect Information

4. Signaling and Forward Induction

     a. Stable equilirium, the intuitive criterion, iterated weak dominance, epistemic
         foundations

5. Repeated Games

6. Reputation Formation 

     a. Reputation with short-lived opponents

     b. Screening and reputation in bargaining

7. Supermodular Games

8. Global Games

9. Cooperative Games

      a. Nash bargaining solution, core, Shapley value

      b. Non-cooperative implentations

Course Info

Instructor
Departments
As Taught In
Spring 2016
Level
Learning Resource Types
Problem Sets
Lecture Notes