The table below features the assigned readings for the course.
For suggestions on how to read philosophy more effectively, see Jim Pryor’s Guidelines on Reading Philosophy.
SES # | TOPICS | READINGS |
---|---|---|
1 | The Skeptical Problem | Descartes, René. “First Meditation: On what can be called into doubt.” In Meditations on First Philosophy in which are demonstrated the existence of God and the distinction between the human soul and body (PDF). earlymoderntexts.com. |
2–3 | What is Knowledge? |
Gettier, Edmund L. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23, no. 6 (1963): 121–3. Zagzebski, Linda. “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems.” Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 174 (1994): 65–73. |
4–5 |
Skepticism and Common Sense |
Moore, G. E. “Proof of an External World.” Chapter 9 in Selected Writings. Edited by Thomas Baldwin. Routledge, 1993. ISBN: 9780415098533. ———. “Certainty.” Chapter 10 in Selected Writings. Edited by Thomas Baldwin. Routledge, 1993. ISBN: 9780415098533. [Preview with Google Books] Stroud, Barry. “The Problem of the External World.” Chapter 1 in The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism. Oxford University Press, 1984. ISBN: 9780198247616. |
6–7 | The Closure of Knowledge |
Dretske, Fred. “The Case against Closure.” In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 2nd ed. Edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa. Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. ISBN: 9780470672099. [Preview with Google Books] OptionalHawthorne, John. “The Case for Closure.” In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 2nd ed. Edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa. Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. ISBN: 9780470672099. [Preview with Google Books] |
8–9 | Sensitivity and Safety |
Nozick, Robert. “Knowledge and Skepticism.” Chapter 3 in Philosophical Explanations. Belknap Press, 1983, pp. 172–85 and 197–217. ISBN: 9780674664791. [Preview with Google Books] Sosa, Ernest. “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.” Noûs 33, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 13, Epistemology (1999): 141–53. |
10–11 | Dogmatism and Bootstrapping |
Pryor, James. “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.” Noûs 34, no. 4 (2000): 517–49. Cohen, Stewart. “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, no. 2 (2002): 309–29. |
12–13 | Default Entitlement |
Wright, Crispin. “Scepticism, Certainty, Moore and Wittgenstein (PDF),” st-andrews.ac.uk. 2004. OptionalJenkins, C. S. “Entitlement and Rationality.” Synthese 157, no. 1 (2007): 25–45. |
14–15 | Inference to the Best Explanation |
Vogel, Jonathan. “The Refutation of Skepticism.” In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 2nd ed. Edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa. Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. ISBN: 9780470672099. Russell, Bertrand. “On Induction.” Chapter 6 in The Problems of Philosophy. ditext.com. |
16–17 | Knowledge and Certainty |
Unger, Peter. “An Argument for Skepticism (PDF).” Philosophical Exchange 1 (1974): 1–10. Stanley, Jason. “Knowledge and Certainty.” Philosophical Issues 18, no. 1 (2008): 35–57. |
18–19 | Contextualism and Practical Interests |
Cohen, Stewart. “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.” Noûs 33, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 13, Epistemology (1999): 57–89. Stanley, Jason. “Introduction.” In Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press, 2008. ISBN: 9780199230433. [Preview with Google Books] |
20–22 | The Lottery Paradox |
Hawthorne, John. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press, 2006. ISBN: 9780199287130. |
23–26 | Semantic Externalism |
Putnam, Hilary. “Meaning and Reference.” Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 19 (1973): 699–711. ———. “Brains in a Vat.” Chapter 27 in Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Edited by Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske. Oxford University Press, 2000. ISBN: 9780198752615. Chalmers, David J. “The Matrix as Metaphysics,” consc.net. Horgan, Terence, and John Tienson. “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality,” u.arizona.edu. |