The following notes were used during the course's recitation sessions. Courtesy of Arda Gitmez, the Teaching Assistant for the course. Used with permission.

1Review of the first lecture and concepts; the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremRecitation 1 Notes (PDF)
2Review of the second and third lectures; Feddersen and Pesendorfer (ASPR, 1998)Recitation 2 Notes (PDF)
3Discussion of "Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government" by Achen and Bartels.Recitation 3 Notes (PDF)
4Review of this week's class; another take on Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008 Econometrica); theoretical model of Ferraz and Finan (2011, AER)Recitation 4 Notes (PDF)
5A review of dynamic games with: a formal definition of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; a statement of single-deviation principle; Markov Perfect EquilibriumRecitation 5 Notes (PDF)
6Markov Perfect Equilibrium; discussion of why dynamic games is different from repeated gamesRecitation 6 Notes (PDF)
7Discussion and review of "The Inefficient Use of Costly Conflict with Complete Information" Powell (2004, APSR)Recitation 7 Notes (PDF)
8Recitation notes are not available for this session. 
9IO and media; conflict and mediaRecitation 9 Notes (PDF)
10Why incentives can backfireRecitation 10 Notes (PDF)