externalism
the meaning of ‘meaning’

this contains the original presentation of the ‘twin earth’ thought experiment

Putnam drew the conclusion that meanings aren’t ‘in the head’ (i.e. that the property of meaning such-and-such by word w is extrinsic), not that thoughts aren’t in the head

this paper is quite difficult, and we won’t discuss everything in it

we will concentrate on a simplified presentation of the famous ‘twin earth’ example
the extension of a term (e.g. ‘rabbit’, ‘creature with a kidney’) is ‘the set of things the term is true of’

so ‘creature with a kidney’ and ‘creature with a heart’ have the same extension

the intension of a term is its meaning, in the ordinary sense of ‘meaning’

so ‘creature with a kidney’ and ‘creature with a heart’ have different intensions
‘two unchallenged assumptions’

1. knowing the meaning (intension) of a term is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state
2. the intension of a term determines its extension (in the sense that sameness of intension entails sameness of extension)
‘I shall argue that these two assumptions are not jointly satisfied by any notion, let alone any notion of meaning. The traditional concept of meaning is a concept which rests on a false theory.’
methodological solipsism

‘no psychological state, properly so-called, presupposes the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed’

if this is right, then:

being jealous of Smith
seeing Jones
knowing that the cat is on the mat
remembering last night’s party

are not psychological states, properly so-called

psychological states, according to m.s., are ‘narrow’
suppose Oscar\textsubscript{1} and Oscar\textsubscript{2} are in the same narrow psychological states, and that Oscar\textsubscript{1}
knows that intension I is the meaning of term A by (1), if Oscar\textsubscript{1} knows that I is the meaning of A, then Oscar\textsubscript{2} knows that I is the meaning of A if Oscar\textsubscript{1} and Oscar\textsubscript{2} both know that I is the meaning of A then Oscar\textsubscript{1} and Oscar\textsubscript{2} both use A with the same meaning or intension by (2), A as used by Oscar\textsubscript{1} has the same extension as A as used by Oscar\textsubscript{2}
‘We claim that it is possible for two speakers to be in exactly the same psychological state (in the narrow sense), even though the extension of the term A in the idiolect of the one is different from the extension of the term A in the idiolect of the other. Extension is not determined by psychological state.’
twin earth

earth

twin earth

a perfect duplicate of earth, except...
XYZ instead of H$_2$O

...the oceans and lakes contain ‘XYZ’, which is a very different chemical kind from H$_2$O, although superficially like it at normal temperatures and pressures.
let us ignore the complication that our bodies contain lots of $\text{H}_2\text{O}$

further, let’s pretend that no one (on earth or twin earth) knows any chemistry (accomplished in Putnam’s example by ‘rolling the time back to about 1750’)
the two Oscars speculate about chemistry

Oscar₁ (on earth)

true just in case \( H₂O \) contains hydrogen

Oscar₂ (on twin earth)

true just in case \( XYZ \) contains hydrogen
Oscar\textsubscript{1} and Oscar\textsubscript{2} are making different claims (Oscar\textsubscript{1}’s is true and Oscar\textsubscript{2}’s is false)

it would seem to follow that ‘water’ has different meanings on earth and twin earth

just as ‘chicory’ has different meanings in US and British English

‘Cut the pie any way you like, ‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head!’
but doesn’t Putnam’s example also show that thoughts aren’t in the head? Oscar₁ has beliefs about water, Oscar₂ has beliefs about twater.

It was soon realized that Putnam’s example, if it shows anything at all, shows that some mental properties (like the property of believing that water is wet) are not intrinsic.
Putnam’s example arguably shows that differences in the subject’s environment (e.g. $H_2O$ vs. $XYZ$) can by themselves make a mental difference.

Burge’s examples purport to show that differences in the subject’s linguistic community can by themselves make a mental difference.
Alfred has various beliefs about arthritis: that he has had arthritis for years, that stiffening joints are a symptom of arthritis… (all true) and:

that he has arthritis in his thigh (false, because arthritis is an inflammation of the joints)
a ‘counterfactual situation’ (a non-actual possible world) in which Alfred is exactly the same in all intrinsic respects, but lives in a slightly different linguistic community

in this community, ‘arthritis’ applies ‘not only to arthritis, but to various other rheumatoid ailments’

in the language of this community, ‘Alfred has arthritis in his thigh’ is true
an ‘interpretation of the counterfactual case’

Alfred has no beliefs about arthritis (in particular, he doesn’t believe that he has arthritis in his thigh)

instead, he has beliefs about the sort of general rheumatoid ailment that is labeled in his community by the word ‘arthritis’

if we call that ailment ‘tharthritis’, then Alfred believes that he has tharthritis in his thigh
the three stages pictured

Alfred with arthritis beliefs

Alfred (a duplicate of Alfred as he is in @) without arthritis beliefs

@ (the actual world)

w₁ (the counterfactual situation)
three positions:

1. internalism
2. externalism (of the Putnam and Burge sort)
3. ‘we propose to pursue a third position…an active externalism, based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes’
1. mental rotation to assess fit into ‘socket’
2. physical rotation (actual tetris)
3. ‘a neural implant which can perform the rotation as fast as the computer in [2]’
   ‘…all three cases are similar’
   ‘cognitive processes ain’t (all) in the head!’
'one can explain my choice of words in scrabble...as the outcome of an extended cognitive process involving the rearrangement of tiles on my tray...the rearrangement is part of thought'
whether there’s water or twater in the rivers and streams, that ‘plays no role in driving the cognitive processes in the here-and-now’

in the C&C examples, ‘if we remove the external component the system’s behavioral competence will drop, just as it would if we removed part of its brain’
‘perhaps some processing takes place in the environment, but what of mind?’

perhaps ‘truly mental states—experiences, beliefs, desires, emotions, and so on—are all determined by states of the brain’

C&C seem to concede at this point that the rearrangement of the scrabble tiles (etc.) may not be ‘part of thought’

the next step of C&C’s argument attempts to show that beliefs, in particular, ‘extend into the world’
Inga wants to go to MoMA; she recalls that it’s on 53rd, and that’s where she walks.

Inga believed that MoMA is on 53rd before she consulted her memory.

This ‘standing belief’ of Inga’s is part of the explanation of how she successfully arrives at MoMA.
Otto (with damaged biological memory) wants to go to MoMA; he recalls that it’s on 53rd by consulting his notebook, and that’s where he walks.

Otto believed that MoMA is on 53rd before he consulted his notebook.

‘for in relevant respects the cases are entirely analogous: the notebook plays for Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga’
but don’t Otto’s beliefs disappear when he’s not actually consulting his notebook?

that ‘seems to miss the big picture’

‘in both cases the information is reliably there when needed…in just the way we expect a belief to be’
Otto and twin earth

Otto and twin earth

Otto believes that MoMA is on 53rd

Otto_1 (on earth)

Otto_2 believes that MoMA is on 51st

Otto_2 (on twin earth)
reductio ad absurdum?

doesn’t this mean that our beliefs are ‘spread out across the internet’!?
new topic: perception
reading: Searle and Valberg