dualism, contd.
argument A again

1. I cannot doubt that I exist

2. I can doubt that my body exists [or that anything physical exists, come to that]
   therefore:

C. I am not my body

an argument like this is suggested in the passage on p. 11 that begins ‘I am not that structure of limbs…’ and ends ‘for all that I am still something’ but the next few sentences seem to take it back
1. I cannot doubt that the masked man is before me

2. I can doubt that my father is before me

Therefore:

C. The masked man is not my father
the ‘masked man fallacy’
the problem is that expressions like ‘I cannot doubt that ___’ create intensional contexts

an intensional context is a sentence \( S \) containing a referring expression \( N \) such that replacing \( N \) with a co-referring expression \( M \) does not necessarily yield a sentence that has the same truth value as \( S \)

so the following can all be true together: ‘I am my body’, ‘I cannot doubt that I exist’, ‘I can doubt that my body exists’
nb: do not confuse ‘intensional’/‘ intensionality’ with ‘intentional’/’intentionality’

verbs for so-called ‘propositional attitudes’, like ‘believes’, ‘hopes’, and so on, create intensional contexts, and of course the propositional attitudes are representational mental states and so are intentional

but there are intensional contexts that have nothing to do with intentionality—as in the second example to follow
example 1: ‘Lois believes that Superman will save the world’ is an intensional context, because replacing ‘Superman’ with ‘the bespectacled Daily Planet reporter’ takes a truth to a falsehood.

example 2: ‘It is necessary that eight is eight’ is an intensional context, because replacing the first occurrence of ‘eight’ with ‘the number of planets’ takes a truth to a falsehood (the number of planets might have been seven).
1. I cannot truly think that I am not thinking; therefore:

2. I cannot exist without thinking, i.e. the property of thinking is one of my essential properties (see the handout on properties and particulars; and Descartes, p. 11)

3. the property of thinking is not an essential property of any physical thing; therefore:

C. I am not a physical thing (a brain, for example)
philosophical toolkit: possibility and necessity

see handout
kinds of possibility and necessity

epistemological possibility/necessity (‘Romney might win’, etc.)

nomological possibility/necessity vs. metaphysical possibility/necessity

we will focus on the metaphysical kind

a proposition is necessary iff (‘if and only if’) it could not have been false

a proposition is possible iff it could have been true
there might have been a talking donkey

the proposition that there is a talking donkey is possible
there might have been blue swans

the proposition that there are blue swans is possible

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.
there could not be a square circle

the proposition that there is a square circle is not possible (impossible)

equivalently: the proposition that there is not a square circle is necessary
plausible examples of necessary truths

mathematical truths: there is no highest prime, there are uncomputable functions, e is irrational,…

logical truths: either it's snowing or it isn't, if Fred is rich and unhappy then he's unhappy,…

'analytic' truths: bachelors are unmarried, vixens are foxes, if something is red it's colored,…
propositions

false : true

might have been true

possible

contingent

might have been false

necessary

impossible
1. if I can clearly and distinctly conceive a proposition \( p \) to be true, then \( p \) is possible. (‘[E]verything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it’ (p. 16))

2. I can clearly and distinctly conceive that the proposition that I am not identical to my body is true, therefore:

3. it is possible that I am not my body (there is a ‘possible world’ in which I am not my body), therefore:

C. I am not my body